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The thesis explores various sources of commonality in market mispricing and their
underlying drivers and effects. In this context, mispricing is defined and measured by
looking at market anomalies, patterns in prices not explained by conventional asset
pricing models. There has not been a consensus in the literature regarding the reason(s)
why market anomalies appear. Therefore, my investigation of the underlying drivers
that link the phenomenon to mispricing can contribute to our understanding in this
area. In my three main chapters, I consider two main sources of common mispricing in
the market: investors preference for skewness and heterogeneous behaviours of investors
in different states and industries.
In Chapters 2 and 3, I focus on investors preference for skewness. There is an
emerging line of behavioural finance research showing that there is a group of investors in
the market that have a preference to hold positively-skewed positions at the expense of
under-diversification. This preference then leads to stocks with higher levels of skewness
to be overpriced and generate lower market returns. In particular I demonstrate how
the preference for skewness can play a bigger role in explaining market anomalies.
I begin by looking at the profitability premium in Chapter 2. I find that less
profitable firms in the cross-section exhibit higher measures of skewness than their more
profitable counterparts. Because of this, investors with a preference for skewness are
attracted towards less profitable firms and away from more profitable ones, inter alia
contributing to the profitability premium. In Chapter 3, I take a more holistic approach
and consider the common mispricing-related component of 11 prominent market anoma-
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lies. I show that the anomaly strategies, to the extent that are related to mispricing, are
driven by the preference for skewness. I also introduce a factor that captures skewness-
related mispricing and improves the performance of conventional asset pricing models in
explaining anomalies.
Finally, in Chapter 4. I document a phenomenon not studied before. That is,
stocks in specific states and industries have higher levels of mispricing in terms of anoma-
lous market behaviour. The most mispriced states do not necessarily stay mispriced for
longer that 12 months, on average. However, the most mispriced industries continue to
be mispriced even after 60 months. I show that state-level mispricing is likely due to
heterogeneous investor sentiment and noise trading across states. Industry-level mispric-
ing, on the other hand, is linked to earnings forecast errors made by analysts. I believe




Market anomalies are cross-sectional patterns in average stock returns that have not
been explained by exposure to systematic risk factors in asset pricing models (Fama and
French, 2008). Each pattern is attributable to a specific variable that predicts future
returns without capturing an established source of systematic risk. This contradicts
the Efficient Market Hypothesis (Fama, 1970), which states that any cross-sectional
predictability should represent a source of systematic risk. In spite of the longstanding
challenge to asset pricing theory posed by anomalies, no consensus has yet been reached
as to what causes so-called anomaly variables to be priced (Fama, 2014).
Recent developments, however, have shed light on various aspects of market
anomalies. First, anomalies are significantly more pronounced among stocks with greater
arbitrage risks and costs (e.g., Nagel, 2005; Stambaugh et al., 2015). In particular, a
large part of the problem is generated by stocks that anomaly variables predict will un-
derperform (e.g., Hirshleifer et al., 2011; Stambaugh et al., 2012; Avramov et al., 2013).
Miller (1977) argues that this predictability will endure as short-selling impediments
make it highly costly for arbitragers to adjust overpricing compared with underpricing.
Second, greater arbitrage activity – due to either lower transaction costs or more in-
formed market participants – has led to a decay in the performance of anomalies (e.g.,
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Hanson and Sunderam, 2014; Chordia et al., 2014; McLean and Pontiff, 2016).
Lastly, there is evidence that anomalies have common underlying drivers based
on the behaviors of their investor clienteles. For example, Stambaugh et al. (2012, 2014)
argue that investor sentiment explains much of the common variation in anomalies in
the equity market. This is because investors tend to become over-optimistic in periods of
high sentiment, leading to overpricing in the market. However, this effect does not occur
in the bond market due to the different characteristics of its investor clientele (Chordia
et al., 2017).
The points above indicate that anomalies at least partly reflect market mispricing
and, to the extent that this is the case, have commonalities. My studies in this thesis
build on recent advances in behavioral finance and present new common factors that
generate mispricing and thus anomalies.
I begin my thesis by considering preference for skewness as a common driver of
anomalies. The behavioral literature shows that investors at the aggregate level are
particularly interested in positively skewed, or lottery-like, stocks. Investors are willing
to buy these stocks despite holding under-diversified positions (see Mitton and Vorkink,
2007; Brunnermeier et al., 2007). This phenomenon is shown to produce mispricing in
the market in the presence of limits to arbitrage (see, e.g., Mitton and Vorkink, 2007;
Kumar, 2009; Boyer et al., 2010; Bali et al., 2011; Conrad et al., 2014).
In Chapter 2, I investigate preference for skewness as a driver of the mispricing
that leads to the profitability premium. This is based on the work of Novy-Marx (2013)
and Ball et al. (2015) showing that firms more profitable in the cross-section outperform
their less profitable peers. My main conjecture is that the positive skewness, or lottery-
like features, of less profitable firms attract investors with speculative proclivities toward
such stocks and away from more profitable ones. This behavior might translate into a
systematic overvaluation of less profitable firms relative to more profitable ones, giving
rise to the profitability premium.
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Using a sample of US firms, I show that less profitable firms are more positively
skewed, or lottery-like. I employ various measures of lottery characteristics to ensure
that this finding is not due to noisy measurement of skewness. The profitability premium
is also considerably larger and more significant among more lottery-like stocks. Similarly,
more lottery-like stocks tend to be significantly more overvalued when they are relatively
unprofitable. Overall, I find that investors’ preference for lottery-like payoffs can at least
partly explain the profitability premium.
Chapter 3 extends my investigation of investor preference for skewness and shows
that this is a common driver of mispricing across a wide range of market anomalies.
Specifically, I find that skewness-loving investors overweight overpriced stocks in their
portfolios, which contributes to these anomalies. Using a combined measure of mispricing
based on eleven prominent anomaly strategies, I demonstrate that stocks with higher
skewness are significantly more mispriced than those with lower skewness. In particular,
positively skewed stocks are more overpriced in the short portfolios of long-short trading
strategies that are used to exploit anomalies. In contrast, underpricing in long portfolios
does not vary with skewness. Finally, I construct a new factor that captures skewness-
related mispricing and observe that it improves the performance of conventional asset
pricing models in explaining the abnormal returns of anomalies.
In Chapter 4, I move to another growing area of behavioral finance and look at
industry and geography as characteristics that can contribute to anomalies. Geography
and industry are attributes shown to attract common investor clienteles (e.g., Coval and
Moskowitz, 1999; Kacperczyk et al., 2005). There is also evidence demonstrating that
commonality in investor clientele for firms in the same geographic region results in their
biases and behaviors being reflected in prices (Kumar et al., 2013). I conjecture that in
the presence of limits to arbitrage, the behaviors of investor clienteles that concentrate
on specific regions or industries may exacerbate anomalies within these groups.
Following this argument, I show that the mispricing levels of a firm’s geographic
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or industrial peers predict how mispriced the firm will be in future. I apply the com-
bined measure of mispricing that I use in Chapter 3 and find that states and industries
in which anomalies perform better will continue to have more predictable stock returns.
The mispricing levels of industrial peers are stronger predictors of future firm mispricing
that those of geographic peers, but the effect of each group is not absorbed by the other.
Finally, I show that geography and industry lead to mispricing for different reasons. Ge-
ographic mispricing is linked to variations in local investor sentiment, whereas industrial
mispricing is related to misinformation generated by analysts.
Overall, this thesis contributes to the asset pricing literature on market anomalies.
In particular, I highlight further that there are other common factors that can generate
market mispricing and exacerbate anomalies. My findings also add to the behavioral fi-
nance literature that looks at investors’ preference for skewness, investor clientele effects,
and geographic and industrial attributes. I show that these behavioral phenomena may
have asset pricing implications beyond what is already documented in the literature.
They not only help us better understand the shortcomings of asset pricing theory, but
also provide novel insights for devising trading strategies.
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Chapter 2
The Other Side of Lottery: The
Profitability Premium
2.1 Introduction
More profitable firms tend to generate higher average returns than their less
profitable peers in the cross-section. This phenomenon is commonly referred to as the
profitability premium and has attracted considerable academic attention since the early
work of Ball and Brown (1968). Over the years, various measures of firm profitabil-
ity have been proposed, almost all having significant predictive power for future stock
returns. Famous examples of profitability measures include net income before extraordi-
nary items (Ball and Brown, 1968), return on equity (Haugen and Baker, 1996), return
on assets (Chen et al., 2011), and gross profitability (Novy-Marx, 2013). The gross prof-
itability measure has also recently been subject to various refinements leading to even
more robust measures of operating profitability (Ball et al., 2015) and cash profitabil-
ity (Ball et al., 2015). Developments in this field have been so significant that almost
all recent major asset pricing factor models include some variant of profitability as an
explanatory factor (e.g., Chen et al., 2011; Hou et al., 2014; Fama and French, 2015,
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2018).
The assumption behind using profitability as a factor is that the profitability
characteristic is linked to some form of systematic risk. In favor of this argument, Ball
et al. (2015) show that operating profitability can reliably predict returns at least four
years before they occur. The authors argue that this evidence is consistent with a ratio-
nal risk-based explanation for the profitability premium as other behavioral explanations
can normally only justify the return predictability in the short-run. However, Wang and
Yu (2013) cast doubt on a solely risk-based story showing that the profitability char-
acteristic has a better return predictability than the loading on a mimicking factor. In
addition, they find that the profitability premium is not significant among firms that
are easy to arbitrage. Wang and Yu (2013) further argue that investor under-reaction
can act as the main cause of the profitability premium. I contribute to this discussion
by providing a new behavioral explanation suggesting that an opposite reaction to prof-
itability information based on a group of investors’ preferences for positively skewed or
lottery-like payoffs can help explain the profitability premium.
Firms with the highest and the lowest profitability levels in the cross-section,
which are the major drivers of the profitability premium, are fundamentally different.
Less profitable firms are on average smaller, more leveraged and have cheaper, more
illiquid and more volatile shares (Wang and Yu, 2013). These characteristics highlight the
possibility of such stocks being positively skewed or lottery-like (Kumar, 2009; Conrad
et al., 2014). The term lottery-like represents cheap bets with a small probability of a
large payoff (Kumar, 2009). Shares possessing such features are significantly over-priced
in the cross-section (Kumar, 2009; Boyer et al., 2010; Bali et al., 2011). This is because
a lottery-like payoff particularly appeals to the so-called prospect theory investors who
tend to over-weight the tails of the return distribution (Barberis and Huang, 2008). That
is, in a market with only a fraction of investors behaving according to the prospect theory
of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), firms with (without) the lottery-like features become
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under- (over-) priced (Barberis et al., 2016). In fact, Kumar (2009) shows that the main
investor clientele for lottery-like stocks are small (retail), unsophisticated, and from low
socio-economic backgrounds. Therefore, the possible under-reaction of the market to
profitability information may instead be largely driven by the aforementioned preference
simply attracting a host of speculative investors toward less profitable firms and away
from the profitable ones.
Specifically, I test whether the preference for lottery-like features can contribute
to the mispricing of profitability information in the market. The main conjecture is that
less profitable firms are more likely to possess lottery-like features in the cross-section,
making them attractive gambling objects for the investor clientele who tends to favor
such features. Therefore, the degree to which a less-profitable stock possesses lottery-
like features can predict its level of overpricing in the market. The effect of lottery-like
features on more profitable firms, however, is relatively more complex. Although more
profitable firms are expected to be, on average, less-lottery like and, therefore, less
attractive for lottery investors, such firms would be unlikely to attract lottery investors
as much as less-profitable firms even if they were highly lottery-like. This is because
profitable stocks usually perform well in the market and investors of booming stocks are
less likely to demonstrate gambling propensities (Thaler and Johnson, 1990; An et al.,
2018) or to show interest in the lottery-like features. In other words, the mispricing
levels of profitable firms are not linked to their lottery-like features, because these firms
are less likely to trigger the lottery preference in investors. Consequently, the overall
profitability premium is expected to be stronger among the more lottery-like stocks.
I would also expect the pricing implications of the lottery features to be more (less)
pronounced among less (more) profitable firms.
Using a sample of all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks from January 1972 to
December 2015 that meet my selection criteria, I find results that are consistent with the
main propositions outlined above. I observe that there is a negative association between
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profitability and the level of the lottery-like features. This relationship is consistent
across the three profitability proxies used in Ball et al. (2015), i.e. gross profitability,
income before extraordinary items, and operating profitability, and four different promi-
nent proxies of the lottery-like features including the jackpot score (Conrad et al., 2014),
the lottery index (Kumar et al., 2016), the maximum daily return (Bali et al., 2011)),
and the expected idiosyncratic skewness (Boyer et al., 2010).
I test for the role of the lottery preference in driving the profitability premium
by sorting stocks independently based on the profitability and the lottery variables. The
main prediction is that less profitable firms should have lower returns among the stocks
with higher lottery measures, and the overall profitability premium (long on the more
profitable stocks and short on the less profitable ones) should be stronger among the
lottery-like stocks. I also expect the lottery premium to be stronger for less profitable
firms. My empirical double-sorting results strongly support these predictions using var-
ious lottery and profitability measures. Conditional profitability strategies based on the
lottery variables (i.e. replicating the profitability strategies just for the most lottery-like
stocks) generate significantly higher returns than unconditional strategies. For example,
the double sorts on the JACKPOT show that high-JACKPOT stocks generate abnormal
monthly hedge returns for the strategies based on gross profitability, income before ex-
traordinary items, and operating profitability equal to 2.06%, 1.93%, and 2.38%, while
the same profitability strategies generate unconditional hedge abnormal returns of 0.51%,
0.66%, and 0.81%, respectively. A similar pattern can also be observed for the lottery
premiums. For example, the JACKPOT strategy generates hedge JACKPOT abnor-
mal returns between 0.93% and 1.36% among the least profitable firms, whereas the
unconditional JACKPOT strategy yields only 0.7% abnormal monthly hedge returns.
Altogether, the findings indicate that the profitability premiums can be, at least party,
attributable to investors’ preference for the lottery-like features of less-profitable firms
and their aversion to buying and holding on to the profitable firms.
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To gather further support, I investigate the relationship between my variables
using the Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression framework. This time, I test my key
conjecture by adding a lottery and a profitability variable and an interaction between
the two in the regressions. The estimated interaction coefficients test my key conjecture
that the profitability premium is strongest when the stock has lottery-like characteristics.
Again, the results provide corroborating evidence for my predications. A 1-standard-
deviation increase in the lottery measures improves the relationship between profitability
and returns by approximately 0.1% to 0.8%, depending on the measure. The interaction
results are also economically meaningful. For instance, a conditional strategy based on
both the gross profitability and the JACKPOT measures outperforms an unconditional
strategy by approximately 50%. Overall, the findings sharply highlight the role of the
lottery-like features in generating the profitability premium. Nevertheless, I should note
that my behavioral factor is not the only driving force; the profitability variables can
still significantly predict returns after controlling for the lottery-like measures and their
interactions with profitability.
My findings contribute to various streams of literature in finance. First, I build
on the pervious accounting and finance literature investigating the profitability premium
(e.g., Novy-Marx, 2013; Ball et al., 2015, 2016) and provide a new behavioral explanation
for the phenomenon. Considering that a consensus has not yet been reached as to why the
profitability information is priced (Ball et al., 2015) and that profitability is now a well-
established asset-pricing factor (Fama and French, 2015), my results can help researchers
better understand the underlying sources of the profitability premium. In line with the
findings of Wang and Yu (2013), I conclude that mispricing is at least partly responsible
for the premium. Unlike, Wang and Yu (2013), however, my evidence is not in favor of
an inattentive under-reaction to the profitability information, but rather is consistent
with an opposite or an intentionally-delayed reaction due to the lottery preference. I
also contribute to the behavioral finance literature that investigates the implications of
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the lottery preference in asset pricing (e.g., Barberis and Huang, 2008; Kumar, 2009;
Boyer et al., 2010; Bali et al., 2011). Several recent studies have accomplished solving
asset pricing puzzles by referring them to the preference for lottery-like assets (Lemmon
and Ni, 2008; Boyer and Vorkink, 2014; Conrad et al., 2014; Kausar et al., 2015). My
results further highlight the importance of such behavior, implying that it may be an
important determinant of how markets react to adverse news more generally.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 provides the
background and my testable hypotheses. Section 2.3 describes the sample, the variable
construction procedure and the single sorting results for various lottery and profitability
strategies used in the paper. Section 2.4 outlines the main results including the double
sort and the regressions, and Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Background and Hypotheses
Evidence on the pricing implications of profitability information goes back to the early
work of Ball and Brown (1968), showing that net income before extraordinary items
predicts cross-sectional returns. Ever since, a number of papers have documented sim-
ilar findings (e.g., Haugen and Baker, 1996; Griffin and Lemmon, 2002; Cohen et al.,
2002; Fama and French, 2006, 2008); however, there is no clear explanation for the
phenomenon. Recently, Novy-Marx (2013) attracted more attention to the issue by in-
troducing a more refined measure, gross profitability, which he claimed is less prone to
the accounting noise often undermining the bottom-line net income. Ball et al. (2015)
built on this study and demonstrated that the predicative powers of gross profitability
and net income before extraordinary items are actually not significantly different when
both measures are deflated by total assets. However, one can still devise a more refined
profitability measure to achieve extra return predictability by deducting only the noisy
income statement items between gross profits and net income. Following this notion,
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Ball et al. (2015) proposed the operating profitability measure, which beats the previous
two measures in predicting cross-sectional returns.
There are two main camps of thought on the possible causes of the profitability
effect. The first group adopts a rational explanation for the phenomenon by linking the
profitability premium to systematic risk. This has led to profitability being accepted
as a major factor in recent asset pricing models (e.g., Chen et al., 2011; Hou et al.,
2014; Fama and French, 2015, 2018). In fact, adding a profitability factor significantly
improves the performance of contemporary factor models in capturing cross-sectional
abnormal returns attributable to various anomalies (Ball et al., 2015; Novy-Marx, 2013).
Fama and French (2015) justify the profitability factor by linking it to expected future
earnings in the context of Miller and Modigliani (1961). Nevertheless, there is no well-
established justification for profitability representing (or being associated with) a source
of systematic risk, apart from the evidence from Ball et al. (2015), showing that it has
long-term return predictability. In fact, Ball et al. (2015) themselves indicate that the
evidence in favor of the rational explanation is not conclusive.
The second camp of research links the profitability premium to mispricing, mainly
in behavioral contexts. The dominant argument here is that investors do not pay at-
tention to profitability information, leading to a systematic under-reaction (e.g., Cohen
et al., 2002; Wang and Yu, 2013; Daniel and Titman, 2016). In a comprehensive study,
Wang and Yu (2013) found no link between the profitability premium and the traditional
sources of macro risk. Furthermore, they showed that the profitability characteristic has
a better return predictability than the loading on a mimicking factor, suggesting that
risk plays only a marginal role in explaining the premium. More importantly, Wang
and Yu (2013) found that the profitability premium is not statistically significant among
firms that are easy to arbitrage, again contrary to the rational explanation. On the
other hand, firms with more inattentive investors based on the measure of Hong and
Stein (1999) demonstrated a stronger effect. Altogether, the findings highlight the role
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of mispricing in explaining the puzzle.
Recent developments in behavioral finance have established that investors show
a strong preference for the right tail of return distributions, i.e. positively skewed or
lottery-like payoffs (e.g., Barberis and Huang, 2008; Kumar, 2009; Boyer et al., 2010;
Bali et al., 2011). Similarly, investors do not show interest and systematically tilt away
from stocks that are less likely to generate lottery-like payoffs (Barberis et al., 2016).
In asset pricing terms, this immediately translates into the over- (under-) pricing of
positively (negatively) skewed payoffs, as modelled by Barberis and Huang (2008) and
Brunnermeier et al. (2007). This preference for the lottery-like features is particularly
pronounced among retail investors at the aggregate level. These investors are willing
to buy stocks with lottery-like features in spite of the fact that such investments are
often not justified by rational models of risk and return (Goetzmann and Kumar, 2008;
Kumar, 2009; Kumar et al., 2011).
Kumar et al. (2016) recently demonstrated that these gambling-like trades are a
significant source of co-movement in stock returns, in particular among stocks that are
considered attractive gambling objects and when local investors have a higher propensity
to gamble. A number of studies have also attempted to explain market anomalies using
the lottery preference. For example, Kausar et al. (2015) showed that stocks with going-
concern issues have the lottery-like characteristics and that retail investors are respon-
sible for most of their trades, leading to a market under-reaction to the going-concern
announcements. Conrad et al. (2014) linked the distress anomaly to the overvaluation
of stocks with high jackpot probabilities. Other examples of anomalies attributed to
the lottery preference include the post-earnings announcement drift (Jiao, 2017), IPO
first-day returns (Aissia, 2014), and option mispricing (Lemmon and Ni, 2008; Boyer
and Vorkink, 2014). As far as profitability is concerned, less profitable firms are, on
average, overpriced, whereas profitable firms are undervalued. Therefore, in order for
the preference for the lottery-like payoffs to act as an explanation for the mispricing,
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one would expect the lottery-like features to be more prevalent among less-profitable
firms. This means that the lottery-like features would, on average, attract investors who
favor such features to buy less-profitable firms, or to not sell them when they become
unprofitable, and this prevents the price from being adjusted. Similarly, profitable firms
would be perceived as more unfavorable by some investors simply because they do not
have appealing lottery-like payoffs, contributing to their underpricing.
The more lottery-like a stock with low profitability is, the more overpriced it will
likely become. This is because when an investment is loss-making, which is typically
the case for a firm with low levels of profitability, its loss-averse investors will become
risk-seeking and will have a stronger tendency to gamble to break even (Thaler and
Johnson, 1990). Therefore, investors are more likely to hold on to less-profitable firms
with the lottery-like features. For profitable firms, however, the relationship between
the lottery-like features and mispricing is less evident as the loss-aversion tendencies of
investors are not triggered. In this case, on one hand, the lottery-like features would
attract investors with gambling preferences in spite of how profitable the firm is because
of the reasons discussed above. On the other hand, investors of profitable firms are
usually more risk-averse as they are more likely to be in the gain regions of their value
functions, according to the framework of Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Therefore,
these investors might avoid buying the lottery-like firms as such firms often have higher
idiosyncratic volatility and significant liquidity concerns (Kumar, 2009). Such risks
would not only deter arbitragers from holding on to the lottery-like stocks and adjusting
the underpricing related to profitability, but might also override the gambling preferences
of less-sophisticated investors. An et al. (2018) studied this effect in the context of
past gains and losses and found that the negative relationship between the lottery-like
characteristics and abnormal returns becomes reversed following prior capital gains. This
means that the lottery-like characteristics completely lose their attractiveness for firms
that are doing well. These arguments constitute my testable hypotheses:
13
H1: More (less) profitable firms are less (more) likely to possess the lottery-
like features.
H2: Lottery-like features increase the profitability premium (abnormal return
of buying more profitable stocks and selling less-profitable ones) by generating
overpricing in less-profitable stocks.
2.3 Sample and Data
The sample consists of all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ firms with available data from
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) daily and monthly stock return files
and Compustat Fundamentals Quarterly files for the period January 1972 to December
2015 (the period for which quarterly data are available). In addition, quarterly data
on institutional stock holdings from the Thomson Reuters (formerly CDA/Spectrum)
are incorporated. Following Ball et al. (2015), all firms with negative book equity or
belonging to the financial sector (6000 ≤ SIC ≤ 6999) are excluded from the sample.
Due to microstructure-related issues discussed in Macey et al. (2008), all monthly and
daily CRSP observations are required to have a share price greater than or equal to $1.
In case of missing returns, delisting returns are used if available. Also, for shareholders’
equity, missing values are replaced with the value of common equity, if available, or total
assets minus total liabilities. If still missing, the Davis et al. (2000) book values of equity
from Professor Kenneth French’s data library.1
2.3.1 Definition of Main Variables
Three profitability measures of income before extraordinary items (Compustat IBQ),
gross profits [total revenues (Compustat REVTQ) minus cost of goods sold (Compustat
COGSQ)], and operating profits [gross profits minus selling, general, and administrative
1See http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/.
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expenses (Compustat XSGAQ) plus research and development expenses (XRDQ)] are
considered in this study, following Ball et al. (2015). All three measures are deflated
by the total book value of assets (Compustat ATQ). This choice is motivated by the
finding of Ball et al. (2015) that showed profit measures deflated by the book value of
total assets provide better return predictability than those deflated by other frequently
used alternatives such as the book and the market value of equity. Unlike Ball et al.
(2015), however, I use quarterly data instead of annual data for all accounting variables
throughout this study. This is in order to capture the most current publicly available
information in the tests.
Following the behavioral finance literature, four major measures of return skew-
ness (or lottery-like payoff) are adopted:
Jackpot score (JACKPOT): Conrad et al. (2014) used a logit model at the end
of June of every year to predict the out-of-sample probability of a stock generating a log
return greater than 100% in the next 12 months. Variables used in the logit regression
are the stock’s (log) return over the last 12 months, volatility and skewness of daily log
returns over the past three months, de-trended stock turnover [(six-month volume/shares
outstanding) – (18-month volume/shares outstanding)], and log market capitalization.
The model is estimated following a rolling window approach using the data from the past
20 years. For my sample, this starts in July 1952 to get the parameters used in 1972.
After estimating the logit model at the end of June of year t, the estimated parameters
are used together with the most recently available data to estimate a jackpot score for
every stock from July of year t to the end of June of year t+ 1.
Lottery index (LIDX): Following Kumar et al. (2016), the lottery index is de-
fined as the sum of the vigintile allocation of stocks with respect to price, idiosyncratic
volatility, and idiosyncratic skewness divided by 60. All stocks in the sample are sorted
at the end of each month based on the three characteristics to compute the lottery index
for the following month. Price is the monthly closing price. Idiosyncratic volatility is
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defined as the standard deviation of the residuals from fitting the four-factor model of
Carhart (1997) on the past six months’ daily return data. Idiosyncratic skewness refers
to the skewness of residuals obtained from a two-factor model estimated using the past
six months’ daily return data, with the two factors being the market factor and its square
(Kumar, 2009).
Maximum daily return (MAXRET): Bali et al. (2011) define this as the maximum
daily return in the previous month.
Expected idiosyncratic skewness (ESKEW): Following Boyer et al. (2010), this is
defined by running a cross-sectional regression at the end of every month using the most
recent five years of data to predict the daily idiosyncratic skewness of stocks estimated
over the following five years. Variables used in the regression include the historical
estimates of daily idiosyncratic volatility and skewness relative to the Fama-French three-
factor model over the past 60 months, momentum as the cumulative returns over months
t − 12 through t − 1, turnover as the average daily turnover in month t − 1, small-size
and medium-size market capitalization dummies (based on sorts of firms by market
capitalization into three groups of small, medium and large), industry dummy based on
the Fama-French 17 industries, and the NASDAQ dummy. After estimating the model
at the end of every month t, the parameters are used together with the most recent
data to get out-of-sample expected idiosyncratic skewness estimates for months t + 61
through t+ 120.
2.3.2 Summary Statistics
Panel A of Table 2.1 provides a summary of the properties of quintile portfolios based
on the three profitability measures. Following Novy-Marx (2013), quintiles are created
by sorting firms at the beginning of every month based on the most recent quarterly
profitability data available at the end of the previous month (following a firm’s report
date of quarterly earnings, Compustat item RDQ). The results demonstrate that firms’
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size and share price, on average, increase with the level of profitability. That is, more
profitable firms are relatively larger and have higher share prices. Also, more profitable
firms tend to have significantly lower leverage ratios compared to their less profitable
counterparts. These patterns are consistent across the three profitability measures. The
differences in the average age of profitable and non-profitable firms, however, are not
consistent across the three measures. Less-profitable firms based on gross profitability
are, on average, older than the profitable firms, while this relationship is reversed once
other profitability measures are considered.
Less-profitable firms also tend to have, on average, higher total and idiosyncratic
volatility levels, and lower liquidity, according to the Amihud (2002) measure. This is
consistent with the previous papers showing that less-profitable firms are considerably
more volatile and face significant shorting barriers (e.g., Wang and Yu, 2013). As a result,
one would also expect institutions to be less interested in holding less-profitable firms
than more-profitable firms. The data clearly backs up this argument; however, institu-
tions still tend to hold, on average, approximately 20% of the total market capitalization
of the less-profitable firms, which is not a negligible figure. Moreover, profitable firms
have significantly higher past 12-month returns and abnormal turnover ratios [based on
the measure of Chen et al. (2001)]. I will later explain that both of these attributes are
consistent with the model of Hong and Stein (2003), showing that stocks with higher
abnormal turnover and past returns tend to become negatively skewed. Similarly, less-
profitable firms have lower past returns and abnormal turnovers, which would cause
them to become positively skewed.
2.3.3 Profitability Anomaly and Single Sorts
In this section I present the results of preforming single sorts based on the profitability
and the lottery variables. This is to show that the variables have pricing implications
beyond what is captured by the systematic risk factors. Table 2.2 presents the monthly
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value weighted abnormal returns of the quintiles of the three profitability and the four
lottery measures. Three risk adjustment models from Fama and French (1993), Carhart
(1997), and Fama and French (2015) are used to achieve abnormal returns. For com-
parison purposes, the profitability strategies are replicated using both the annual and
the quarterly data. The quarterly strategies are based on sorting stocks at the begin-
ning of every month for which returns are measured, using the most recent quarterly
announcement data. Annual strategies are replicated following the methodology of Ball
et al. (2015). That is, first, all stocks are sorted at the end of every June using the most
recent annual data released in the previous calendar year. Then, the portfolio returns
are measured from July until the end of June of the next year. The lottery strategies
are based on monthly sorts of stocks using the four variables explained in the previous
section.
Panels A and B of Table 2.2 report the results for the profitability strategies. The
three- and the four-factor hedge (buying quintile 5 and selling quintile 1) portfolio alphas
are statistically significant at the 5% level for all of the annual and quarterly profitability
strategies. Consistent with the findings of Ball et al. (2015), the gross profitability
strategy actually tends to generate the lowest abnormal hedge returns among the three
profitability strategies. Moreover, in almost all cases, the quarterly strategies generate
more statistically and economically significant hedge returns than the annual strategies,
which is consistent with the findings of Novy-Marx (2013). The hedge returns tend be
driven mostly by the short leg, except those based on the gross profitability measure.
In fact, in most cases, the short leg is more than twice as large as the long leg for the
quarterly data.
Interestingly, the hedge alphas based on the five-factor model, which includes a
profitability factor, are also all statistically significant apart from the one based on the
annual income before extraordinary items. This is in line with the findings of Wang
and Yu (2013), showing that the abnormal returns are not all attributable to systematic
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risk and could be mispricing-related. Nevertheless, the factor used in the Fama and
French (2015) model is based on operating profitability to assets, which is different from
the three measures used here. Fama and French (2018) show that the choice of the
profitability factor can make a significant difference in the magnitude of alphas. In other
words, a better profitability factor could capture the abnormal returns currently left
unexplained by the five-factor model.
Panel C of Table 2.2 presents the replication results for the four return skewness
(lottery) measures. The three- and the four-factor hedge alphas show that the lottery
index (LIDX) of Kumar et al. (2016) generates the highest abnormal returns. This is
followed by the jackpot score (JACKPOT) of Conrad et al. (2014), the maximum returns
(MAXRET) of Bali et al. (2011), and the expected idiosyncratic skewness (ESKEW)
of Boyer and Vorkink (2014), in that order. The LIDX is still in the lead with the
five-factor model; however, ESKEW seems to beat the other two measures this time.
Nevertheless, all measures are statistically and economically significant. As the returns
to these strategies are mostly driven by the extreme cases, one would expect the hedge
returns to be significantly larger once deciles are used instead of quintiles. However,
since the tests in the rest of this paper are mostly based on quintile sorts, the deciles
sorting results are not reported.
2.4 Results
This section presents the main empirical results. First, I investigate how various skewness
(lottery) measures vary with profitability and can attract investors based on the different
natures of profitable and non-profitable firms. Next, the role of skewness is examined in
determining the profitability premiums through regressions and double sorts.
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2.4.1 4.1. Are Less-profitable Firms More Lottery-like?
In this section, I compare how various return skewness or lottery-like payoff measures
change across the profitability quintiles. Panel B of Table 2.1 presents the average values
of the four skewness measures outlined in Subsection 2.3.1 for the quarterly quintiles
based on the three profitability proxies. Increase in all four lottery proxies indicates a
more positively skewed or lottery-like return distribution. Consistent across all measures,
the propensity for a stock to have a lottery-like payoff distribution increases as it becomes
less profitable. The difference between the lottery scores of the profitable (quintile 5)
and non-profitable (quintile 1) firms are all statistically significant at the 1% level. These
differences seem to be significantly larger for the sorts based on operating profitability
and income before extraordinary items. Moreover, in almost all cases, there seems to
be a jump in value from quintile 1 to 2, suggesting a considerable concentration of
the lottery-like features in quintile 1, which consists of the least-profitable firms. The
results so far provide supporting evidence for the first hypothesis. That is, the lottery
measures, on average, decrease with profitability. This predicts that less-sophisticated
investors should, on average, be more attracted to less-profitable firms than profitable
firms.
Although explaining why less (more) profitable firms are more likely to have
positively (negatively) skewed returns is beyond the scope of this study, one can still
reasonably speculate based on the characteristics observed so far. Less-profitable firms
are on average smaller, more volatile, and have significantly lower past returns and
turnover. All of these characteristics are documented by Chen et al. (2001) to relate
to positive skewness. Now, it is not clear whether such characteristics are caused by
low profitability itself or by some other unknown variable. However, the argument of
Chen et al. (2001) still holds here; firms generally have strong tendencies to hide bad
information and this particularly becomes a problem when bad news is more frequent
and the firm faces less external scrutiny due to its small size. The market already knows
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this, therefore, takes a pessimistic view of these firms. Consequently, the market would
only be surprised once positive news comes out, as there always is a continuous and slow
stream of previously hidden bad news. The sudden positive reaction of the market to
occasional positive news leads to a positively skewed or lottery-like returns distribution.
For profitable firms, on the other hand, the story is slightly more complex. These
firms are large and have significant past returns and turnover. Hong and Stein (2003)
show that high past abnormal turnover is a proxy for significant difference in opinion
among investors. In a world with shorting constraints, this would mean that, ordinarily,
only the buying activity of bullish investors is reflected in prices, leading to high average
returns. However, when there is very bad news about the firm, some of the previously
bearish investors may enter the market and buy if they believe that the news is not
credible or that the market has over-reacted. This way, the stock price would change
much more in response to bad news than to good news, leading to a negative skewness.
2.4.2 Double Sorts
As shown previously, profitability tends to have a negative relationship with the lottery
proxies. I now examine how the return predictability of the three profitability measures
relies on the stock’s lottery characteristics. This is done by independently sorting stocks
at the end of every month into five profitability and five lottery groups and then looking
at the value-weighted returns of the intersecting portfolios for the following month.
Tables 2.3 to 2.6 present the double sorting results based on the JACKPOT, the LIDX,
the MAXRET, and the ESKEW, respectively. The results include value-weighted raw
and abnormal returns based on the four-factor model (Carhart, 1997).
Consistent across Tables 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6, the profitability premiums (buying
the more profitable quintile and selling the least profitable one) based on the three strate-
gies increase monotonically with the lottery measures. That is, conditional profitability
strategies based on the lottery variables generate significantly higher returns than uncon-
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ditional strategies. Taking the double sorts on the JACKPOT in Table 2.3, for example,
high-JACKPOT stocks (quintile 5) generate abnormal monthly hedge returns for the
strategies based on gross profitability, income before extraordinary items and operating
profitability equal to 2.06%, 1.93%, and 2.38%, respectively. This is while the same
profitability strategies generate unconditional hedge abnormal returns of 0.51%, 0.66%,
and 0.81%, respectively (reported in Table 2.2). Low-JACKPOT stocks also tend to
yield statistically significant profitability premia, but the abnormal hedge returns are
about five times smaller than those of the high-JACKPOT stocks.
A similar pattern can also be observed for the lottery premia. That is, the previ-
ously documented abnormal returns attributable to the strategy of shorting high-lottery
stocks and buying low-lottery stocks seem to be mostly driven by the lowest-profitability
stocks. For example, the JACKPOT double sorts in Table 2.3 report hedge JACKPOT
abnormal returns between 0.93% and 1.36%. This compares with an unconditional
JACKPOT strategy that yields only 0.7% abnormal monthly hedge returns. For prof-
itable firms, on the other hand, the lottery premiums are not statistically significant or
even negative in a few cases. This interesting observation is similar to the finding of An
et al. (2018), that the lottery strategy returns become reversed following capital gains.
In fact, the abnormal hedge returns of the high-profitability quintiles increase monoton-
ically with the lottery measures in most cases. The differences in returns between the
extreme quintiles, however, are statistically significant only in a few instances. Actually,
in contrast to the abnormal returns of the least-profitable stocks, which almost com-
pletely vanish in the low-lottery quintiles, the most-profitable stocks generate positive
and significant abnormal returns both in the high- and in the low-lottery groups. This is
in line with my prediction regarding the two countervailing forces driving the abnormal
returns of the profitable firms.
Altogether, the findings highlight a positive relationship between the profitability
premiums and the lottery characteristics measured using different proxies. This is in line
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with my second hypothesis suggesting that the profitability premia can be attributable
to investors’ preference for the lottery-like features of less-profitable firms and their
aversion to buying and holding on to the profitable firms.
2.4.3 Fama Macbeth Regressions
The results in the previous subsection provide corroborating evidence for my second hy-
pothesis by demonstrating a simple and intuitive relationship between profitability and
the lottery-like feature. However, double sorting does not immediately allow us to com-
pare the magnitude and the significance of the relationship across my measures. Also, one
cannot explicitly control for other variables in a sorting methodology. To address these
issues, I ran a series of Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions. The effect of the lottery
features on the relationship between profitability and return was investigated through
running regressions separately within the lottery quintiles and using interaction terms,
which are reported in the sections below. Following the main profitability studies (e.g.,
Novy-Marx, 2013; Ball et al., 2015), I use four main control variables in all regressions
including the natural logarithms of the market value of equity and the book-to-market
ratio, the previous month return and the return for the past 12 months excluding the
past month. The regressions are estimated using quarterly profitability and monthly
lottery variables, explained in Subsection 2.3.1, from January 1972 to December 2015.
All independent variables are standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard devi-
ation of one in the pooled distribution across the whole sample. To eliminate outliers,
all explanatory variables are winsorized at their 5th and 95th percentiles.
2.4.3.1 Regressions by Quintile
Table 2.7 presents the Fama-Macbeth regression coefficients estimated separately for the
three profitability measures. For illustration purposes, the sample used for estimation
was broken down into five quintiles based on the lottery proxies. That is, the regressions
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are estimated separately within each lottery quintile. The regression models contain
only one profitability variable and the four control variables mentioned above (for more
details, please see the description in Table 2.7). Only the profitability coefficients are
reported in the table. The estimated coefficients indicate that the three profitability
variables tend to have highly statistically significant predicting powers for the future
returns. This relationship is robust in all of the lottery quintile sub-samples. However,
the coefficients increase monotonically as one moves from the low-lottery to the high-
lottery sub-samples. This is in line with my previous findings that the predictive power
of profitability is driven mostly by the high-lottery stocks. Nevertheless, the sub-sample
results in this subsection are for illustration only and I do not seek to draw any statistical
inference about the conditional effect of the lottery characteristics.
Consistent with the sorting results, the operating profitability (OP) measure
has generally the largest and the most significant coefficients. A 1-standard-deviation
increase in the OP is, on average, associated with an approximate 1% to 4% increase
in the future monthly returns, depending on the lottery sub-sample. After OP, income
before extraordinary items (IB) has the strongest coefficients. Gross profitability (GP),
although the weakest among the three measures, still has significant statistical power
with the coefficients ranging from 0.3% to 1%. The division into lottery sub-samples
seems to carve out the most drastic spread in the coefficients for the OP measure.
The difference between the OP coefficients in the high- and the low-lottery sub-samples
exceeds 1% in all cases.
I have repeated the same regression exercise for the four lottery measures, this
time estimated separately within five profitability sub-samples. Table 2.8 presents the
estimated Fama-Macbeth coefficients of the four lottery measures. The LIDX generally
tends to have the largest coefficients, followed by JACKPOT, MAXRET, and ESKEW.
In line with the sorting results, the return predictabilities of all four lottery variables
appear to be stronger for the less-profitable firms. Also, the spreads between the lottery
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coefficients of the highest- and the lowest-profitability firms are larger for JACKPOT
and ESKEW. In fact, for these two measures, the lottery variables do not have any
statistically significant power to predict the returns of the profitable stocks. Altogether,
the results of this subsection provide supporting evidence for my predictions. In the
next subsection, I will use the Fama-Macbeth regression framework to test my second
hypothesis in a more rigorous way.
2.4.3.2 Regressions with Interaction Term
To identify and test the role of the lottery-like features in generating the profitability
premium, I again estimated a series of Fama-Macbeth regressions for my various proxies.
However, this time, I add both a lottery and a profitability variable and an interaction
between the two (lottery × profitability) in every regression. The estimates of this
interaction term test my key conjecture that the profitability premium is strongest when
a stock has the lottery-like characteristics. At the same time, the individual profitability
and lottery explanatory variables capture the direct effects of the two variables.
Table 2.9 presents the baseline regression results. The table includes 12 sub-
sections for different combinations of my profitability and lottery variables. The 12
interaction terms, except one for the interaction between IB and ESKEW, are all highly
statistically significant and positive. This indicates that the profitability premium is
strongest for stocks that have high-lottery features. A 1-standard-deviation increase
in the lottery measures improves the relationship between profitability and returns by
approximately 0.1% to 0.8%, depending on the measure. The positive interaction terms
also mean that the lottery features are better linked to the future returns once a firm
is less profitable. Among the profitability measures, the OP tends to have a stronger
interaction with the lottery measures. For the lottery measures, on the other hand,
JACKPOT generates larger and more significant interaction coefficients. For the rest of
the measures, the results are slightly mixed and not directly comparable.
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The odd columns (1, 3, 5, and 7) in Table 2.9 provide estimation results for the
same regression models without interaction terms. It is interesting to observe that the
profitability effect tends to absorb the lottery effect of the LIDX and the ESKEW once
both variables are included in the regressions. This is demonstrated by insignificant
coefficients of the two measures once a profitability measure is added in the regressions.
Considering that all of the lottery measures have a very significant return predictability,
the fact that the profitability variables can account for their role highlights how closely
the lottery and profitability are related to one another. Interestingly, some of these
insignificant coefficients become significant again once an interaction term is added.
This suggests that the lack of significance issue may be due partly to the estimated
lottery variables capturing the omitted interaction effects.
The interaction results are also economically meaningful. For example, looking
at column 2 of Panel A, which includes the GP and the JACKPOT, the interaction
term is almost half of the size of the GP and the JACKPOT coefficients. This means
that a conditional strategy based on both the GP and the JACKPOT outperforms an
unconditional strategy by approximately 50%. However, this was a relatively extreme
case, as for the rest of the measures the interaction coefficients range from 20% to 60%
of the profitability coefficients. Collectively, the results in this section provide strong
evidence for my second hypothesis.
2.4.3.3 Robustness Check
In this subsection, I investigate whether the effect of the lottery-like features on the
profitability premium can be captured by other firm characteristics. In particular, I
consider four major stock variables including the market value of equity, book-to-market
ratio, and past short-term and long-term returns. I also incorporate two prominent
proxies for liquidity and arbitrage costs including the illiquidity measure of Amihud
(2002) and the institutional ownership ratio. These variables control for any liquidity
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concerns that may be captured by our lottery measures. The construction details of all
these variables are explained in Table 2.1.
To investigate whether any of the six variables stated above drives the results, I
add all these variables together with their interactions with the profitability measures
to the regression models of Table 2.9. By doing this, I can check whether the new
interaction terms can absorb the coefficients on the interactions between lottery and
profitability.
I present the results of this robustness test in Table 2.10. All the interactions
between the lottery and the profitability measures remain highly statistically and eco-
nomically significant after controlling for the new variables. The only exception is the
interaction between IB and ESKEW, which is not statistically significant even in the
original model in Table 2.9. Most of the new interaction coefficients are not statistically
significant, expect those including illiquidity and institutional ownership. This finding
indicates that liquidity and arbitrage costs play a role in generating the profitability
premium. However, these variables still cannot capture the effect of the lottery-like
features.
Taken together, the robustness check results indicate that the role of the lottery-
like features in generating the profitability premium is unlikely to be related to other
stock characteristics unrelated to investors’ preference for lottery-like assets. Impor-
tantly, I show that the lottery-like features do not indirectly capture liquidity or arbitrage
costs, which could be a major concern.
2.5 Conclusion and Discussion
Accounting and finance literature have long reported the power of firm profitability in
predicting future stock returns (e.g., Haugen and Baker, 1996; Griffin and Lemmon,
2002; Cohen et al., 2002; Fama and French, 2006, 2008). That is, more profitable firms
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outperform less profitable ones in the cross-section of stock returns. Recent more re-
fined profitability measures (e.g., Novy-Marx, 2013; Ball et al., 2015, 2016) are, in fact,
so robust that they have been used to construct new factors in the latest asset-pricing
models (e.g., Chen et al., 2001; Hou et al., 2014; Fama and French, 2015, 2018). Adding
a profitability factor significantly improves the performance of previous factor models
in capturing cross-sectional abnormal returns generated by various anomaly strategies
(Novy-Marx, 2013; Fama and French, 2016). Nevertheless, the literature has not yet
explicitly defined why there is a premium attributable to profitability. In a recent study,
Wang and Yu (2013) find corroborating evidence for mispricing due to information un-
certainty and investor inattention as the main driver of the profitability premium. In
this paper, I propose a novel behavioral explanation and link the return predictability
of profitability information to investors’ preference for lottery-like payoffs. Motivated
by the recent behavioral studies (e.g., Barberis and Huang, 2008; Kumar, 2009; Boyer
et al., 2010; Bali et al., 2011), my story is that the lottery-like features of less profitable
firms attract investors with the lottery preferences toward less profitable firms and away
from more profitable ones, leading to a mispricing.
I address the research question in two main steps. First, I explore whether less
profitable firms have higher measures of lottery-like features than more profitable ones.
At this stage, I expect to observe that less-profitable firms are more lottery-like leading to
them becoming overpriced. Similarly, more profitable firms are not expected to have high
lottery measures. Considering that profitability can significantly predict the future four
years of returns (Ball et al., 2015), I would anticipate less-profitable firms in the cross-
section to continue to be relatively more lottery-like, remaining attractive investment
options for the lottery investors. In the second step, I explore the effect of the lottery-
like features on the profitability premium. In particular, I test whether the profitability
premium is stronger among more lottery-like stocks and, similarly, whether the lottery
premium is more pronounced among less profitable stocks. My expectation is that the
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profitability premium is larger and more significant among the more lottery-like stocks.
Also, since my proposition relies on a two-way relationship between profitability and
the lottery-like features, I predict that the lottery premium is larger among the less
profitable stocks.
I use a sample of all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ firms with available data from
the CRSP daily and monthly stock return files and Compustat Fundamentals Quarterly
files for the period January 1972 to December 2015. Following Ball et al. (2015), I use
three profitability proxies of gross profitability, income before extraordinary items and
operating profitability. Also, I use four of the most prominent proxies of the lottery-like
features including the jackpot score (Conrad et al., 2014), the lottery index (Kumar
et al., 2016), the maximum daily return (Bali et al., 2011)), and the expected idiosyn-
cratic skewness (Boyer et al., 2010). The results indicate that there is a negative re-
lationship between the lottery tendencies of a stock using my four measures and that
stock’s profitability level. In other words, less profitable firms are, on average, more
lottery-like than more profitable ones. This relationship is also consistent for at least a
four-year event period around the announcement.
I test my second hypothesis using double-sorting and Fama and MacBeth (1973)
regression methodologies. The results from the both methods indicate that an interaction
between the lottery-like features and profitability has a significant power in predicting
future returns, beyond what is captured by the individual effects of the two variables. In
other words, the profitability premium is stronger and more significant among the more
lottery-like stocks and it is more robust among the less-profitable stocks. These findings
are in line with my main conjecture that the profitability premium is at least partly
attributable to investors’ preference for lottery-like assets. However, my explanation,
clearly, does not explain the whole profitability premium as the least lottery-like stocks
still demonstrate marginally significant profitability premiums in some cases. In other
words, not all of the mispricing, if in fact the whole phenomenon can be categorized
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as such, is driven by the lottery-like stocks. In fact, the positive abnormal returns
generated by the most profitable stocks are highly significant in all my lottery sub-
samples. Therefore, my theory leaves a large part of the premium that is driven by
the profitable stocks unexplained. The reason is that I do not explicitly justify positive
returns (underpricing) but rather focus on the negative ones (overpricing). I also do not
explicitly investigate the underlying trades that lead to, or exacerbate, the mispricing.
I therefore build on the previous papers in this area (e.g., Kumar, 2009; Kausar et al.,
2015) and argue that unsophisticated retail investors, who are found to be the main
trading clientele of lottery-like assets, trade stocks in a direction that is the opposite to
what the stocks’ profitability levels indicate they should be traded.
My study contributes to the finance and accounting literature investigating the
profitability premium (e.g., Novy-Marx, 2013; Ball et al., 2015, 2016). My study provides
a novel explanation for the profitability premium showing that the mispricing due to the
preference of a group of investors for the lottery-like assets is at least partly causing the
phenomenon. I also contribute to the behavioral finance literature looking at the lottery
preference in asset pricing (e.g., Barberis and Huang, 2008; Kumar, 2009; Boyer et al.,
2010; Bali et al., 2011). My findings suggest that investors’ preference for lottery-like




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.2: Quintile Portfolio Analysis
This table presents the monthly value-weighted abnormal returns of the quintiles of the three profitability
and the four lottery measures. Three risk adjustment models of Fama and French (1993), Carhart (1997),
and Fama and French (2015) are used to achieve abnormal returns. The profitability strategies are
replicated using both the annual and the quarterly data. The quarterly strategies are based on sorting
stocks at the beginning of every month for which returns are measured, using the most recent quarterly
announcement data. For the annual strategies, first all stocks are sorted at the end of every June using
the most recent annual data released in the previous calendar year. Then, the portfolio returns are
measured from July until the end of June of the next year. The profitability measures include gross
profits (GP), income before extraordinary items (IB), and operating profits (OP). All three profitability
measures are deflated by the book value of total assets. The lottery strategies are based on monthly
sorts of stocks using the four variables explained in Subsection 2.3.1. *, **, and *** denote significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Anomaly Quintile Three Factor α Four Factor α Five Factor α
Panel A: Quarterly Profitability Measures
GP
Low -0.249*** -0.197** -0.030
(-3.00) (-2.33) (-0.40)
2 -0.170** -0.137* -0.181**
(-2.21) (-1.75) (-2.27)
3 0.019 0.054 -0.035
(0.27) (0.76) (-0.49)
4 0.118* 0.154** 0.110
(1.70) (2.17) (1.55)
High 0.367*** 0.318*** 0.231***
(4.49) (3.83) (2.87)
High-Low 0.616*** 0.515*** 0.261**
(4.85) (4.01) (2.33)
IB
Low -0.670*** -0.471*** -0.164
(-4.34) (-3.08) (-1.37)
2 -0.356*** -0.172* -0.06
(-3.37) (-1.70) (-0.66)
3 -0.024 0.040 0.012
(-0.38) (0.64) (0.18)
4 0.094 0.097 -0.027
(1.60) (1.61) (-0.47)
High 0.255*** 0.196*** 0.167***
(4.19) (3.19) (2.83)
High-Low 0.925*** 0.666*** 0.331**
(5.10) (3.74) (2.43)
OP
Low -0.775*** -0.560*** -0.312**
(-5.2) (-3.83) (-2.45)
2 -0.315*** -0.154* -0.122
(-3.63) (-1.86) (-1.45)
3 -0.102 -0.052 -0.141**
(-1.48) (-0.74) (-1.97)
4 0.074 0.092 -0.038
(1.16) (1.41) (-0.60)
High 0.306*** 0.256*** 0.255***
(4.81) (3.98) (3.94)
High-Low 1.081*** 0.816*** 0.568***
(6.25) (4.83) (3.81)
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Table 2.2: Quintile Portfolio Analysis (Continued)
Anomaly Quintile Three Factor α Four Factor α Five Factor α
Panel B: Annual Profitability Measures
GP
Low -0.192*** -0.189*** -0.031
(-4.15) (-3.98) (-0.76)
2 -0.155*** -0.134*** -0.156***
(-3.52) (-2.98) (-3.46)
3 0.056 0.058 0.037
(1.45) (1.46) (0.94)
4 0.078* 0.153*** 0.060
(1.94) (3.85) (1.47)
High 0.360*** 0.308*** 0.250***
(7.39) (6.23) (5.41)
High-Low 0.552*** 0.497*** 0.281***
(4.92) (4.33) (2.90)
IB
Low -0.231** -0.174* 0.172**
(-2.47) (-1.83) (2.40)
2 -0.226*** -0.155*** -0.046
(-4.16) (-2.83) (-1.03)
3 0.006 0.006 0.005
(0.19) (0.16) (0.14)
4 0.026 0.017 -0.057*
(0.82) (0.52) (-1.80)
High 0.185*** 0.182*** 0.135***
(5.89) (5.66) (4.60)
High-Low 0.416*** 0.357** -0.036
(2.81) (2.36) (-0.34)
OP
Low -0.539*** -0.477*** -0.02
(-4.67) (-4.04) (-0.21)
2 -0.188*** -0.087 -0.062
(-2.95) (-1.36) (-1.02)
3 0.025 0.020 -0.035
(0.54) (0.42) (-0.73)
4 0.061 0.101** 0.029
(1.45) (2.37) (0.67)
High 0.310*** 0.290*** 0.301***
(6.95) (6.36) (6.66)
High-Low 0.849*** 0.767*** 0.321**
(4.77) (4.22) (2.18)
Panel C: Lottery Measures
JACKPOT
Low 0.080*** 0.049** 0.012
(3.44) (2.13) (0.56)
2 0.015 0.074 0.166***
(0.28) (1.34) (3.18)
3 -0.048 0.012 0.202***
(-0.63) (0.15) (3.06)
4 -0.514*** -0.337*** -0.078
(-4.23) (-2.81) (-0.74)
High -0.948*** -0.652*** -0.332**
(-5.23) (-3.68) (-2.14)
Low-High 1.028*** 0.701*** 0.344**
(5.35) (3.75) (2.12)
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Table 2.2: Quintile Portfolio Analysis (Continued)
Anomaly Quintile Three Factor α Four Factor α Five Factor α
Panel C: Lottery Measures (Continued)
LIDX
Low 0.115*** 0.084*** 0.072***
(4.85) (3.53) (3.12)
2 -0.008 0.012 0.075
(-0.16) (0.23) (1.49)
3 -0.092 -0.007 0.113*
(-1.24) (-0.09) (1.68)
4 -0.330*** -0.146 0.022
(-3.2) (-1.46) (0.24)
High -1.007*** -0.701*** -0.586***
(-6.63) (-4.85) (-4.29)
Low-High 1.123*** 0.785*** 0.658***
(7.01) (5.19) (4.66)
MAXRET
Low 0.109** 0.086* 0.004
(2.33) (1.79) (0.09)
2 0.072 0.096* 0.074
(1.51) (1.96) (1.50)
3 0.085 0.125* 0.167***
(1.35) (1.96) (2.62)
4 -0.091 -0.033 0.155*
(-0.99) (-0.35) (1.79)
High -0.628*** -0.501*** -0.227**
(-5.04) (-3.99) (-2.06)
Low-High 0.737*** 0.587*** 0.231*
(4.82) (3.81) (1.72)
ESKEW
Low 0.093** 0.076* 0.083**
(2.42) (1.95) (2.16)
2 0.131** 0.117* 0.166***
(2.04) (1.77) (2.72)
3 -0.108 -0.018 0.077
(-0.94) (-0.15) (0.69)
4 -0.249** -0.136 -0.004
(-2.07) (-1.12) (-0.04)
High -0.636*** -0.457*** -0.281**
(-4.34) (-3.15) (-2.10)
Low-High 0.729*** 0.534*** 0.364**
(4.55) (3.36) (2.51)
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Table 2.3: Double Sorts by JACKPOT and Profitability
This table presents the double sorting results based on the jackpot score (JACKPOT ) and the three prof-
itability measures. The profitability measures include gross profits (GP), income before extraordinary
items (IB), and operating profits (OP). All three profitability measures are deflated by the book value
of total assets. The jackpot measure is explained in Subsection 2.3.1. The results include value-weighted
raw and abnormal returns based on the four-factor model (Carhart, 1997). Sorting is performed by
independently sorting stocks at the end of every month into five profitability and five lottery groups and
then looking at the value-weighted returns of the intersecting portfolios for the following month. *, **,
and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
JACKPOT
Low 2 3 4 High Low - High
Panel A: Raw Returns
GP
Low 0.882 0.833 0.722 0.338 -0.515 1.397
2 0.907 0.907 0.833 0.330 0.09 0.824
3 0.948 0.929 0.989 0.814 0.545 0.417
4 0.966 1.064 1.167 0.908 0.845 0.131
High 1.171 1.269 1.623 1.348 1.464 -0.317
High - Low 0.289 0.436 0.901 0.992 2.043
IB
Low 0.755 0.684 0.643 0.127 -0.240 0.983
2 0.821 0.95 0.793 0.630 0.089 0.712
3 0.944 1.069 1.080 0.922 1.151 -0.216
4 1.010 1.075 1.291 0.912 1.188 -0.164
High 1.077 1.153 1.394 1.224 1.721 -0.648
High - Low 0.321 0.469 0.729 1.098 1.975
OP
Low 0.581 0.473 0.609 0.051 -0.571 1.151
2 0.822 0.767 0.622 0.607 0.202 0.621
3 0.887 0.985 1.129 0.818 1.164 -0.256
4 0.986 1.061 1.122 1.032 1.444 -0.445
High 1.095 1.191 1.529 1.193 1.819 -0.721
High - Low 0.514 0.718 0.919 1.125 2.385
Panel B: Four Factor Alphas
GP
Low -0.061 -0.251* -0.380** -0.633*** -1.377*** 1.316***
(-0.68) (-1.82) (-1.97) (-3.06) (-5.42) (4.85)
2 -0.118 -0.154 -0.200 -0.567*** -0.792*** 0.68**
(-1.35) (-1.32) (-1.22) (-2.76) (-2.77) (2.18)
3 0.064 -0.083 0.027 -0.098 -0.414* 0.483*
(0.78) (-0.71) (0.18) (-0.56) (-1.66) (1.75)
4 0.159* 0.158 0.146 0.044 -0.043 0.214
(1.90) (1.53) (1.11) (0.23) (-0.18) (0.82)
High 0.294*** 0.355*** 0.608*** 0.330* 0.654*** -0.368
(3.00) (3.04) (4.20) (1.76) (2.62) (-1.28)
High - Low 0.355*** 0.606*** 0.988*** 0.951*** 2.067***
(2.63) (3.28) (4.29) (3.93) (7.35)
IB
Low -0.247 -0.231 -0.351* -0.836*** -1.130*** 0.935***
(-1.17) (-1.27) (-1.84) (-3.97) (-4.55) (2.99)
2 -0.136 -0.089 -0.249 -0.271 -0.802*** 0.662***
(-1.38) (-0.74) (-1.56) (-1.36) (-3.36) (2.70)
3 0.025 0.113 0.054 -0.142 0.130 -0.104
(0.38) (1.10) (0.42) (-0.86) (0.58) (-0.44)
4 0.098 0.034 0.214 0.038 0.360 -0.258
(1.41) (0.37) (1.47) (0.23) (1.45) (-0.94)
High 0.196*** 0.251** 0.394*** 0.272 0.772*** -0.582*
(2.71) (2.40) (2.90) (1.37) (2.62) (-1.87)
High - Low 0.440** 0.489** 0.742*** 1.108*** 1.931***
(2.02) (2.38) (3.23) (4.48) (6.08)
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Table 2.3: Double Sorts by JACKPOT and Profitability (Continued)
JACKPOT
Low 2 3 4 High Low - High
Panel B: Four Factor Alphas (Continued)
OP
Low -0.272* -0.48*** -0.412** -0.847*** -1.442*** 1.17***
(-1.75) (-2.59) (-2.05) (-3.93) (-5.91) (4.13)
2 -0.091 -0.266** -0.393** -0.337* -0.666*** 0.562**
(-1.04) (-2.22) (-2.44) (-1.67) (-2.63) (2.06)
3 -0.064 -0.116 0.039 -0.137 0.259 -0.300
(-0.80) (-1.09) (0.28) (-0.75) (0.89) (-0.95)
4 0.061 0.122 0.152 0.184 0.451* -0.376
(0.80) (1.06) (1.09) (1.02) (1.69) (-1.31)
High 0.219*** 0.284** 0.512*** 0.293 0.937*** -0.713**
(2.94) (2.55) (3.44) (1.38) (3.20) (-2.29)
High - Low 0.491*** 0.764*** 0.924*** 1.128*** 2.384***
(2.76) (3.73) (3.76) (4.22) (7.36)
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Table 2.4: Double Sorts by LIDX and Profitability
This table presents the double sorting results based on the lottery index (LIDX ) and the three profitabil-
ity measures. The profitability measures include gross profits (GP), income before extraordinary items
(IB), and operating profits (OP). All three profitability measures are deflated by the book value of total
assets. The lottery index measure is explained in Subsection 2.3.1. The results include value-weighted
raw and abnormal returns based on the four-factor model (Carhart, 1997). Sorting is performed by
independently sorting stocks at the end of every month into five profitability and five lottery groups and
then looking at the value-weighted returns of the intersecting portfolios for the following month. *, **,
and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Double Sorts by LIDX and Profitability
LIDX
Low 2 3 4 High Low - High
Panel A: Raw Returns
GP
Low 0.827 0.793 0.746 0.409 -0.209 1.029
2 0.923 0.819 0.880 0.657 0.253 0.672
3 0.924 0.940 1.042 0.944 0.595 0.330
4 0.945 1.042 1.149 1.300 0.775 0.178
High 1.097 1.406 1.631 1.776 1.333 -0.232
High - Low 0.273 0.613 0.885 1.367 1.534
IB
Low 0.864 0.831 0.43 0.282 -0.094 0.933
2 0.813 0.749 0.808 0.709 0.293 0.542
3 0.922 0.958 1.330 1.107 1.09 -0.172
4 1.003 1.056 1.179 1.514 1.250 -0.276
High 1.035 1.141 1.351 1.601 1.515 -0.481
High - Low 0.187 0.322 0.921 1.319 1.591
OP
Low 0.562 0.44 0.39 0.076 -0.524 1.078
2 0.830 0.767 0.631 0.740 0.312 0.518
3 0.930 0.795 1.160 0.913 1.036 -0.100
4 0.988 1.040 0.987 1.470 1.368 -0.388
High 1.037 1.282 1.609 1.758 2.007 -0.969
High - Low 0.477 0.843 1.219 1.682 2.524
Panel B: Four Factor Alphas
GP
Low -0.036 -0.209 -0.285* -0.651*** -1.235*** 1.204***
(-0.37) (-1.49) (-1.77) (-3.14) (-5.14) (4.71)
2 -0.071 -0.230** -0.188 -0.339* -0.641*** 0.571**
(-0.75) (-1.98) (-1.28) (-1.77) (-2.64) (2.16)
3 0.049 0.003 0.101 -0.055 -0.331 0.380
(0.55) (0.02) (0.70) (-0.36) (-1.36) (1.45)
4 0.167* 0.090 0.269** 0.345** -0.260 0.437*
(1.88) (0.72) (1.97) (2.06) (-1.27) (1.94)
High 0.259** 0.450*** 0.708*** 0.788*** 0.222 0.041
(2.57) (3.63) (4.9) (4.75) (0.98) (0.16)
High - Low 0.299** 0.659*** 0.994*** 1.439*** 1.462***
(2.05) (3.49) (4.97) (6.09) (5.44)
IB
Low 0.035 -0.178 -0.455** -0.805*** -1.005*** 1.074***
(0.16) (-0.82) (-2.34) (-3.73) (-4.39) (3.84)
2 -0.061 -0.180 -0.258* -0.321* -0.730*** 0.687***
(-0.53) (-1.35) (-1.74) (-1.78) (-3.49) (2.9)
3 0.038 -0.030 0.310** 0.134 -0.078 0.124
(0.5) (-0.29) (2.44) (0.87) (-0.36) (0.52)
4 0.105 0.005 0.199 0.517*** 0.144 -0.041
(1.5) (0.05) (1.52) (3.03) (0.67) (-0.18)
High 0.181** 0.203* 0.424*** 0.553*** 0.382* -0.202
(2.55) (1.86) (2.98) (3.16) (1.69) (-0.84)
High - Low 0.160 0.382 0.878*** 1.358*** 1.379***
(0.69) (1.63) (3.76) (5.26) (5.37)
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Table 2.4: Double Sorts by LIDX and Profitability (Continued)
LIDX
Low 2 3 4 High Low - High
Panel B: Four Factor Alphas (Continued)
OP
Low -0.208 -0.486** -0.482** -1.015*** -1.444*** 1.24***
(-1.17) (-2.53) (-2.36) (-4.78) (-6.33) (4.59)
2 -0.021 -0.163 -0.433*** -0.270 -0.72*** 0.699***
(-0.21) (-1.29) (-2.86) (-1.51) (-2.96) (2.65)
3 0.005 -0.268** 0.143 -0.068 -0.122 0.132
(0.06) (-2.48) (1.04) (-0.42) (-0.50) (0.51)
4 0.088 0.019 0.034 0.522*** 0.411* -0.313
(1.09) (0.18) (0.23) (3.01) (1.69) (-1.19)
High 0.193** 0.344*** 0.665*** 0.757*** 0.859*** -0.664**
(2.45) (2.71) (4.19) (3.71) (3.45) (-2.56)
High - Low 0.403** 0.830*** 1.147*** 1.772*** 2.307***
(2.02) (3.77) (4.71) (6.58) (8.24)
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Table 2.5: Double Sorts by MAXRET and Profitability
This table presents the double sorting results based on the maximum daily return (MAXRET ) and
the three profitability measures. The profitability measures include gross profits (GP), income before
extraordinary items (IB), and operating profits (OP). All three profitability measures are deflated by
the book value of total assets. The maximum daily return measure is explained in Subsection 2.3.1. The
results include value-weighted raw and abnormal returns based on the four-factor model (Carhart, 1997).
Sorting is performed by independently sorting stocks at the end of every month into five profitability
and five lottery groups and then looking at the value-weighted returns of the intersecting portfolios for
the following month. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
MAXRET
Low 2 3 4 High Low - High
Panel A: Raw Returns
GP
Low 0.989 0.731 0.918 0.376 -0.06 1.049
2 1.127 0.886 0.893 0.755 0.331 0.797
3 1.194 0.963 0.779 0.985 0.601 0.593
4 1.046 1.096 1.117 0.923 0.787 0.259
High 1.128 1.282 1.229 1.650 1.139 0.000
High - Low 0.139 0.550 0.323 1.256 1.197
IB
Low 1.061 0.940 0.699 0.395 -0.331 1.396
2 1.036 0.865 0.902 0.607 0.286 0.750
3 0.861 1.043 0.993 1.035 0.814 0.047
4 1.076 1.025 1.001 0.96 1.042 0.041
High 1.164 1.136 1.162 1.331 1.056 0.108
High - Low 0.098 0.196 0.442 0.936 1.387
OP
Low 0.981 0.453 0.421 0.185 -0.541 1.522
2 1.055 0.814 0.705 0.560 0.24 0.812
3 1.051 0.874 0.893 0.834 0.770 0.281
4 1.124 1.102 0.888 0.900 0.963 0.160
High 1.062 1.181 1.203 1.519 1.025 0.045
High - Low 0.081 0.750 0.782 1.321 1.564
Panel B: Four Factor Alphas
GP
Low 0.110 -0.251** -0.144 -0.690*** -0.994*** 1.105***
(0.97) (-2.24) (-0.93) (-3.74) (-4.19) (4.31)
2 0.191 -0.177* -0.123 -0.219 -0.659*** 0.871***
(1.59) (-1.70) (-0.94) (-1.25) (-2.95) (3.34)
3 0.256** 0.106 -0.154 0.068 -0.322 0.578**
(2.04) (0.87) (-1.18) (0.37) (-1.55) (2.31)
4 0.190 0.300** 0.259** -0.059 -0.129 0.319
(1.64) (2.40) (2.01) (-0.37) (-0.62) (1.23)
High 0.314** 0.394*** 0.352*** 0.718*** 0.241 0.086
(2.40) (3.28) (2.70) (4.17) (1.17) (0.33)
High - Low 0.203 0.644*** 0.508*** 1.381*** 1.243***
(1.18) (3.83) (2.60) (5.52) (4.51)
IB
Low 0.088 0.012 -0.219 -0.524** -1.315*** 1.412***
(0.44) (0.06) (-1.15) (-2.52) (-5.84) (4.99)
2 0.123 -0.131 -0.038 -0.404** -0.703*** 0.826***
(1.05) (-1.02) (-0.27) (-2.35) (-3.06) (3.20)
3 -0.049 0.087 0.021 0.027 -0.157 0.127
(-0.52) (0.87) (0.17) (0.18) (-0.83) (0.58)
4 0.205** 0.044 0.051 -0.039 0.055 0.157
(2.34) (0.46) (0.44) (-0.25) (0.28) (0.71)
High 0.287*** 0.341*** 0.232* 0.400** 0.127 0.160
(2.75) (3.20) (1.79) (2.45) (0.59) (0.61)
High - Low 0.199 0.328 0.433* 0.924*** 1.442***
(0.90) (1.43) (1.95) (3.73) (5.34)
39
Table 2.5: Double Sorts by MAXRET and Profitability (Continued)
MAXRET
Low 2 3 4 High Low - High
Panel B: Four Factor Alphas (Continued)
OP
Low 0.096 -0.472*** -0.444** -0.713*** -1.446*** 1.543***
(0.61) (-2.64) (-2.2) (-3.46) (-5.87) (5.14)
2 0.211* -0.187 -0.242* -0.362* -0.771*** 0.99***
(1.78) (-1.64) (-1.81) (-1.94) (-3.61) (3.81)
3 0.084 -0.106 -0.114 -0.201 -0.109 0.193
(0.73) (-1.06) (-0.93) (-1.25) (-0.51) (0.78)
4 0.179 0.199* -0.031 -0.058 -0.023 0.220
(1.61) (1.79) (-0.25) (-0.38) (-0.10) (0.80)
High 0.229** 0.359*** 0.274** 0.613*** 0.120 0.119
(2.06) (3.04) (1.98) (3.42) (0.53) (0.44)
High - Low 0.133 0.832*** 0.719*** 1.332*** 1.574***
(0.68) (3.95) (3.04) (5.19) (5.18)
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Table 2.6: Double Sorts by ESKEW and Profitability
This table presents the double sorting results based on the expected idiosyncratic skewness (ESKEW )
and the three profitability measures. The profitability measures include gross profits (GP), income before
extraordinary items (IB), and operating profits (OP). All three profitability measures are deflated by
the book value of total assets. The expected idiosyncratic skewness measure is explained in Subsection
2.3.1. The results include value-weighted raw and abnormal returns based on the four-factor model
(Carhart, 1997). Sorting is performed by independently sorting stocks at the end of every month into
five profitability and five lottery groups and then looking at the value-weighted returns of the intersecting
portfolios for the following month. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
ESKEW
Low 2 3 4 High Low - High
Panel A: Raw Returns
GP
Low 0.828 0.872 0.488 0.213 0.033 0.809
2 0.845 0.900 0.860 0.733 0.411 0.428
3 0.847 1.175 0.974 1.093 0.826 0.011
4 1.054 1.039 0.927 1.176 1.006 0.029
High 1.258 1.163 1.484 1.528 1.817 -0.559
High - Low 0.440 0.292 0.977 1.315 1.784
IB
Low 1.049 0.426 0.453 0.075 -0.260 1.365
2 0.764 0.870 0.797 0.801 0.647 0.088
3 0.903 1.042 1.011 1.384 1.400 -0.472
4 0.979 1.236 1.222 1.284 1.829 -0.856
High 1.139 1.036 1.010 1.426 1.872 -0.743
High - Low 0.054 0.610 0.557 1.350 2.118
OP
Low 0.500 0.580 0.028 -0.099 -0.346 0.865
2 0.800 0.757 0.742 0.838 0.383 0.404
3 0.916 1.048 1.010 1.108 1.265 -0.344
4 0.982 0.985 1.163 1.458 1.713 -0.731
High 1.160 1.161 1.191 1.370 2.121 -0.955
High - Low 0.661 0.581 1.148 1.469 2.468
Panel B: Four Factor Alphas
GP
Low -0.073 -0.102 -0.579*** -0.625*** -0.916*** 0.872***
(-0.67) (-0.79) (-3.05) (-3.01) (-3.76) (-3.39)
2 -0.140 -0.131 -0.073 -0.190 -0.495** 0.370
(-1.39) (-1.05) (-0.44) (-1.01) (-2.21) (-1.50)
3 -0.070 0.321*** 0.194 0.039 -0.033 -0.038
(-0.75) (2.89) (1.24) (0.23) (-0.16) (0.16)
4 0.284*** 0.112 0.300** -0.109 0.089 0.185
(2.94) (0.82) (2.08) (-0.6) (0.43) (-0.82)
High 0.387*** 0.31** 0.586*** 0.761*** 0.570*** -0.182
(3.53) (2.43) (3.81) (3.86) (2.65) (0.73)
High - Low 0.472*** 0.413** 1.136*** 1.397*** 1.486***
(3.00) (2.24) (4.78) (5.31) (5.53)
IB
Low -0.094 -0.429** -0.536** -0.955*** -1.111*** 1.041***
(-0.43) (-2.18) (-2.35) (-4.66) (-4.82) (-3.49)
2 -0.122 -0.115 -0.153 -0.315* -0.382* 0.242
(-1.09) (-0.83) (-0.91) (-1.65) (-1.73) (-1.01)
3 -0.013 0.126 0.099 0.243 0.354* -0.339
(-0.15) (1.23) (0.69) (1.28) (1.88) (1.63)
4 0.068 0.358*** 0.255* 0.299* 0.623*** -0.564**
(0.85) (3.47) (1.75) (1.87) (2.85) (2.35)
High 0.304*** 0.098 0.234 0.544*** 0.675*** -0.383
(3.44) (0.88) (1.43) (2.92) (2.67) (1.44)
High - Low 0.374 0.528** 0.769*** 1.499*** 1.781***
(1.60) (2.33) (2.78) (5.91) (6.36)
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Table 2.6: Double Sorts by ESKEW and Profitability (Continued)
ESKEW
Low 2 3 4 High Low - High
Panel B: Four Factor Alphas (Continued)
OP
Low -0.251 -0.362* -0.891*** -1.12*** -1.216*** 0.985***
(-1.32) (-1.9) (-4.13) (-5.48) (-5.23) (-3.57)
2 -0.096 -0.179 -0.205 -0.077 -0.586*** 0.485**
(-0.87) (-1.35) (-1.39) (-0.40) (-2.88) (-2.09)
3 -0.045 0.128 -0.076 0.153 0.155 -0.196
(-0.47) (1.13) (-0.51) (0.91) (0.77) (0.84)
4 0.033 0.151 0.419*** 0.406** 0.816*** -0.782***
(0.36) (1.35) (2.6) (2.25) (3.18) (2.88)
High 0.338*** 0.267** 0.474*** 0.424** 0.834*** -0.489*
(3.32) (2.12) (2.63) (2.00) (3.17) (1.74)
High - Low 0.589*** 0.629*** 1.342*** 1.556*** 2.05***
(2.84) (2.67) (4.6) (5.9) (7.13)
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Table 2.7: Fama-Macbeth Regressions by Lottery Quintile
This table presents the Fama-Macbeth regression coefficients estimated separately for the three prof-
itability measures. The profitability measures include gross profits (GP), income before extraordinary
items (IB), and operating profits (OP). All three profitability measures are deflated by the book value of
total assets. The sample used for estimation is broken down into quintiles based on the lottery proxies.
That is, the regressions are estimated separately within each lottery quintile. The lottery measures are
explained in Subsection 2.3.1. The regression models contain only one profitability variable and four
control variables: Ri,t = β0 + β1profitabilityi,t−1 + β2logmei,t−1 + β3logbmi,t−1 + β4ret[−12, 2]i,t−1 +
β5ret[−1, 0]i,t−1 + i,t, where logme is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity, logbm is the
natural logarithm of the book-to-market ratio, ret[−1, 0] is the prior 1-month return, and ret[−12, 2)] is
the prior year’s return skipping the last month. Only the profitability coefficients (β1) are reported in
the table. The sample period is from January 1972 to December 2015. *, **, and *** denote significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Lottery Variable Lottery Quintile GP IB OP
JACKPOT
Low 0.004*** 0.007*** 0.016***
(5.04) (6.98) (9.07)
2 0.004*** 0.007*** 0.022***
(5.78) (8.72) (11.64)
3 0.006*** 0.009*** 0.023***
(7.76) (8.29) (13.33)
4 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.031***
(9.58) (8.87) (15.16)
High 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.037***
(10.14) (10.69) (16.04)
LIDX
Low 0.003*** 0.006*** 0.015***
(5.09) (8.27) (9.96)
2 0.005*** 0.008*** 0.022***
(6.16) (9.16) (11.36)
3 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.026***
(7.95) (9.43) (13.22)
4 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.034***
(9.78) (9.6) (16.04)
High 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.038***
(9.11) (8.49) (14.02)
MAXRET
Low 0.005*** 0.010*** 0.025***
(7.05) (10.96) (14.48)
2 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.024***
(7.97) (9.71) (13.31)
3 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.025***
(7.97) (8.49) (12.27)
4 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.028***
(7.23) (7.91) (13.20)
High 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.037***
(9.86) (9.40) (14.90)
ESKEW
Low 0.004*** 0.007*** 0.015***
(5.30) (7.34) (7.85)
2 0.006*** 0.009*** 0.023***
(7.69) (8.67) (10.58)
3 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.028***
(7.68) (8.07) (12.92)
4 0.008*** 0.011*** 0.036***
(10.15) (10.85) (17.34)
High 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.042***
(9.98) (10.26) (15.20)
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Table 2.8: Fama-Macbeth Regressions by Profitability Quintile
This table presents the Fama-Macbeth regression coefficients estimated separately for the four lottery
proxies. The lottery proxies are explained in Subsection 2.3.1. The sample used for estimation is broken
down into quintiles based on the profitability proxies. That is, the regressions are estimated separately
within each profitability quintile. The profitability measures include gross profits (GP), income before
extraordinary items (IB), and operating profits (OP). All three profitability measures are deflated by
the book value of total assets. The regression models contain only one lottery variable and four control
variables: Ri,t = β0+β1lotteryi,t−1+β2logmei,t−1+β3logbmi,t−1+β4ret[−12, 2]i,t−1+β5ret[−1, 0]i,t−1+
i,t, where logme is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity, logbm is the natural logarithm
of the book-to-market ratio, ret[−1, 0] is the prior 1-month return, and ret[−12, 2)] is the prior year’s
return skipping the last month. Only the lottery coefficients (β1) are reported in the table. The sample
period is from January 1972 to December 2015. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels, respectively.
Lottery Variable Profitability Quintile GP IB OP
JACKPOT
Low -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.005***
(-3.20) (-3.72) (-3.35)
2 -0.008*** -0.003* -0.004***
(-4.90) (-1.84) (-2.80)
3 -0.005*** 0.000 -0.000
(-3.70) (0.01) (-0.19)
4 -0.005*** -0.001 -0.003*
(-3.82) (-0.64) (-1.80)
High -0.004*** -0.005** -0.004**
(-2.79) (-2.48) (-2.29)
LIDX
Low -0.014*** -0.013** -0.013**
(-2.88) (-2.54) (-2.57)
2 -0.012*** -0.003 -0.010**
(-2.88) (-0.68) (-2.16)
3 -0.006 0.002 0.000
(-1.45) (0.58) (0.00)
4 -0.004 0.005 0.000
(-0.93) (1.51) (-0.01)
High 0.002 -0.001 0.003
(0.44) (-0.17) (0.75)
MAXRET
Low -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005***
(-5.75) (-6.60) (-6.43)
2 -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.004***
(-5.43) (-3.73) (-4.74)
3 -0.003*** -0.001 -0.002***
(-4.27) (-1.45) (-3.08)
4 -0.003*** -0.001* -0.002**
(-4.46) (-1.67) (-2.28)
High -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.002**
(-2.95) (-3.35) (-2.46)
ESKEW
Low -0.0022*** -0.004*** -0.0042***
(-2.55) (-2.84) (-2.88)
2 -0.002 0.001 -0.001
(-1.53) (0.91) (-0.84)
3 0.002 0.002** 0.000
(1.29) (2.10) (0.21)
4 -0.001 0.002 0.000
(-1.21) (1.64) (0.53)

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.10: Fama-Macbeth Interactions Horserace
This table presents the Fama-Macbeth regression estimates after controlling for a range of stock char-
acteristics. We take the regression specifications in Table 2.9 and add six proxies for stock performance
and their interactions with the profitability measures to each specification, separately. The lottery and
profitability measures are explained in Subsection 2.3.1. logme is the natural logarithm of the market
value of equity, logbm is the natural logarithm of the book-to-market ratio, ret[−1, 0] is the prior 1-
month return, and ret[−12, 2)] is the prior year’s return skipping the last month. Illiq is the illiquidity
measure of Amihud (2002), calculated as the annual average of the daily ratio of absolute stock return
to its daily dollar trading volume, all scaled by 10−6. I.Hold is the sum of the quarterly institutional
holdings by aggregating the positions of different institutions from the Thomson Reuters database. For
brevity, we only report the coefficients on the interaction terms. The sample period is from January
1980 to December 2015.
JACKPOT % LIDX % MAXRET % ESKEW
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Gross Profitablity (GP)
GP × lottery 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002***
(2.65) (4.63) (4.11) (2.56)
GP × logme 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.76) (1.61) (0.13) (-0.24)
GP × logbm 0.000* 0.000 -0.001 0.000
(1.68) (1.50) (-1.00) (0.93)
GP × ret[-12,2)] 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
(-0.66) (-0.88) (-1.35) (-1.59)
GP × ret[-1,0] 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.16) (0.78) (0.66) (1.59)
GP × Illiq 0.001*** 0.000 0.000 -0.001
(3.05) (-0.16) (-0.33) (-0.66)
GP × I.Hold -0.002** -0.002 -0.001* -0.002*
(-2.22) (-1.47) (-1.72) (-1.92)
Panel B: Income Before Extraordinary Items (IB)
IB × lottery 0.002*** 0.001** 0.002** 0.001
(2.58) (2.06) (2.27) (0.64)
IB × logme 0.000 -0.001* -0.001 -0.001
(-0.39) (-1.85) (-1.23) (-0.80)
IB × logbm 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.25) (0.90) (0.99) (0.82)
IB × ret[-12,2)] 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(1.01) (1.54) (1.09) (1.48)
IB × ret[-1,0] 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(4.82) (0.91) (0.68) (1.61)
IB × Illiq 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(4.01) (4.66) (4.39) (4.21)
IB × I.Hold 0.002*** -0.002** -0.001** -0.002***
(4.01) (-2.21) (-2.12) (-2.69)
Panel C: Operating Profitability (OP)
OP × lottery 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.007***
(2.56) (3.23) (3.54) (3.63)
OP × logme -0.001 -0.001 -0.001* -0.001
(-1.36) (-1.30) (-1.73) (-0.90)
OP × logbm 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(1.16) (0.99) (1.15) (1.02)
OP × ret[-12,2)] 0.001* 0.001 0.001 0.001
(1.82) (1.02) (0.85) (1.02)
OP × ret[-1,0] 0.003 0.001 0.002 -0.006
(0.89) (1.02) (1.24) (-0.85)
OP × Illiq 0.003** 0.003** 0.003* 0.002**
(2.16) (2.15) (1.91) (2.31)
OP × I.Hold -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(-4.00) (-3.91) (-3.62) (-4.21)
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Chapter 3
Skewness Preference and Market
Anomalies
3.1 Introduction
Stocks with positively skewed or lottery-like return distributions generate lower
returns in the cross section (see, e.g., Mitton and Vorkink, 2007; Kumar, 2009; Boyer
et al., 2010; Bali et al., 2011; Conrad et al., 2014). The prevalent view in the literature
is that skewness becomes priced because a group of investors deviate from the stan-
dard expected utility framework and choose to underdiversify in order to hold positively
skewed positions. Theoretical papers commonly refer to this behavior as “the preference
for skewness” and attempt to explain it by using more advanced utility functions (e.g.,
Mitton and Vorkink, 2007; Brunnermeier et al., 2007; Barberis and Huang, 2008).
Recent papers have used the preference for skewness to explain a number of long-
standing puzzles in asset pricing. Examples include initial public offering (IPO) returns
(Green and Hwang, 2012), underperformance of distressed (Conrad et al., 2014) and
going-concern stocks (Kausar et al., 2015), and irregularities in out-of-the-money option
returns (Boyer and Vorkink, 2014).
In this study, I investigate whether the preference for skewness has broader im-
plications in generating mispricing patterns in the market. In particular, I determine
whether the common mispricing-related component of market anomalies is associated
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with investor preference for skewness.
Market anomalies are patterns in the cross section of stock returns that are not
explained by existing asset pricing models. In particular, stocks with certain character-
istics generate returns that are not commensurate with their level of risk. It is often
difficult to determine whether anomalies are indications of imperfect risk models or signs
of market mispricing.1
Recent studies provide evidence showing that anomalies, at least partly, reflect
mispricing. For example, Nagel (2005) and Stambaugh et al. (2015), among others,
demonstrate that anomalies are significantly more prevalent among stocks with greater
arbitrage risks and costs. In addition, most abnormal anomaly returns are attributable
to underperforming, or overpriced, stocks. These stocks need to be sold short, but many
investors are reluctant or unable to do so (see, e.g., Hirshleifer et al., 2011; Stambaugh
et al., 2012; Avramov et al., 2013).
Mispricing, to the extent that it is the underlying driver of market anomalies,
exhibits commonalities across stocks. Stambaugh et al. (2012), for example, find a
common time-varying component across a wide range of anomalies is strongly related
to investor sentiment. I conjecture that the common mispricing-related component of
anomalies can be, at least partly, explained by the pricing implications of preference for
skewness.
I motivate the potential link between the two phenomena by building on the ob-
servation of Harvey and Siddique (2000), who claim that stocks that anomaly strategies
predict will underperform, commonly referred to as “Short-leg stocks”, are often those
with the highest levels of skewness in the cross section. 2 In contrast, stocks predicted
by anomaly strategies to outperform, referred to as “Long-leg stocks”, have the lowest
levels of cross-sectional skewness.
my conjecture is that investors with a preference for skewness will be attracted
to Short-leg stocks, but not Long-leg stocks. In the presence of limits to arbitrage,
such behavior would contribute to the cross-sectional mispricing predicted by anomaly
1This argument began with Fama (1970) and is referred to as the “joint hypothesis problem”; that
is, any test of asset pricing models is a joint test of market efficiency and of the models themselves.




To measure the common mispricing-related component of anomalies, I adopt the
approach of Stambaugh et al. (2015). This measure is constructed by taking the av-
erage of each stock’s decile ranks for 11 anomaly variables. The anomalies I consider
consist of accruals (Sloan, 1996), asset growth (Cooper et al., 2008), composite equity
issues (Daniel and Titman, 2006), distress (Campbell et al., 2008), gross profitability
(Novy-Marx, 2013), investment-to-assets (Titman et al., 2004), momentum (Jegadeesh
and Titman, 1993), net operating assets (Hirshleifer et al., 2004), net stock issues (Rit-
ter, 1991; Loughran and Ritter, 1995), O-score (Ohlson, 1980), and return on assets
(Fama and French, 2006). This approach essentially diversifies any anomaly-specific ef-
fect by taking the average of anomaly decile ranks across a range of strategies and offers
a measure of likelihood for every stock to be mispriced (see Stambaugh et al., 2015;
Stambaugh and Yuan, 2016).
I also consider prominent skewness measures used in the recent empirical asset
pricing literature. These measures include jackpot probability (Conrad et al., 2014),
lottery index (Kumar et al., 2016), maximum daily return (Bali et al., 2011), expected
idiosyncratic skewness (Boyer et al., 2010), and options-based idiosyncratic skewness
(Conrad et al., 2013).
I test two main hypotheses by combining the pricing implications of return skew-
ness with the findings of Stambaugh et al. (2012, 2014) for the commonality of mispricing
across anomalies. The first hypothesis is that the performance of anomalies, to the extent
that it is related to mispricing, would be stronger among stocks with higher skewness.
This follows from my previously mentioned argument that skewness features attract
investors with a preference for such features and thereby exacerbate anomalies.
I find strong support for this prediction using all five skewness measures. my
measure of anomaly-based mispricing generates between 1.22% and 1.71% greater Long-
Short monthly abnormal returns among stocks in the highest skewness quintiles com-
pared to those in the lowest skewness quintiles. In a regression framework, I find that
a 1-standard-deviation increase in skewness adds between 30% and 60%, depending on
the measure of skewness used, to anomaly return predictability.
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My second hypothesis states that the effect of skewness on anomalies will be
driven by the underperformance of Short-leg stocks. This is because the prevalent form
of mispricing is overpricing (Stambaugh et al., 2012); therefore, any mispricing effect
caused by the preference for skewness should mainly affect Short-leg stocks. Stocks
in the Long leg, on the other hand, are unlikely to be affected by the preference for
skewness, because they are underpriced, which is easier for arbitrageurs to adjust.
My findings indicate that Short-leg stocks with high levels of skewness generate
3 to 9 times larger negative abnormal returns, whereas returns of Long-leg stocks do
not significantly change with the level of skewness. I also find Short-leg stocks with low
levels of skewness in the cross section do not significantly underperform. This result
indicates that the presence of short-selling impediments is not sufficient to explain the
commonly reported finding in the literature that anomaly spreads are mostly driven by
Short-leg stocks (e.g., Hirshleifer et al., 2011; Stambaugh et al., 2012; Avramov et al.,
2013). In fact, skewness plays a key role in explaining why overpricing is more prevalent
than is underpricing in extreme anomaly portfolios.
My two hypotheses predict that investors with a preference for skewness will
invest disproportionately more in Short-leg stocks, rather than among Long-leg stocks.
Specifically, I examine whether investors with a preference for skewness actually trade
in a direction opposite of what anomaly strategies suggest. I test this by looking at the
portfolio holdings data of a sample of retail investors obtained from a large U.S. discount
brokerage house for the period 1991 to 1996.
My results strongly support this prediction. Investors with a history of over-
weighting stocks with high levels of skewness by one standard deviation of the cross-
sectional distribution allocate between 11.6% and 18.4% higher raw weight (8.7% to
13.9% greater weight in excess of the market weight) to Short-leg stocks relative to Long-
leg ones. I also use an exogenous geographical proxy for the preference for skewness,
developed by Kumar et al. (2011), showing that the ratio of Catholics to Protestants in
the local population can proxy for local preference for skewness. I find that this ratio is
associated with a higher portfolio weight on Short-leg stocks in investors’ portfolios.
I investigate two alternative explanations for my results. First, I test whether the
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relation between skewness and anomaly returns is due to a missing systematic coskew-
ness factor in the asset pricing model, rather than a mispricing effect generated by the
preference for skewness. This proposition is based on Harvey and Siddique (2000), who
show that extreme anomaly returns are partly explained by the loading on a coskewness
factor. Second, I investigate whether my skewness measures indirectly reflect arbitrage
costs instead of features that attract investors who like skewness. This test is moti-
vated by previous studies documenting a close association between skewness and limits
to arbitrage (e.g., Bris et al., 2007; Chang et al., 2007; Xu, 2007). I find that my main
results are robust after controlling for coskewness and a wide range of proxies for limits
to arbitrage.
In the last part of the paper, I build on the evidence in Stambaugh and Yuan
(2016) and examine whether skewness present in asset pricing models improves the mod-
els performance in capturing anomaly returns. Specifically, Stambaugh and Yuan (2016)
demonstrate that factors representing a common source of mispricing in the cross section
can help capture abnormal returns associated with a number of anomaly strategies. I
follow the approach of Stambaugh and Yuan (2016) and construct a skewness factor by
combining four skewness measures: jackpot probability, lottery index, maximum daily
return, and expected idiosyncratic skewness.
I find that adding this factor to models significantly enhances overall perfor-
mance in explaining anomalies. my skewness factor is particularly useful for explaining
anomalies that are mostly driven by skewed stocks, such as those related to financial
distress.
These findings relate to the stream of papers, such as Nagel (2005), Stambaugh
et al. (2012, 2015), Avramov et al. (2013), Hanson and Sunderam (2014), Chordia et al.
(2014), and McLean and Pontiff (2016), which investigate the mispricing-related com-
ponent of market anomalies. I contribute to this stream by providing a new explanation
for commonality in mispricing across anomalies.
Aside from Harvey and Siddique (2000), I am not aware of any other paper that
has studied the pricing implications of skewness as a common contributing factor to
a wide range of market anomalies. My approach is different than that of Harvey and
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Siddique (2000), who suggest that the effect of skewness on anomalies can be captured by
a rational model that accounts for exposure to coskewness, as a measure of undiversifiable
downside risk. In my case, I attribute the role of skewness in predicting returns to the
mispricing effect of trades initiated by investors who have a preference for skewness. In
fact, my findings indicate that exposure to a coskewness factor cannot explain the link
between my various firm-level skewness measures and anomaly returns.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Subsection 3.2 briefly dis-
cusses the evidence on anomalies and skewness and develops my hypotheses. Section 3.3
summarizes the data and my main variables. Section 3.4 presents the main empirical
results. Section 3.5 examines two alternative explanations for my main results. Section
3.6 builds upon the implications of my findings and constructs a skewness factor. Section
3.7 concludes.
3.2 Background and Testable Hypotheses
I begin this section by reviewing the relevant literature on the preference for skewness
and its link to market anomalies. I then develop two testable hypotheses exploring
whether the mispricing-related component of anomalies is driven by investors’ preference
for holding positively skewed assets.
3.2.1 Skewness, Mispricing, and Market Anomalies
Much of the early work on return skewness argues that only coskewness, defined as
the portion of an asset’s skewness related to market skewness, should be relevant for
individual security pricing (e.g., Kraus and Litzenberger, 1976; Harvey and Siddique,
2000; Dittmar, 2002). The logic is that fully diversified investors will only care about
skewness as a measure of undiversifiable downside risk (Harvey et al., 2010) and that
idiosyncratic, or firm-level, return skewness will be irrelevant for investment decisions.
However, recent empirical findings indicate that idiosyncratic skewness is negatively
related to future returns even more strongly than is coskewness (e.g., Kumar, 2009;
Boyer et al., 2010; Bali et al., 2011).
More recent theoretical papers justify the pricing role of idiosyncratic skewness by
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arguing that a group of investors in the market have a preference for holding positively
skewed positions at the expense of underdiversification (see Mitton and Vorkink, 2007;
Brunnermeier et al., 2007). This preference will then lead to stocks with higher levels of
idiosyncratic skewness being overpriced and, in doing so, generate lower returns in the
market.
Barberis and Huang (2008) develop a model to demonstrate that the cumulative
prospect theory of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) can explain why investors might have
a preference for holding positively skewed assets. Cumulative prospect theory reveals
that individuals overweight the tails of return distributions, resulting in overvaluation
of securities that are likely to generate positively skewed, or lottery-like, payoffs.
Empirical findings strongly support the role of cumulative prospect theory pref-
erences in skewness pricing. For example, Barberis et al. (2016) show that the prospect
theory value function assigns a higher value to positively skewed stocks and that such
stocks are overvalued internationally. Nevertheless, not all investors behave according
to cumulative prospect theory. Preference for skewness is mainly prevalent among retail
investors, in particular, to those who are less sophisticated and tend to exhibit a strong
propensity to gamble in nonfinancial settings (Kumar, 2009).
A number of papers build on the role of skewness in explaining market anomalies.
Harvey and Siddique (2000) is the first major study to acknowledge that securities that
often generate abnormal returns and drive market anomalies also have the most extreme
levels of skewness in the cross section. They introduce a factor to capture systematic
coskewness and show that adding it to the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) can
significantly improve the performance of the model in explaining market anomalies.
Essentially, Harvey and Siddique (2000) attribute market anomalies to the failure of
pricing kernels to capture systematic skewness.
In contrast, recent studies suggest that skewness has a mispricing effect that
contributes to individual market anomalies. The motivation underlying the latter ap-
proach is that stocks that anomaly variables suggest will underperform often have high
levels of positive skewness. This feature can then attract investors with a preference
for skewness and lead to the overpricing (underpricing) of more (less) positively skewed
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stocks (for a review, see Barberis, 2013). The resultant mispricing will persist, because
it is too risky or costly for other investors who do not have a preference for skewness
to adjust the prices (see Barberis and Huang, 2008; Conrad et al., 2014). Examples of
market anomalies attributed to the mispricing effect of preference for skewness include
IPO stocks (Green and Hwang, 2012), distressed firms (Conrad et al., 2014), out-of-
the-money options (Boyer and Vorkink, 2014), and going-concern stocks (Kausar et al.,
2015).
Most market anomalies are, at least partly, related to mispricing. This linkage is
backed by evidence indicating that anomalies are more pronounced among stocks with
higher arbitrage risk (e.g., Nagel, 2005; Stambaugh et al., 2015) and that an increase
in arbitrage activity leads to a decay in anomaly strategy returns (e.g., Hanson and
Sunderam, 2014; Chordia et al., 2014; McLean and Pontiff, 2016). Also, the profitability
of anomaly strategies is largely generated by the short side, which consists of overpriced
stocks (e.g., Hirshleifer et al., 2011; Stambaugh et al., 2012; Avramov et al., 2013).
This observation is in line with the argument of Miller (1977) that mispricing largely
prevails because short-selling impediments make it more difficult to adjust overpricing
compared with underpricing. Stambaugh et al. (2012, 2014) follow this line of reasoning
and uncover a common mispricing component across major anomaly strategies that is
strongly related to investors sentiment. In the next subsection, I build on the literature
reviewed above to form a series of testable hypotheses.
3.2.2 Main Testable Hypotheses
I examine the possibility that the mispricing-related component of market anomalies is,
at least partly, driven by the preference of a group of investors for stocks with skewness
features. The main motivation behind my argument is the observation that stocks in
the short (long) leg of anomaly strategy portfolios that generate the greatest abnormal
returns often have the highest (lowest) levels of skewness in the cross section. This
relation can be theoretically justified in two ways.
First, skewness has a strong negative relationship with past returns (e.g., Chen
et al., 2001; Cao et al., 2002; Xu, 2007; Del Viva et al., 2017). Stocks in the short
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(long) legs generate (higher) lower returns; therefore, they are likely to have relatively
higher (lower) levels of skewness. Second, short-sale constraints increase the skewness of
individual stocks (e.g., Bris et al., 2007; Chang et al., 2007; Xu, 2007). For example, Xu
(2007) introduces a theoretical model and shows that when short-selling is difficult or
costly, investors react more to positive information than to negative information. This is
because reacting to negative information requires short-selling the stock, which is costly
and difficult. Consequently, stocks will have more extreme positive returns than extreme
negative returns, leading to positive skewness. We know that anomaly strategy returns
are mostly generated by stocks in the Short-leg, in particular, those facing significant
short-sale constraints (Nagel, 2005). As a result, short-sale constraints lead to the most
mispriced group of stocks also having a higher level of skewness in the cross section.
Combining the pricing implication of return skewness with the findings of Stam-
baugh et al. (2012, 2014) about the commonality of mispricing across anomalies leads
to the three main testable predictions outlined below:
H1: Cross-sectional return predictability of anomalies would be stronger
among stocks with higher skewness, to the extent that predictability is related
to mispricing.
This first hypothesis follows from the literature reviewed in the previous sub-
section showing that high skewness features appeal to a host of investors that have a
preference for positive skewness. I conjecture that such investors maintain an upward
pressure on the prices of positively skewed stocks contributing to their overpricing. As
discussed above, stocks in the short legs of anomaly strategies are, on average, more
positively skewed than are those in the long legs. Therefore, investors with a preference
for skewness are generally more likely to be attracted to the short leg, not the long leg,
thereby contributing to the anomaly. However, because of short-selling impediments,
there is asymmetry in the mispricing effect of investors preference for skewness on short-
and Long-leg stock returns. This leads to my second hypothesis:
H2: The Short legs of anomaly strategies would generate lower returns among
stocks with higher skewness compared with those with lower skewness. Re-
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turns of the Long legs, however, would not be affected by different levels of
skewness.
My second hypothesis suggests that the effect of skewness on anomalies is driven
by the underperformance of overpriced stocks with high levels of skewness. I follow
Stambaugh et al. (2012) and argue that the prevalent form of mispricing is overpricing.
Therefore, if the preference for skewness were to lead to mispricing, it would be mainly
due to an increase in overpricing in the short leg. On the other hand, the effect of the
preference for skewness should be limited on the long leg because the stocks in that
group are underpriced, which is easier for arbitragers to adjust.
3.3 Data and Measures
My main tests are based on a conventional sample of all common (share code 10 or 11)
NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks with available data in the Center for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP) daily and monthly stock return files for the period from January
1963 to December 2015. I exclude all firms with negative book equity, or those belonging
to the financial sector (6000 ≤ SIC ≤ 6999) or those with a share price below $1.3 In
the case of missing returns, I use delisting returns.
To construct my main skewness and anomaly variables, I use accounting data
from Compustat Fundamentals Annual and Quarterly files and option price data from
OptionMetrics. My factor returns and risk-free rates come from Professor Kenneth
French’s data library.4 In addition, I use the end-of-month portfolio positions of a
sample of retail investors from a major U.S. discount brokerage house covering the time
period from 1991 to 1996. Lastly, for robustness tests, I obtain short interest data from
Compustat and quarterly data on institutional stock holdings from Thomson Reuters.
Table 3.A presents the definitions and sources of all variables.
3I consider other share price cutoffs in the robustness tests and show that my results do not depend
on the price filter.
4See http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/.
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3.3.1 Skewness and Anomaly-Based Mispricing Measures
In this section, I briefly introduce my main skewness and anomaly-based mispricing
variables. Table 3.A presents further details about the construction of the variables.
My main tests employ four prominent (firm-level) skewness measures commonly used
in the literature: jackpot probability (JACKPOT ), lottery index (LIDX ), maximum
daily return (MAXRET ), and expected idiosyncratic skewness (ESKEW ). JACKPOT
is based on Conrad et al. (2014) and is defined as the out-of-sample probability of a
stock generating a log return greater than 100% during the next 12 months. LIDX is
an index originally introduced in Kumar et al. (2016) and ranks securities by how much
they share lottery-like features (i.e., low price, high volatility, and high skewness) that
capture the preference for skewness. MAXRET is the stock’s maximum 1-day return in
the past month as used by Bali et al. (2011). ESKEW is defined as an out-of-sample
measure of expected idiosyncratic skewness, following Boyer et al. (2010).
In addition, to provide evidence based on option prices, I use the options-based
idiosyncratic skewness (OS ) measure of Conrad et al. (2013). This is defined as the
third moment of the (risk-neutral) density function of individual securities formulated
by Bakshi et al. (2003). The advantage of OS over the previous measures is that it is
based on a nonparametric ex ante estimate of future return expectations. Therefore,
it should be able to capture investors’ expectations of future return skewness without
using other proxy variables that might not directly trigger the preference for skewness.
However, OS is only available for a small subset of stocks with traded options, and, thus,
I do not use it in all of my tests. Finally, I use the coskewness (COSKEW ) measure
of Harvey and Siddique (2000) in my robustness tests to distinguish my preference for
skewness story from the argument that skewness relates to the stochastic discount factor.
I consider the 11 prominent anomaly strategies analyzed in Stambaugh et al.
(2012, 2014, 2015). The anomalies consist of accruals (Sloan, 1996), asset growth (Cooper
et al., 2008), composite equity issues (Daniel and Titman, 2006), distress (Campbell
et al., 2008), gross profitability (Novy-Marx, 2013), investment-to-assets (Titman et al.,
2004), momentum (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993), net operating assets (Hirshleifer et al.,
2004), net stock issues (Ritter, 1991; Loughran and Ritter, 1995), O-score (Ohlson, 1980),
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and return on assets (Fama and French, 2006). As my story is based on the common
mispricing component across all of the anomalies, I use the innovative mispricing (MIS )
measure of Stambaugh et al. (2015).
MIS is constructed by taking the average of each stock’s decile ranks with respect
to the 11 anomaly variables. Decile ranks are defined at the end of every month. The 1st
and the 10th deciles consist of stocks that each anomaly strategy predicts will outperform
and underperform in the following month, respectively. Considering that anomalies
may not be wholly related to mispricing, MIS is a less noisy measure of mispricing
across all the anomalies. The reason is that by taking the average of the anomaly
decile ranks, I essentially diversify any anomaly-specific effect and will be left with a
mispricing component that is common across all the strategies (see Stambaugh et al.,
2015; Stambaugh and Yuan, 2016).
Panel C of Table 3.1 presents the performance of MIS and the four key skewness
measures (i.e., JACKPOT, LIDX, MAXRET, and ESKEW ) in predicting future returns.
I sort stocks into quintiles at the end of every month based on the five variables. Then
I measure the value-weighted return of each quintile group, together with the return of
the hedge portfolio (going long in quintile 5 and short in quintile 1) in the following
month. To adjust the returns for risk, I regress the monthly returns of each portfolio on
the three (Fama and French, 1993), the four (Carhart, 1997), and the five (Fama and
French, 2015) factors separately and report the alphas.
The Long-Short strategies of all five measures generate statistically significant
abnormal returns at the 1% level. The exception is the alpha of the hedge MAXRET
strategy, which seems to be partly captured by the five-factor model, and is only sig-
nificant at the 10% level. The MIS hedge portfolio yields highly statistically significant
alphas with all the three models ranging from 63 to 109 basis points per month. In
line with Stambaugh et al. (2015), I find that the overwhelming majority of hedge MIS
returns come from the short leg. With all three factor models, the short MIS portfolio
(quintile 5) generates alphas that are more than 2 times larger than those of the long
portfolio (quintile 1).
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3.3.2 Summary Statistics: Characteristics of Mispriced Stocks
To have a better understanding of stocks with different levels of mispricing, I present the
mean cross-sectional characteristics of MIS quintiles in Panel A of Table 3.1. Quintile
rankings are determined monthly by sorting stocks based on their end-of-month MIS
value. I measure the characteristics at the end of the month in which I define the
quintiles.
I find that the Short-leg (quintile 5) firms, on average, are smaller (lower mar-
ket capitalization), are more volatile, and have cheaper shares with poorer past return
performance, when compared to firms in the Long-leg (quintile 1). Short-leg stocks are
also relatively less liquid, according to the illiquidity measure of Amihud (2002), and are
more heavily sold short. Average holdings indicate that institutional investors tend to
target the right stocks by holding more of the shares of Long-leg stocks. On the other
hand, my brokerage sample suggests that retail (individual) investors place a higher
weight on Short-leg stocks.
Part of my story relies on the conjecture that stocks in the Short leg have higher
skewness, which then attracts investors with a preference for skewness, thereby contribut-
ing to overpricing. I test this assertion by comparing the mean skewness measures across
the MIS quintiles. Together with my four main skewness proxies, I also look at coskew-
ness (COSKEW ), options-based skewness (OS ), idiosyncratic skewness (ISKEWNESS ),
and total skewness (SKEWNESS ). ISKEWNESS and SKEWNESS are computed using
daily returns for the same month as MIS (for further details, see Table 3.A).
Panel B of Table 3.1 presents the results. The average values of all seven skewness
measures monotonically increase from MIS quintiles 1 to 5. In all cases, a simple t-
test indicates that the difference between the skewness values of quintiles 1 and 5 is
statistically significant at the 5% level. Altogether, I find results similar to those reported
in Harvey and Siddique (2000) and Conrad et al. (2014), who find that skewness increases
by moving from the long to the short legs of anomaly strategies. However, I must be
careful in generalizing my argument because the pattern of skewness that I observe is
based on an average measure across anomalies, that is, MIS, and not on each individual
anomaly.
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It is beyond the scope of this study to determine why skewness increases from the
Long to the Short leg. Still, I can speculate about possible causes based on the previous
literature and the portfolio characteristics in Panel A of Table 3.1. A first possible
explanation might be that stocks in the Short leg become more skewed because of their
poor past returns performance. Several studies show that low (high) past average returns
lead to higher (lower) skewness because of market imperfections (e.g., Chen et al., 2001;
Cao et al., 2002; Xu, 2007; Del Viva et al., 2017). In addition, stocks in the short leg
are attractive targets for short sellers because of their underperformance, as captured
by a higher average short ratio in Panel A of Table 3.1. Such stocks are also smaller
and have lower institutional holding levels. The combination of these characteristics is a
recipe for significant short-sale constraints (Nagel, 2005), which directly generate higher
skewness (e.g., Bris et al., 2007; Chang et al., 2007; Xu, 2007).
A third possible explanation is based on the argument of Conine and Tamarkin
(1981) that the limited liability nature of firms implies higher volatility, thereby leading
to higher skewness. The average characteristics in Panel A of Table 3.1 indicate that
firms in the short side are not only more volatile but they also have a higher leverage
ratio, which can explain their higher skewness.
3.4 Empirical Results
In this section, I present my main empirical findings. I begin by testing whether skewness
exacerbates anomalies (H1 and H2 ) using double sorts and Fama-Macbeth regressions.
Then I use my brokerage data to explore how the holdings of investors with a preference
for skewness translate into mispricing.
3.4.1 Skewness and Anomalies
3.4.1.1 Double Sorts
I test my first and second hypotheses (H1 and H2 ) by analyzing the performance of
portfolios double sorted on my combined anomaly variable, that is, MIS, and each of
my four main skewness measures, that is, JACKPOT, LIDX, MAXRET, and ESKEW.
Portfolios are formed by independently sorting stocks into quintiles based on each of the
61
two variables at the end of every month. I then compute the value-weighted returns
of the 25 portfolios over the following month and regress these on the four Carhart
(1997) factors to generate abnormal returns.5 The sample excludes penny stocks and
covers January 1963 to December 2015, except for sorts based on ESKEW, which start
in January 1988.
Panel A of Table 3.2 presents the monthly abnormal returns of the double-sorted
portfolios. As expected, the magnitude of mispricing as captured by MIS spreads (most
overpriced - most underpriced) monotonically increases with each of the four skewness
measures. MIS spreads of stocks in the high skewness quintiles are between 1.22% and
1.71% greater in absolute terms than those in the low skewness quintiles. Differences in
MIS spreads of high and low skewness groups are all highly statistically and economically
significant. For example, the 1.22% difference in the MIS spreads of high and low
ESKEW quintiles is about twice the size of the -0.62% MIS spread of the low ESKEW
quintile. Sorts based on JACKPOT yield the strongest results among all of the four
measures, and high JACKPOT stocks generate a MIS spread of -2.06%, which is about
6 times larger than the -0.35% spread of low JACKPOT stocks. My findings so far are
in line with my first hypothesis (H1 ) that mispricing is concentrated among stocks with
higher levels of skewness.
Panel A of Table 3.2 also shows that the differences in MIS spreads across the
skewness quintiles mostly come from changes in returns of the short leg (most over-
priced). In fact, the difference between the abnormal returns of the high and the low
skewness quintiles is not statistically significant among the most underpriced stocks.
In other words, changes in skewness do not significantly affect underpriced stocks. On
the other hand, increases in skewness measures are associated with the most overpriced
stocks generating 3 to 9 times larger negative abnormal returns. More interesting is that
negative abnormal returns are not statistically significant for overpriced stocks in the low
MAX or low JACKPOT quintiles. This means that stocks with low levels of skewness,
at least according to those two proxies, are not likely to become overpriced even if the
anomaly variables suggest they will. Therefore, the commonly reported finding in the
5I find similar results if I adjust returns using the five-factor model of Fama and French (2015). These
results are available on request.
62
literature that anomaly spreads are mostly driven by Short-leg stocks heavily depends
on the level of skewness. These results support my second hypothesis (H2 ), which looks
at whether the effect of skewness on anomaly returns mostly comes from the short side.
To examine the relative distribution of firms across the most mispriced groups,
I compute the average number of observations in each of the double-sorted portfolios.
Results, presented in Panel B of Table 3.1, indicate that for the most overpriced stocks,
the average number of stocks increases with each of the four skewness measures. In
contrast, there are fewer firms in higher skewness quintiles among the most underpriced
stocks. This pattern indicates that firms in the extreme mispricing quintiles, which are
responsible for the MIS premium, are also likely to be those that generate the skewness
premium. Of course, this observation was predictable based on my summary statistics
in Panel B of Table 3.1 showing that overpriced firms are more likely to have higher
levels of skewness compared with underpriced ones.
Taken together, my double-sorting results are consistent with my main conjecture,
which posits that the mispricing-related component of anomalies is largely driven by
stocks with higher levels of skewness in the cross section. Moreover, the effect of skewness
on anomaly returns is concentrated in Short-leg stocks, which are difficult to arbitrage.
3.4.1.2 Fama-Macbeth Regression Estimates
To further investigate the relation between skewness and anomalies, I run a series of Fama
and MacBeth (1973) regressions. Specifically, at the end of each month t, I use a set of
independent variables, including stock characteristics, and my skewness and mispricing
measures to predict stock returns in month t + 1. The main variable of interest is the
interaction between each of the skewness measures and the anomaly variable, MIS. In
all regressions, I control for market value, the book-to-market ratio, and past returns
for the previous month and for the prior 12 months but skipping the last month. To
facilitate my interpretation, I standardize all variables in the regressions to have a mean
of zero and a standard deviation of 1. Also, all variables are winsorized at the 0.5 and
99.5 percentiles, to ensure that extreme values do not affect my results.
I test my first hypothesis (H1 ) again using Fama-Macbeth regressions. I hypoth-
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esize that the anomaly premium is higher for stocks with greater levels of skewness, so
I expect to find that the interaction between the skewness measures and the anomaly
variable has a negative sign. Panel A of Table 3.3 presents the time-series averages of
the baseline Fama-Macbeth regression coefficients, along with Newey and West (1987)
t-statistics. The first five regression specifications (columns (1) to (5)) exclude interac-
tion terms and test whether MIS and my skewness variables are individually linked to
future returns. Each of the five main variables is statistically significant at the 5% level.
As can be seen, the MIS coefficient is larger and more significant than that of any of the
individual skewness measures. A 1-standard-deviation increase in MIS is associated with
a 0.5% decline (t-statistic of -11.72) in the following month’s return, after controlling for
major firm characteristics. Among the skewness measures, JACKPOT is the strongest
return predictor with a coefficient of -0.004 (t-statistic of -4.16).
Specifications in columns (6) to (9) each include one of the skewness measures,
its interaction with MIS, and MIS itself, as independent variables. Here, I am essen-
tially testing my main premise that the interaction between skewness and the anomaly
variables predicts future returns beyond what is captured by each of the two variables
individually. All four interaction variants are highly statistically significant, with t-
statistics larger than the target threshold figure of 3 suggested by Harvey et al. (2016).6
A 1-standard-deviation increase in skewness adds between 0.1% and 0.3% to the predic-
tive power of MIS on a monthly basis. These figures amount to between 30% and 60% of
the predictive value of MIS by itself. An interesting observation is that the interaction
terms fully absorb the statistical significance of JACKPOT and LIDX. In other words,
the return premia of these two variables are wholly generated by stocks that are likely
to be mispriced, as suggested by the combined anomaly measure.
To ensure that my regression results are not sensitive to my data filters or are
driven by specific parts of the sample, I run a series of robustness tests. For brevity, I only
report the coefficients on my main variables of interest, which are the interaction terms in
Panel B of Table 3.3. Altogether, my estimates are robust. Skipping winsorization and
excluding firms with a share price lower than $5 have negligible effects on the interaction
6Harvey et al. (2016) argue that because of potential data-mining issues, a t-statistic of 3 is a more
appropriate significance cutoff for Fama-Macbeth regressions than is the usual cutoff of 2.
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coefficients. An interesting observation is that my results become slightly stronger once
I drop micro-cap stocks. Excluding mega-cap stocks, however, has a limited effect on
the coefficients. Following Fama and French (2008), I define micro- and mega-cap stocks
as those with market capitalizations below the 20th and above the 80th percentiles of
NYSE market capitalization, respectively. In addition, I try removing NASDAQ stocks
from my sample. In this case, although the coefficients remain highly significant, their
magnitudes shrink slightly in some cases.
I also consider looking at different time periods in the sample. First, I divide
the whole sample into recession and expansion periods, based on the NBER Recession
Indicator,7 and estimate the interaction coefficients separately for each subsample. This
is to see whether the effect of skewness on mispricing is particular to recession times when
the market is highly volatile. The results, reported in rows (6) and (7) of Panel B of Table
3.3, indicate that the interaction coefficients remain significant in both the recession and
the expansion period. The exception, however, is the ESKEW×MIS coefficient, which
is only significant for expansion periods, probably because the ESKEW data start in
1988, so estimates fail to capture the recessions in the 1970s and the 1980s. For the
interaction terms based on the other three skewness measures, the coefficient estimates
are slightly larger but less significant during the recession periods.
Last, I divide my sample into two parts: the first involves the period between
1962 and 1990 and the second between 1991 and 2015. The aim is to see whether results
change over time. I observe that the coefficients are much larger for the second sub-
sample. This observation is also interesting, because it suggests that the skewness effect
is actually stronger for more recent time periods in the sample. Overall, the baseline
regression results presented in this section provide further evidence to corroborate my
first hypothesis and show that skewness increases the level of mispricing predicted by
the anomaly strategies.
In Panel C of Table 3.3, I test my second hypothesis (H2 ) again by checking
whether skewness contributes to anomalies by exacerbating overpricing, while not affect-
ing underpricing significantly. Since an interaction term between MIS and the skewness
7The data are taken from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis website
(https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/USREC).
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variables cannot directly capture this effect, I run the Fama-Macbeth specification in
column (1) of Panel A within subsamples of MIS and the four skewness variables. This
specification only includes MIS and firm controls as independent variables. I construct
the subsamples by sorting stocks independently at the beginning of each month into
two MIS and two skewness portfolios using medians as breakpoints. I then estimate the
regression model within each of the four intersecting subsamples, separately. I repeat
this exercise for each of my four skewness measures.
My second hypothesis predicts that mispricing levels (MIS coefficients) of over-
priced stocks, which are in the above-median MIS group, are significantly different be-
tween the subsamples of high and low skewness. On the other hand, mispricing levels
of underpriced stocks, which are in the below-median MIS group, do not significantly
differ between the high- and the low-skewness groups. In line with this prediction, the
results in Panel C of Table 3.3 show that the MIS coefficients of overpriced stocks are
between 0.2% and 0.4% more negative in high-skewness subsamples compared to low-
skewness ones. These differences are all statistically significant. Among underpriced
stocks, however, there are not any statistically significant differences in MIS coefficients
between high and low skewness subsamples. These findings provide further corroborating
evidence for my second hypothesis (H2 ).
3.4.1.3 Evidence from Option-Based Skewness Measures
In the previous sections, I incorporate four prominent measures of firm skewness to
test whether they affect the mispricing associated with anomaly strategies, as captured
by the MIS measure. All four of my skewness variables yield results that are in line
with my predictions; however, they are all noisy proxies for investors’ perceptions about
future return skewness. To make sure that my results reflect the role of skewness in
predicting returns, and not an unrelated effect captured by the skewness measures, I
repeat my main tests with a skewness measure constructed using option prices. In
particular, I use the options-based idiosyncratic skewness measure of Bakshi et al. (2003)
and Conrad et al. (2013). This options-based measure offers us information regarding
expected future return skewness, without being subject to hindsight bias and without
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requiring a parametric model for estimation (Conrad et al., 2013). However, I cannot use
this measure in all my tests because option prices are available only for a small subset
of firms in my sample.
Table 3.4, Panels A and B, respectively, present the results for double sorting and
the Fama-Macbeth regressions using the options-based idiosyncratic skewness measure
(OS ). I essentially repeat the exercises in sections 4.1 and 4.2 but use the new measure.
OS is constructed following the methodology of Conrad et al. (2013), as explained in
Table 3.A. The sample period covering OS starts from 1996, because option price data
for earlier years are not available in the OptionMetrics database.
The double-sorting results in Panel A of Table 3.4 suggest a pattern similar to
what I observed before. That is, the spread between the most overpriced and the most
underpriced stocks is largest among stocks in the high-OS quintile. As OS increases,
MIS spreads do not grow with a clear monotonic pattern; however, there is a 2.06%
difference between the monthly abnormal returns (t-statistic of -2.23) of the low- and
the high-OS quintiles. Also, most of the increase in the MIS spread in the high skewness
group comes from the change in the returns of the Short-leg (most overpriced) stocks.
Again, these observations support my first and second hypotheses.
The Fama-Macbeth regression results in Panel B of Table 3.4 are also in line with
my first hypothesis. In specification (1), I find that OS by itself cannot significantly
predict returns. Conrad et al. (2013) argue that, because of the limited number of
firms with available option data, the relation between OS and returns cannot be reliably
estimated. Nevertheless, my tests do not require me to have a reliable estimate for the
premium associated with OS. I am instead interested to see whether OS exacerbates
the mispricing captured by MIS. In specification (2), I test this conjecture by adding an
interaction term between OS and MIS to the model.
The coefficient of the interaction term is -0.003 (t-statistics of -2.29), indicating
that a 1-standard-deviation increase in OS increases the return predictability of MIS by
0.3%. This estimate is also economically significant. Considering that the MIS coefficient
is also equal to -0.003, the interaction coefficient suggests that a 1-standard-deviation
increase in OS doubles the premium associated with MIS. Altogether, regressions and
67
double-sorting tests based on the options-based skewness measure support my previous
results about the effect of skewness on the anomaly-based mispricing.
3.4.2 Do Skewness-Loving Investors Hold the Wrong Stocks?
My results so far suggest that the common mispricing-related component of anomaly
strategies is strongly concentrated among stocks with higher levels of skewness. More-
over, I show that this relation is mostly driven by the exacerbating effect of skewness on
the prices of stocks that anomaly strategies suggest are overpriced. In this subsection, I
examine the mechanism through which investors with skewness proclivities affect market
anomalies. I expect to find that investors with such preferences invest disproportionately
more in Short-leg stocks compared with Long-leg ones. Following Barberis and Huang
(2008), investors with a preference for skewness deviate from holding a combination of
the risk-free asset and the tangency portfolio and place a relatively higher weight on
stocks with higher levels of skewness. Stocks in the short legs of anomalies are more pos-
itively skewed than are those in the long legs. Therefore, all else being equal, Short-leg
stocks should be relatively more attractive to investors with skewness preferences.
I test this prediction using the portfolio holdings data of a sample of retail in-
vestors obtained from a large U.S. discount brokerage house for the period 1991 to 1996.
The reason for using data for retail investors is that previous papers show that such
investors are more likely to have a preference for skewness (Kumar, 2009). My main
dependent variables are the raw and excess weights allocated to overpriced (Short-leg)
stocks, relative to undepriced (Long-leg) ones, in each investor portfolio at the end of
every month.
Raw and excess relative weights are defined as [W overpricedi,t −W underpricedi,t ] and
[(W overpricedi,t −W overpricedmkt,t )−(W underpricedi,t −W underpricedmkt,t )], respectively. W overpricedi,t is the
raw weight allocated to overpriced stocks in portfolio i at the end of month t; W underpricedi,t
is the raw weight allocated to underpriced stocks in portfolio i at the end of month t;
W overpricedmkt,t is the raw weight allocated to overpriced stocks in the market portfolio at
the end of month t; and W underpricedmkt,t is the raw weight allocated to underpriced stocks
in the market portfolio at the end of month t. Underpriced and overpriced stocks are
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defined as those in the 1st and 5th quintiles of MIS, respectively.
I regress my relative weight measures on a series of variables capturing investors’
preference for skewness, as well as controlling for socioeconomic and portfolio character-
istics. I estimate regressions for each month and then compute the time-series averages
of the coefficients using the Fama-Macbeth framework. Because preference for skewness
is not directly measurable, I adopt an indirect proxy by computing the average portfolio
weight each investor allocated to stocks with high levels of positive skewness in the past.
I define stocks with high levels of positive skewness as those having skewness measures
above the monthly cross-sectional median. At the end of every month t, I take the av-
erage of the weight each portfolio holder allocated to stocks with high levels of positive
skewness over the previous 12 months ending in t-1. The stronger an investor’s pref-
erence for skewness, the more likely she is to have allocated a higher weight to skewed
assets in the past.
Skewness is measured using four proxies: JACKPOT, LIDX, MAXRET, and ES-
KEW. I also incorporate the Catholic-to-Protestant ratio (CPRATIO) used in Kumar
et al. (2011) and Kumar et al. (2016) as a measure of the local preference for skew-
ness. Kumar et al. (2011) show that investors living in Catholic regions have stronger
gambling tendencies and are more likely to be attracted to investments with positively
skewed payoffs than are those residing in Protestant regions. CPRATIO is defined as
the number of Catholic adherents divided by the number of Protestant adherents in the
portfolio holder’s county. Table 3.A presents details about the construction of all vari-
ables, including the socioeconomic and portfolio characteristics controls. I standardize
all independent variables to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1 and also
winsorize them at the 0.5 and 99.5 percentiles.
Panel A of Table 3.5 presents the baseline results. Columns (1) to (4) show
that investors who overweighted stocks with high levels of skewness in the past year
by 1 standard deviation of the cross-sectional distribution allocate between 11.6% and
18.4% higher raw weight to overpriced stocks, relative to underpriced ones. Excess
weight regression estimates (columns (5) to (8)) provide a clearer picture because they
are based on weights adjusted for benchmark (market) weights. A 1-standard-deviation
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increase in an investor’s past weight on high-skewness stocks predicts between 8.7% and
13.9% higher relative excess weight on overpriced stocks.
Coefficient estimates of past weights on high-skewness stocks are highly statisti-
cally significant for all four skewness measures even after controlling for a wide range of
controls and adjusting standard errors for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation using
the Newey and West (1987) approach. CPRATIO coefficients are also statistically sig-
nificant in all cases, but have relatively small magnitudes. The estimates indicate that
a 1-standard-deviation increase in regional CPRATIO is associated with between 0.4%
and 0.6% higher raw weights (0.3% to 0.5% higher excess weights) on overpriced stocks
relative to underpriced stocks.
The rest of the coefficients in Panel A of Table 3.5 are also worth noting, because
they further highlight the characteristics of the clientele of investors who place higher
weights on stocks expected to perform poorly. The estimates indicate that such investors
hold smaller and less diversified portfolios with significantly poorer past performance
and higher portfolio variance. These investors are also less likely to concentrate their
positions on a specific industry or geographical location. The latter finding is in line
with Ivkovi and Weisbenner (2005), who show that local investors have more knowledge
about local stocks and are less likely to buy local stocks that perform poorly.
Investors who put a higher relative weight on overpriced stocks are also likely to
be male, single, old, and living in rental properties. Furthermore, they reside in less-
populated regions with greater income inequality and poorer levels of education. Most
of these characteristics are similar to those documented by previous studies as features
of unsophisticated investors exhibiting stronger behavioral biases (e.g., Goetzmann and
Kumar, 2008; Korniotis and Kumar, 2013a) or a preference for skewness (e.g., Mitton
and Vorkink, 2007; Kumar, 2009).
A possible concern with my results in Panel A of Table 3.5 is that I use the same
stocks in each portfolio to compute the weights on both mispriced and high-skewess
stocks. Even though all my independent variables are lagged by 1 month, most investors
do not change their positions regularly. Therefore, the relation between the weights
on skewed and overpriced stocks may just reflect the correlation between the skewness
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measures and my mispricing indicator, MIS. In other words, an investor may overweight
stocks with high levels of MIS (i.e., overpriced) for reasons other than a preference
for skewness and still have a relatively high portfolio weight on skewed stocks simply
because overpriced stocks have higher skewness levels. To address this issue, I adjust my
measures of past weight on high-skewness stocks by excluding all stocks in MIS quintile
1 or 5. Essentially, I compute the average weight an investor allocated to skewed stocks
by excluding those that are mispriced according to MIS.
Panel B of Table 3.5 presents the results based on my alternative measures of
weight on high-skewness stocks. I use the same regression specification used in Panel
A. For brevity, control variable coefficients are not reported in the table, because they
all remain almost intact from the previous regressions. The main results remain both
statistically and economically significant with the new weight measures. A 1-standard-
deviation increase in an investor’s past weight on high-skewness stocks that are not in
the extreme MIS quintiles predicts between 7.3% and 13.3% higher relative raw weight
on overpriced stocks (t-statistics ranging from 8.51 to 21.44). In relative excess weight
regressions, the estimates range between 5.5% and 8.5%.
In short, the findings in this section support my prediction that investors with
skewness preferences invest disproportionately more in Short-leg stocks compared with
Long-leg ones and exacerbate market anomalies. Specifically, investors who have a his-
tory of holding stocks with higher levels of skewness are more (less) likely to hold stocks
that will underperform (outperform), as suggested by the anomaly strategies. Investors
who overweight underperforming stocks relative to outperforming ones are also likely to
come from Catholic regions, where the propensity to gamble is strong. Lastly, I observe
that such investors possess other characteristics that have been previously linked to in-
vestors sophistication and possession of the preference for skewness and other behavioral
biases.
3.5 Robustness Tests
I argued in the previous section that the effect of skewness on anomalies is driven by
the preference of a group of investors to hold positively skewed assets. In this section,
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I test two alternative explanations for my results. In particular, I consider skewness as
a measure of systematic tail risk, as captured by coskewness, and an indirect proxy for
factors deterring arbitragers.
3.5.1 Role of Coskewness in Anomalies
Harvey and Siddique (2000) argue that part of the reason anomaly strategies exist is
because asset pricing models do not account for the downside tail risk captured by skew-
ness. They build on Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) and conjecture that only a security’s
coskewness with the market portfolio should be priced because fully diversified investors
do not care about the skewness of individual securities. Harvey and Siddique (2000)
propose a coskewness factor and demonstrate that adding it to the CAPM significantly
enhances the ability of the model to capture cross-sectional anomalies. In this subsec-
tion, I consider the coskewness measures of Harvey and Siddique (2000) and test whether
the relationship between skewness and anomaly returns can be linked to a missing sys-
tematic coskewness factor in the asset pricing model, rather than to a mispricing effect
generated by the preference for skewness.
Harvey and Siddique (2000) measure coskewness in two ways: their original def-
inition, which is the standardized correlation between CAPM residuals and squared
market returns, and their alternative measure, defined as the loading on a squared mar-
ket return factor added to the CAPM. I include both variants of coskewness in my tests.
I estimate the former measure using monthly returns data for the past 60 months and
the latter measure using daily returns for the past month. Table 3.A provides further
details on the construction of the variables.
Panel A of Table 3.6 reports the results of my baseline Fama-Macbeth regressions
with the addition of the original coskewness measure of Harvey and Siddique (2000) as
a control variable. I also consider an interaction term between coskewness and MIS to
capture any possible effect coskewness might have on the coefficients of my skewness
interaction terms. The results indicate that controlling for coskewness has almost no
impact on my previous interaction coefficients. The interaction term between coskewness
and MIS does not enter any of my regressions significantly and has negligible coefficients
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in all cases. The coskewness term does not have a statistically significant coefficient, even
in the column (1) specification, where none of the other main variables are included in
the regression. Barberis et al. (2016) report similar results for the insignificance of
coskewness in Fama-Macbeth regressions.
I repeat this exercise with the alternative measure of coskewness defined as the
coefficient on a squared market factor. Results are very similar to those based on the
original definition. For brevity, I only report the main coefficients of interest in Panel B
of Table 3.6. Interaction terms between coskewness and MIS are again not statistically
significant. Overall, the findings in this subsection indicate that the effect of skewness
on anomaly returns cannot be linked to coskewness. In other words, it is firm-specific
skewness rather than systematic skewness that affects the predictability of anomaly
strategies.
3.5.2 Skewness as a Proxy for Limits to Arbitrage
Part of my story regarding the role of skewness in generating anomalies relies on the
presence of limits to arbitrage in the market. In the absence of arbitrage risks and costs,
any skewness-related mispricing would likely vanish, as expected utility investors would
reverse the pricing effect of investors who have a preference for skewness (Barberis and
Huang, 2008). However, a possible concern of my findings is that my skewness mea-
sures might indirectly reflect arbitrage costs, instead of features that trigger investors’
preference for skewness. If this were to be the case, the exacerbating effect of skewness
on anomalies would be simply due to skewed stocks being more difficult to arbitrage.
Previous studies document the close link between skewness and limits to arbitrage. For
example, several papers show that short-sale constraints directly lead to higher skew-
ness (e.g., Bris et al., 2007; Chang et al., 2007; Xu, 2007). In addition, Conrad et al.
(2014) find that their JACKPOT measure, which has the best performance in my tests,
is strongly associated with arbitrage costs.
In this section, I address the concern outlined above by adding several measures
of arbitrage cost as control variables to my Fama-Macbeth regressions. Similar to my
approach in the previous subsection, I also interact these limits-to-arbitrage proxies with
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MIS and add them alongside my main interaction terms. I expect to observe that my
main interactions between skewness and MIS do not lose their economic and statistical
significance with the addition of the other variables to the regressions. The logic behind
this conjecture is that the interactions between skewness and MIS capture stocks that
are not only difficult to arbitrage but that are also traded in the wrong direction by
investors reacting to skewness. As a result, skewness and MIS interactions are likely to
predict higher levels of mispricing compared with simple interactions between MIS and
proxies for limits to arbitrage.
I follow previous papers and consider five measures for limits to arbitrage. They
include the illiquidity measure of Amihud (2002), the short interest ratio (following
Hanson and Sunderam (2014)), the bid-ask spread (motivated by Amihud and Mendelson
(1986) and Hasbrouck (2009)), the frequency of zero daily returns suggested by Lesmond
et al. (1999), and the percentage institutional holding (like in DAvolio (2002)). Table
3.A presents the construction details for each measure.
Panels A to E of Table 3.7 report the results of running the Fama-Macbeth
regressions with the addition of each of the five proxies outlined above. I observe that
the coefficients of my main interaction terms between skewness and MIS remain almost
the same after adding any of the five limits-to-arbitrage proxies and their interactions
with MIS to the regressions. This finding indicates that the strength of the interaction
between skewness and anomaly-related mispricing in predicting returns is only due to the
correlation between skewness and proxies for limits to arbitrage. In fact, the interactions
between MIS and the five limits-to-arbitrage proxies are statistically significant in only
a few cases. In sum, these results indicate that the role of skewness in exacerbating
anomalies goes beyond just capturing arbitrage costs, which are often associated with
skewness.
3.6 Skewness as a Factor
In the previous sections, I established that skewness features of stocks that are likely
to be mispriced according to anomaly strategies attract investors with skewness prefer-
ences and thereby contribute to mispricing. In this section, I build on the approach of
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Stambaugh and Yuan (2016) and examine whether firm-specific skewness in asset pricing
models in the form of a mispricing factor, rather than a systematic risk factor, improves
their ability to capture anomaly returns.
The idea behind constructing a mispricing factor is that mispricing has common
drivers across stocks; therefore, factors exhibiting these common sources will help explain
cross-sectional variations in returns that do not reflect compensation for systematic risk.
Considering that skewness has a significant association with the common mispricing-
related component of anomaly strategies, a skewness factor is likely to capture at least
part of the commonality in abnormal returns. It is important to note, however, that I
am not seeking to develop an asset pricing model here. The purpose of the exercise in
this section is to investigate whether a skewness factor should be considered in future
models to enable a better explanation of cross-sectional returns.
I follow the approach of Stambaugh and Yuan (2016) and use my four skewness
measures—JACKPOT, LIDX, MAXRET, and ESKEW —to construct a skewness factor.
That is, I first compute the average decile rank of each stock at the end of each month
with respect to the four skewness measures. Next, I independently sort stocks based on
their average skewness decile ranks and their market capitalization into three and two
portfolios, respectively. I then compute the value-weighted monthly return of each of
the six (= 2× 3) intersecting portfolios.
Unlike Stambaugh and Yuan (2016), I use the sample median rather than the
NYSE median to allocate stocks into size groups. The reason for my different approach
is that using NYSE median groups would lead to an extreme difference between the
numbers of firms in the two size groups within highly skewed stocks.
Last, I take the average of the returns of the two size portfolios with the highest
skewness tercile rank and deduct it from the average return of the two size portfolios
with the lowest tercile rank, to derive monthly factor returns. I call this skewness factor
nonskewed minus skewed (NMS ).
I add NMS to the following four prominent models: Fama and French (1993)
three-factor (FF3 ), Carhart (1997) four-factor (CAR), Fama and French (2015) five-
factor (FF5 ), and Fama and French (2015) with the addition of momentum (FF6 ). I
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then compare the performance of the new models with the original ones in capturing the
11 anomaly strategies used to construct my anomaly variable (MIS ). As described in
Subsection 3.3.1, the anomalies include accruals, asset growth, composite equity issues,
distress, gross profitability, investment-to-assets, momentum, net operating assets, net
stock issues, O-score, and return on assets.
I evaluate the performance of the models by comparing the Long-Short abnormal
returns of each anomaly strategy with respect to different models. The return on the
Long-Short portfolio is computed as the difference between the value-weighted monthly
return on stocks ranked in the bottom decile and the return on those in the top decile
of each anomaly variable. I then regress the time series of Long-Short portfolio returns
on different systematic risk factors to estimate for the abnormal returns, as captured by
the intercept alpha.
Table 3.8, Panels A and B, respectively, present the alphas and t-statistics of the
11 anomaly strategies produced using various models. The results indicate that adding
the NMS factor shrinks the anomaly strategy alphas in the majority of cases. The
exceptions are accruals, composite equity issuance, and investment-to-assets anomalies,
for which the hedge alphas in some cases increase with the addition of the NMS factor.
The most significant cases of improvement come from the distress and O-score anomalies.
Adding the NMS factor reduces the distress anomaly alphas by 0.24% to 0.72% and the
O-score alphas by 0.1% to 0.29%. Models with the NMS factor also produce t-statistics
between 1.11 and 2.6 lower for the distress anomaly and between 0.98 and 2.2 lower for
the O-score anomaly.
To better compare the models with each other, I present a set of summarizing
performance measures for each model in Panel C of Table 3.8. In particular, I follow
Stambaugh and Yuan (2016) and compute the average absolute alpha, the average ab-
solute t-statistic of alpha, and the Gibbons et al. (1989) statistics (GRS) testing the
null hypothesis that the intercept terms of all anomaly strategies are collectively equal
to zero. Consistent across all these three performance measures, models with the NMS
factor perform better than do their peers that do not have the NMS factor. For ex-
ample, the three-factor model (FF3 ) with the addition of NMS produces a 0.2% lower
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average alpha, and average t-statistics and GRS statistics that are lower by 1.04 and
3.16, respectively.
Comparing the performance of models with the same number of factors also
indicates that those with the NMS factor perform relatively better. FF3 with the
addition of NMS, for instance, generates an average alpha that is almost the same as
CAR but has t-statistics and GRS statistics that are lower by 0.17 and 1.02. The best
model among them all is the five-factor model with momentum (FF6 ) and the NMS
factor. This model produces an average alpha of 0.4%, an average t-statistic of 2.929,
and a GRS statistic of 6.471. For comparison, the corresponding figures for FF3 are 1%,
5.033, and 7.269.
Overall, I find that the NMS factor helps capture part of the commonality in mis-
pricing that is linked to skewness. The NMS factor is particularly useful for explaining
distress-related anomalies, which are shown to be driven by skewed stocks (e.g., Conrad
et al., 2014). Future studies can build on these findings and produce more refined factors
capturing the pricing effects of skewness.
3.7 Summary and Conclusion
This study examines whether investor preference for skewness can act as a common driver
of cross-sectional mispricing patterns identified by various anomaly strategies. Using a
composite mispricing measure based on 11 strategies, I demonstrate that anomalies are
significantly more prevalent among stocks with higher levels of cross-sectional skewness.
This result is consistent across a wide range of skewness measures commonly used in
the literature. Skewness predominantly exacerbates anomalies through an increase in
overpricing among stocks in the Short portfolio. Returns among stocks in the Long
portfolio, on the other hand, do not significantly change with the level of skewness.
I attribute the effect of skewness on anomalies to the proclivity of a group of
investors to hold positively skewed positions. Portfolio holdings from a large U.S. re-
tail brokerage house suggest that investors with a history of holding positively skewed
positions are considerably more likely to overweight stocks that anomaly strategies pre-
dict will underperform, relative to those that will outperform. Investors who overweight
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underperforming stocks relative to outperforming ones also possess characteristics that
have been previously linked to investor sophistication and a preference for skewness.
My results do not fully explain various market anomalies. Numerous underlying
mechanisms—though not all related to mispricing— are likely to drive each individual
anomaly. I demonstrate mispricing-related commonalities across a range of strategies
and show that the preference for skewness plays an important role here. In this sense, my
work is related to papers that look for common drivers of anomalies. Stambaugh et al.
(2012), for example, highlights the role of investor sentiment. While investor sentiment
can explain time-series variations in the performance of anomalies, my story explains
variations in the cross section. For example, I can, at least partly, explain why some
stocks in the Short legs of anomaly portfolios are more overpriced than others.
As the main takeaway, I document that pricing implications of skewness extend
beyond the individual cases of cross-sectional mispricing investigated in previous papers.
Considering that stocks with the most extreme fundamental characteristics are also the
most skewed in the cross section, skewness should be taken into account in asset pricing
models, to better explain expected returns. The effect of skewness is mostly observed
in the form of mispricing, which is unlikely to be captured by a systematic risk factor.
I suggest that a factor that captures skewness-related mispricing commonalities can be
useful in asset pricing models.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
This table reports the average characteristics of MIS quintiles in Panels A and B and the monthly value-
weighted abnormal returns of quintiles based on MIS and the four skewness measures of JACKPOT,
LIDX, MAXRET, and ESKEW in Panel C. MIS is a combined measure of mispricing based on 11
prominent anomaly strategies, following Stambaugh et al. (2015). Higher (lower) values of MIS indicate
a higher likelihood for the stock to be overpriced (underpriced). Table 3.A defines MIS and all other
variables. Quintile portfolios are formed by sorting stocks into five groups at the end of every month.
The t-statistics for the difference between the values of quintiles 1 and 5 (5 - 1) in Panels A and B
are based on Newey-West heteroscedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors using a lag
of 36. The three-, four-, and five-factor models used to adjust returns in Panel C correspond to the
models of Fama and French (1993), Carhart (1997), and Fama and French (2015), respectively. The
sample excludes penny stocks and covers January 1963 to December 2015, except for the sorts based on




1 2 3 4 5 5 - 1
Panel A: Key Statistics of MIS Portfolios
ME ($ Billion) 1.56 3.50 1.88 1.14 0.78 0.51 -2.99 (-3.61)
PRICE ($) 21.16 29.17 24.4 20.43 17.81 13.99 -15.18 (-8.04)
VOLATILITY (%) 3.05 2.50 2.78 3.03 3.27 3.68 1.19 (7.83)
IVOL (%) 2.95 2.37 2.67 2.95 3.19 3.60 1.23 (6.98)
RET[-12,-2] (%) 3.13 18.41 10.67 4.08 -3.07 -14.45 -32.86 (-11.13)
TURNOVER (%) 9.39 8.87 8.83 8.98 9.67 10.63 1.76 (3.54)
SHORTRATIO 2.14 1.82 1.96 2.12 2.41 2.80 0.98 (5.38)
ILLIQ (10ˆ-6) 4.28 2.91 4.22 5.10 4.92 4.26 1.35 (7.59)
LEVERAGE 0.24 0.13 0.19 0.25 0.29 0.33 0.20 (15.52)
B/M 0.84 0.67 0.81 0.90 0.92 0.90 0.23 (5.66)
RHOLDING (%) 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.03 (4.37)
IHOLDING (%) 30.71 36.89 34.00 32.04 28.02 22.61 -14.28 (-7.93)
Panel B: Skewness Characteristics of MIS Portfolios
ESKEW 0.78 0.62 0.70 0.77 0.84 0.96 0.33 (5.48)
JACKPOT (%) 2.00 1.30 1.63 1.98 2.24 2.82 1.52 (4.36)
LIDX 0.49 0.42 0.45 0.49 0.51 0.57 0.15 (8.17)
MAXRET (%) 6.87 5.49 6.18 6.83 7.42 8.45 2.97 (7.23)
OS -0.28 -0.32 -0.28 -0.25 -0.24 -0.21 0.11 (6.86)
ISKEWNESS 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.03 (2.24)
SKEWNESS 0.25 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.28 0.05 (2.55)
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Table 3.1: (Continued)
Panel C: Abnormal Returns of MIS and Skewness Measures
Variable Model 1 2 3 4 5 5 - 1
MIS
3-Factor 0.29*** 0.07* -0.07 -0.22*** -0.80*** -1.09***
(6.66) (1.77) (-1.24) (-3.57) (-8.30) (-8.90)
4-Factor 0.20*** 0.08* -0.05 -0.11* -0.56*** -0.76***
(4.87) (1.76) (-0.82) (-1.78) (-6.31) (-6.92)
5-Factor 0.18*** 0.05 0.00 -0.08 -0.45*** -0.63***
(4.46) (1.20) (0.08) (-1.26) (-5.32) (-5.99)
JACKPOT
3-Factor 0.08*** 0.02 -0.09 -0.51*** -0.97*** -1.05***
(3.47) (0.29) (-1.24) (-4.23) (-5.39) (-5.50)
4-Factor 0.05** 0.07 -0.03 -0.34*** -0.65*** -0.70***
(2.16) (1.31) (-0.35) (-2.82) (-3.73) (-3.80)
5-Factor 0.01 0.17*** 0.15** -0.08 -0.35** -0.37**
(0.62) (3.17) (2.36) (-0.73) (-2.29) (-2.27)
LIDX
3-Factor 0.11*** -0.02 -0.09 -0.32*** -0.99*** -1.09***
(4.13) (-0.32) (-1.17) (-3.13) (-6.45) (-6.77)
4-Factor 0.08*** 0.00 0.01 -0.14 -0.66*** -0.74***
(2.97) (0.08) (0.07) (-1.36) (-4.55) (-4.84)
5-Factor 0.07*** 0.07 0.14** 0.00 -0.57*** -0.64***
(3.07) (1.34) (1.99) (-0.02) (-4.09) (-4.46)
MAXRET
3-Factor 0.10** 0.03 0.08 -0.10 -0.61*** -0.70***
(2.03) (0.60) (1.38) (-1.07) (-4.92) (-4.68)
4-Factor 0.08 0.06 0.12** -0.04 -0.47*** -0.55***
(1.56) (1.09) (1.97) (-0.44) (-3.81) (-3.62)
5-Factor 0.01 0.06 0.18*** 0.12 -0.24** -0.25*
(0.20) (1.29) (2.84) (1.35) (-2.17) (-1.86)
ESKEW
3-Factor 0.10** 0.11* -0.09 -0.25** -0.62*** -0.72***
(2.55) (1.73) (-0.83) (-2.10) (-4.21) (-4.46)
4-Factor 0.08** 0.10 -0.01 -0.13 -0.44*** -0.52***
(2.06) (1.52) (-0.09) (-1.07) (-2.96) (-3.22)
5-Factor 0.09** 0.14** 0.10 0.00 -0.25* -0.34**
(2.30) (2.29) (0.88) (-0.02) (-1.87) (-2.32)
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Table 3.2: Double Sorts
Panel A reports benchmark adjusted returns for double-sorted portfolios based on MIS and one of the four
skewness measures of JACKPOT, LIDX, MAXRET, and ESKEW. Table 3.A defines all the variables.
The portfolios are formed by independently sorting stocks into five portfolios at the end of every month
with respect to each variable. I then compute the value-weighted returns of the 25 intersecting portfolios
for the following month and regress the time series of returns on the four factors of Carhart (1997).
The regression intercept is the abnormal return estimate reported in the table. Panel B presents the
average number of stocks in each portfolio. The sample excludes penny stocks and covers January 1963
to December 2015, except for sorts based on ESKEW, which start in January 1988. *, **, and ***
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Most
2 3 4
Most Most Overpriced -
Underpriced Overpriced Most Underpriced
Panel A: Abnormal Returns of Double-Sorted Portfolios
JACKPOT
Low 0.19*** 0.02 -0.11* -0.11 -0.16 -0.35***
(4.23) (0.40) (-1.74) (-1.58) (-1.51) (-2.89)
2 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.17* -0.19* -0.68*** -1.05***
(4.54) (4.56) (1.68) (-1.88) (-5.62) (-7.20)
3 0.42*** 0.48*** 0.08 -0.09 -0.92*** -1.34***
(3.99) (4.21) (0.72) (-0.82) (-6.83) (-7.85)
4 0.72*** 0.35** 0.07 -0.10 -1.11*** -1.83***
(4.94) (2.45) (0.49) (-0.65) (-6.81) (-9.71)
High 0.50** 0.45** -0.21 -0.29 -1.55*** -2.06***
(2.33) (2.36) (-1.05) (-1.42) (-7.73) (-8.15)
High - 0.31 0.43** -0.09 -0.18 -1.40*** -1.71***
Low (1.40) (2.14) (-0.43) (-0.80) (-6.03) (-6.32)
LIDX
Low 0.22*** 0.06 -0.04 -0.06 -0.35*** -0.56***
(4.47) (1.17) (-0.60) (-0.77) (-3.30) (-4.65)
2 0.21** 0.05 -0.01 -0.17* -0.34*** -0.55***
(2.52) (0.67) (-0.14) (-1.79) (-2.73) (-3.54)
3 0.51*** 0.35*** 0.13 -0.20 -0.75*** -1.27***
(4.20) (3.12) (1.14) (-1.65) (-5.77) (-6.88)
4 0.43*** 0.52*** 0.05 -0.04 -1.06*** -1.50***
(3.18) (4.06) (0.44) (-0.30) (-6.68) (-7.52)
High 0.47** 0.15 -0.23 -0.40** -1.43*** -1.90***
(2.40) (0.82) (-1.23) (-2.03) (-7.48) (-8.27)
High - 0.25 0.09 -0.18 -0.34 -1.08*** -1.37***
Low (1.24) (0.46) (-0.91) (-1.58) (-5.01) (-5.47)
MAXRET
Low 0.20*** 0.10 0.00 0.04 -0.15 -0.34**
(2.68) (1.36) (-0.02) (0.42) (-1.28) (-2.56)
2 0.21*** 0.14* 0.06 -0.11 -0.34*** -0.54***
(2.65) (1.70) (0.60) (-1.19) (-2.98) (-3.91)
3 0.49*** 0.14 -0.05 -0.04 -0.62*** -1.11***
(4.98) (1.39) (-0.46) (-0.35) (-4.90) (-6.89)
4 0.54*** 0.14 0.03 -0.34** -0.80*** -1.34***
(3.64) (1.02) (0.24) (-2.44) (-5.49) (-6.68)
High 0.20 -0.08 -0.37** -0.39** -1.51*** -1.70***
(1.10) (-0.44) (-2.02) (-2.21) (-8.61) (-7.62)
High - 0.00 -0.17 -0.37* -0.43** -1.37*** -1.37***





Most Most Overpriced -
Underpriced Overpriced Most Underpriced
ESKEW
Low 0.31*** 0.03 -0.05 -0.09 -0.32** -0.62***
(4.57) (0.46) (-0.53) (-1.00) (-2.54) (-4.32)
2 0.22** 0.15* 0.11 -0.01 -0.51*** -0.73***
(2.11) (1.66) (1.10) (-0.09) (-3.98) (-4.53)
3 0.32** 0.18 0.09 -0.11 -0.86*** -1.18***
(2.34) (1.30) (0.67) (-0.80) (-5.24) (-5.69)
4 0.57*** 0.35** -0.10 -0.06 -1.00*** -1.58***
(4.01) (2.19) (-0.64) (-0.38) (-6.11) (-8.28)
High 0.58*** 0.35** 0.22 -0.24 -1.30*** -1.88***
(3.45) (2.21) (1.22) (-1.25) (-5.98) (-7.78)
High - 0.28 0.32* 0.27 -0.16 -0.98*** -1.22***
Low (1.53) (1.83) (1.26) (-0.71) (-3.89) (-4.56)






Low 209 172 135 106 68
2 154 144 132 118 86
3 112 116 122 124 119
4 92 106 120 134 157
High 65 95 124 150 202
LIDX
Low 196 163 131 106 66
2 154 141 130 120 94
3 121 123 123 125 123
4 89 105 120 133 158
High 63 93 120 140 182
MAXRET
Low 176 146 124 104 78
2 156 143 130 117 96
3 126 130 129 128 120
4 97 112 124 135 150
High 69 94 117 139 181
ESKEW
Low 190 160 133 115 83
2 168 151 135 118 90
3 121 126 129 132 132
4 102 114 124 135 153












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.4: Options-Based Skewness Tests
This tables presents double sorting and Fama-Macbeth regression results based on the options-based
idiosyncratic skewness measure (OS) of Conrad et al. (2013). The double sorting and regression method-
ologies are the same as those described in Tables 2 and 3, respectively. Table 3.A defines all the variables.
The sample period covers January 1996 to December 2015, as the option price data for older periods are
not available in the OptionMetrics database. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
Panel A: Double Sorts
OS Quintile
Most Most Most Overpriced -
Underpriced Overpriced Most Underpriced
Low 0.21 0.28 0.10
(1.22) (0.43) (0.14)
2 0.00 -1.86*** -1.70***
(0.02) (-3.43) (-2.99)
3 0.44* -1.72*** -2.04***
(1.89) (-2.82) (-2.95)
4 0.08 -0.82 -0.99*
(0.27) (-1.49) (-1.65)
High 0.52 -1.66*** -2.13***
(1.04) (-2.90) (-2.98)
High - Low 0.31 -1.55** -2.06**
(0.58) (-2.04) (-2.23)
























Table 3.5: Individual Investor Portfolio Weight Regressions
This table presents estimates from the Fama-Macbeth regressions, where the dependent variables are the
raw weight (columns (1) to (4)) and the excess weight (columns (5) to (8)) allocated to overpriced stocks
relative to undepriced ones in each investor portfolio at the end of every month. Overpriced (underpriced)
stocks are defined as those in the fifth (first) quintile of MIS. The raw and the excess relative weights are
defined as W overpricedi,t −Wunderpricedi,t and EW overpriced−EWunderpriced = [(W overpricedi,t −W overpricedmkt,t )−
(Wunderpricedi,t −Wunderpricedmkt,t )], respectively. W overpricedi,t is the raw weight allocated to overpriced stocks
in portfolio i at the end of month t; Wunderpricedi,t is the raw weight allocated to underpriced stocks in
portfolio i at the end of month t; W overpricedmkt,t is the raw weight allocated to overpriced stocks in the
market portfolio at the end of month t; and Wunderpricedmkt,t is the raw weight allocated to underpriced
stocks in the market portfolio at the end of month t. In Panel A, my main independent variables are the
average portfolio weight an investor allocated to stocks with skewness levels above the sample median
over the past 12 months. I use four different skewness measures of JACKPOT, LIDX, MAXRET, and
ESKEW to compute this weight. In Panel B, I estimate the same models but modify my measures of
past weight on skewed stocks to exclude all stocks allocated to MIS quintile 1 or 5. I include a wide
range of socioeconomic and portfolio characteristics control variables in both panels. For brevity, I do
not report the control variable coefficients in Panel B. Table 3.A defines all the variables. I standardize
all independent variables in my regressions to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1 and
winsorize them at the 0.5 and 99.5 percentiles. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and
autocorrelation using the Newey and West (1987) approach. The sample period is January 1991 to
December 1996. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Baseline Estimates
W overpriced −W underpriced EW overpriced − EW underpriced
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Intercept -0.317*** -0.319*** -0.317*** -0.313*** -0.075*** -0.076*** -0.075*** -0.313***









Portfolio α -0.004 -0.006 -0.008 0.000 -0.005 -0.006 -0.008 -0.003
(-0.13) (-0.24) (-0.27) (-0.01) (-0.20) (-0.31) (-0.34) (-0.09)
Portfolio Return -0.153*** -0.161*** -0.167*** -0.158*** -0.121*** -0.127*** -0.131*** -0.124***
(-4.65) (-5.83) (-5.30) (-4.59) (-4.74) (-5.90) (-5.41) (-4.70)
Portfolio Variance 0.183*** 0.154*** 0.132*** 0.217*** 0.148*** 0.125*** 0.109*** 0.173***
(8.22) (9.94) (7.42) (9.43) (8.73) (10.55) (8.03) (10.07)
Local Weight -0.012*** -0.014*** -0.022*** -0.008** -0.01*** -0.011*** -0.018*** -0.007**
(-2.84) (-4.24) (-4.79) (-2.23) (-2.74) (-3.85) (-4.35) (-2.24)
Industry -0.118*** -0.118*** -0.119*** -0.121*** -0.122*** -0.122*** -0.122*** -0.124***
Concentration (-17.95) (-21.09) (-21.05) (-19.13) (-20.45) (-23.35) (-23.27) (-21.61)
Diversification 0.013*** 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.017*** 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.016***
(5.31) (4.38) (3.56) (5.89) (6.77) (5.72) (5.37) (7.01)
ln(Portolio Size) -0.013** -0.001 -0.005 -0.014** -0.001 0.008* 0.005 -0.002
(-2.02) (-0.14) (-0.98) (-2.33) (-0.25) (1.70) (1.06) (-0.35)
Age (Years) 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.021*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.016*** 0.009***
(7.26) (7.43) (10.59) (4.76) (7.07) (6.87) (10.09) (4.65)
Male Dummy 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.01*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.007***




W overpriced −W underpriced EW overpriced − EW underpriced
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Married Dummy -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.011*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.008***
(-4.98) (-4.71) (-4.44) (-6.00) (-4.22) (-3.85) (-3.72) (-5.06)
Tenant Dummy 0.005** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.003** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004***
(2.64) (3.20) (3.10) (3.33) (2.35) (2.90) (2.70) (3.07)
CPRATIO 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004** 0.006*** 0.004** 0.003** 0.003* 0.005***
(3.20) (2.78) (2.12) (4.34) (2.64) (2.31) (1.82) (3.60)
ln(Population) -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.011***
(-3.65) (-3.02) (-2.95) (-3.75) (-4.25) (-3.49) (-3.43) (-4.26)
Income Equality -0.024*** -0.027*** -0.035*** -0.023*** -0.020*** -0.022*** -0.029*** -0.02***
(%) (-4.48) (-6.26) (-6.70) (-4.21) (-4.86) (-6.64) (-6.61) (-4.46)
ln(Household -0.034*** -0.038*** -0.044*** -0.034*** -0.028*** -0.031*** -0.036*** -0.028***
Income) (-12.22) (-13.57) (-24.58) (-14.28) (-14.1) (-14.62) (-28.5) (-15.99)
Minority (%) 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.003
(1.05) (0.19) (0.18) (0.86) (0.94) (0.22) (0.22) (0.79)
Rural (%) -0.003 -0.004* -0.003 -0.003* -0.003 -0.004* -0.003 -0.003*
(-1.46) (-1.93) (-1.21) (-1.94) (-1.66) (-2.00) (-1.38) (-1.96)
Education (%) -0.006* -0.005** -0.011*** -0.005 -0.004* -0.004* -0.008*** -0.003
(-1.91) (-2.04) (-3.99) (-1.64) (-1.86) (-1.87) (-3.78) (-1.42)
Average Number
6477 6477 6,477 6,477 6,477 6,477 6,477 6,477
of Observations
Average Adjusted
0.248 0.267 0.272 0.234 0.245 0.261 0.266 0.233R2
Panel B: Skewness Weights Excluding Overpriced and Underpriced Stocks
W overpriced −W underpriced EW overpriced − EW underpriced










Table 3.6: Fama-Macbeth Regressions Controlling for Coskewness
This table presents the Fama-Macbeth regression estimates after controlling for the effect of coskewness.
I take the regression specifications in Table 3.3 and add a measure of coskewness and its interaction
with MIS to all regressions. In Panel A, I define coskewness (COSKEW) following the original Harvey
and Siddique (2000) definition. In Panel B, I adopt Harvey and Siddique’s (2000) alternative measure
of coskewness, which is defined as the regression coefficient on a squared market factor. Table 3.A
defines all the variables. I standardize all independent variables in my regressions to have a mean of
zero and a standard deviation of 1 and winsorize them at the 0.5 and 99.5 percentiles. Standard errors
are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation using the Newey and West (1987) approach. The
sample excludes penny stocks and covers January 1963 to December 2015, except for the regression that
includes ESKEW, which starts in January 1988. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Coskewness Based on the Original Harvey and Siddique (2000) Definition (COSKEW)
Intercept 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.009***
(4.70) (3.90) (4.32) (4.13) (3.69)
MIS -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***









COSKEW 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000
(-1.2) (-1.21) (-1.77) (-1.28) (-1.52)
MIS × JACKPOT -0.002***
(-3.6)
MIS × LIDX -0.002***
(-6.62)
MIS × MAXRET -0.002***
(-6.35)
MIS × ESKEW -0.001***
(-3.85)
MIS × COSKEW 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(-0.24) (-0.68) (-0.29) (-0.81)
log(ME) -0.001 -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001**
(-1.47) (-2.98) (-2.71) (-2.98) (-1.98)
log(B/M) 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(5.21) (4.84) (4.62) (4.66) (4.92)
RET[-12,-2] 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(5.22) (3.48) (3.71) (3.69) (3.11)
RET[-1,0] -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.007***
(-11.34) (-12.24) (-12.42) (-10.04) (-11.69)
Average Number of Observations 2,173 2,154 2,154 2,154 2,198
Average Adjusted R2 0.043 0.052 0.053 0.052 0.048
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Table 3.6: (Continued)
Panel B: Coskewness Defined as the Coefficient on the Squared Market Factor (βm2)
βm2 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
(-0.53) (-0.55) (-0.72) (-0.40) (-0.60)
MIS × JACKPOT -0.003***
(-6.05)
MIS × LIDX -0.002***
(-7.65)
MIS × MAXRET -0.002***
(-7.20)
MIS × ESKEW -0.001***
(-3.96)
MIS × βm2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.15) (-0.34) (-0.16) (-0.19)
Average Number of Observations 3,084 3,072 3,032 3,033 3,153
Average Adjusted R2 0.041 0.048 0.05 0.048 0.045
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Table 3.7: Fama-Macbeth Regressions Controlling for Limits to Arbitrage
This table presents the Fama-Macbeth regression estimates after controlling for limits to arbitrage. I
take the regression specifications in Table 3.3 and add five proxies for limits to arbitrage and their
interactions with MIS to each specification, separately. Panels A to E report the results based on each
of the five proxies. ILLIQ is the illiquidity measure of Amihud (2002); SHORTINT is the short interest
ratio following Hanson and Sunderam (2014); BIDASK is the bid-ask spread; %ZEROS is the frequency
of zero daily returns devised by Lesmond et al. (1999); and IHOLDING is the percentage institutional
holding. Table 3.A explains the construction details for all variables. For brevity, I only report the
coefficients on the interaction terms and the proxies for limits to arbitrage. All independent variables in
the regressions are standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1 and are winsorized
at the 0.5 and 99.5 percentiles. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation
using the Newey and West (1987) approach. The sample excludes penny stocks and covers January 1963
to December 2015, except for the regression that includes ESKEW, which starts in January 1988, and
those including SHORTINT and IHOLDING, which because of data availability start in January 1973
and in January 1980, respectively. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: ILLIQ
ILLIQ 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002***
(3.37) (2.94) (3.12) (2.71)
MIS × JACKPOT -0.004***
(-5.82)
MIS × LIDX -0.002***
(-8.96)
MIS × MAXRET -0.003***
(-10.5)
MIS × ESKEW -0.002***
(-5.01)
MIS × ILLIQ 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(3.99) (3.51) (2.94) (2.90)
Average Number of Observations 3,097 3,096 3,097 3,047
Average Adjusted R2 0.049 0.051 0.049 0.048
Panel B: SHORTINT
SHORTINT -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002
(-1.13) (-1.09) (-0.95) (-1.22)
MIS × JACKPOT -0.004***
(-4.20)
MIS × LIDX -0.002***
(-6.76)
MIS × MAXRET -0.002***
(-5.67)
MIS × ESKEW -0.002***
(-4.61)
MIS × SHORTINT -0.002* -0.002* -0.002 -0.002**
(-1.74) (-1.76) (-1.19) (-2.11)
Average Number of Observations 1,629 1,629 1,629 1,597




BIDASK 0.003 0.003* 0.004** 0.004*
(1.63) (1.67) (2.11) (1.85)
MIS × JACKPOT -0.004***
(-3.19)
MIS × LIDX -0.003***
(-6.98)
MIS × MAXRET -0.003***
(-5.62)
MIS × ESKEW -0.003***
(-5.68)
MIS × BIDASK 0.000 0.002* 0.000 0.002
(0.43) (1.67) (-0.16) (1.34)
Average Number of Observations 2,860 2,859 2,860 2,810
Average Adjusted R2 0.043 0.044 0.042 0.041
Panel D: %ZEROS
%ZEROS -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(-0.54) (-0.36) (-0.65) (-0.74)
MIS × JACKPOT -0.004***
(-6.96)
MIS × LIDX -0.002***
(-9.44)
MIS × MAXRET -0.002***
(-10.88)
MIS × ESKEW -0.002***
(-6.18)
MIS × %ZEROS 0.000 0.002** 0.000 0.001
(0.55) (2.18) (-0.28) (1.55)
Average Number of Observations 3,370 3,368 3,370 3,252
Average Adjusted R2 0.047 0.049 0.047 0.046
Panel E: IHOLDING
IHOLDING -0.048 -0.049 -0.053 -0.039
(-1.34) (-1.35) (-1.40) (-1.29)
MIS × JACKPOT -0.003***
(-5.38)
MIS × LIDX -0.002***
(-7.41)
MIS × MAXRET -0.002***
(-8.76)
MIS × ESKEW -0.001***
(-3.28)
MIS × IHOLDING 0.092 0.095 0.096 0.068
(1.40) (1.46) (1.50) (1.46)
Average Number of Observations 3,487 3,486 3,487 3,392































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.A: Variable Descriptions
This table defines the main variables used in the empirical analysis.
Variable Name Source Description
Panel A: Skewness and Anomaly Variables
βm2 CRSP This is computed following Harvey and Sid-
dique (2000) by estimating the following model:
Ri,t −Rf,t = αi + βm,i(Rm,t −Rf,t) + βm2,i(Rm,t −Rf,t)2 + i,t,
where Ri,t is the return on stock i on day t, Rm,t is the market return
on day t, and Rf,t is the risk-free rate on day t. I estimate the above
regression using daily returns for the most recent month.
COSKEW CRSP Harvey and Siddique (2000) use this as their main









where i,t = Ri,t −Rf,t − αi − βi(Rm,t −Rf,t), Ri,t is the return on
stock i on month t, Rm,t is the market return on month t, and Rf,t is
the risk-free rate on month t. I estimate the above regression using
monthly returns for the past 60 months.
ESKEW CRSP Following Boyer et al. (2010), this is defined by running a cross-sectional
regression at the end of every month using the most recent 5 years of
data to predict the daily idiosyncratic skewness of stocks estimated over
the following 5 years. Variables used in the regression include the histori-
cal estimates of daily idiosyncratic volatility and skewness relative to the
Fama-French three-factor model over the past 60 months, momentum as
the cumulative returns over months t−12 through t−1, turnover as the
average daily turnover in month t− 1, small- and medium-sized market
capitalization dummies (based on sorts of firms by market capitaliza-
tion into three groups of small, medium, and large), an industry dummy
based on the Fama-French 17 industries, and a NASDAQ dummy. After
estimating the model at the end of every month t, I use the parame-
ters together with the most recent data to get out-of-sample expected
idiosyncratic skewness estimates for months t+ 61 through t+ 120. My
estimates start in 1988 because detailed data on the trading volume of
NASDAQ stocks become available in 1983.
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Table 3.A: (Continued)
Variable Name Source Description
Panel A (Continued): Skewness and Anomaly Variables
JACKPOT CRSP and
Compustat
Conrad et al. (2014) compute this by running a logit model at the
end of June for every year to predict the out-of-sample probability of a
stock generating a log return greater than 100% in the next 12 months.
Variables used in the logit regression are the stock’s (log) return over
the last 12 months, volatility and skewness of daily log returns over
the past 3 months, detrended stock turnover ([6-month volume/shares
outstanding] − [18-month volume/shares outstanding]), and log market
capitalization. The model is estimated following a rolling-window ap-
proach using data from the past 10 years. Unlike Conrad et al. (2014),
who use data from the past 20 years, I only require 10 years of historical
data for each rolling-window estimation. Considering that the Compus-
tat Fundamentals database started in 1950, a shorter estimation window
enables me to start my parameter estimates from 1963. After estimating
the logit model at the end of June of year t, the estimated parameters
are used together with the most recently available data to estimate a
jackpot score for every stock from July of year t to the end of June of
year t+ 1.
LIDX CRSP Following Kumar et al. (2016), this is defined as the sum of the vigintile
allocation of stocks with respect to price, idiosyncratic volatility, and
idiosyncratic skewness divided by 60. Vigintiles are defined such that
stocks with the lowest price, the highest idiosyncratic skewness, and the
highest idiosyncratic volatility are allocated to the highest corresponding
vigintile groups. All stocks in the sample are sorted at the end of each
month based on the three characteristics to compute the lottery index
for the following month. Price is the monthly closing price. Idiosyncratic
volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the residuals from fitting
the four-factor model of Carhart (1997) to the daily return data for the
past 6 months. Idiosyncratic skewness refers to the skewness of residuals
obtained from a two-factor model estimated using daily return data for




Variable Name Source Description
Panel A (Continued): Skewness and Anomaly Variables




Following Stambaugh et al. (2015), MIS is the average of decile ranks
of a stock with respect to 11 prominent anomalies. Sorting for each
anomaly is performed at the end of every month. Deciles 1 and 10 in-
clude stocks that each anomaly strategy predicts will outperform and un-
derperform the most in the following month, respectively. Unlike Stam-
baugh et al. (2015), I determine my decile cutoffs using my whole sam-
ple, not just NYSE stocks. I require at least five non-missing anomaly
decile ranks to compute MIS for a stock. The 11 anomaly strategies con-
sidered are accruals (Sloan, 1996), asset growth (Cooper et al., 2008),
composite equity issues (Daniel and Titman, 2006), distress (Campbell
et al., 2008), gross profitability (Novy-Marx, 2013), investment-to-assets
(Titman et al., 2004), momentum (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993), net
operating assets (Hirshleifer et al., 2004), net stock issues (Ritter, 1991;
Loughran and Ritter, 1995), O-score (Ohlson, 1980), and return on as-
sets (Fama and French, 2006). I follow the detailed description of Stam-
baugh et al. (2012, 2015), together with the corresponding anomaly
literature, to replicate each strategy.
ISKEWNESS CRSP Skewness of residuals obtained from running the four-factor model of
Carhart (1997) on daily returns for the most recent month.
OS OptionMetrics This follows Conrad et al. (2013) and Bakshi et al. (2003) and is defined
as the third moment of the risk-neutral density function of a security
constructed using a set of out-of-the-money option prices with different
strike price on that security. My sample of out-of-the-money calls and
puts include securities that have expiration dates close to 0.250 years (3
months). I choose this time to maturity because the measure based on
options with 3 months to maturity has the strongest return predictability
in Conrad et al. (2013). My estimation technique and option data filters
closely follow those used in Conrad et al. (2013).
SKEWNESS CRSP Skewness of daily returns for the most recent month.
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Table 3.A: (Continued)
Variable Name Source Description
Panel B: All Other Control Variables
%ZEROS CRSP This was devised by Lesmond et al. (1999) as the percentage of daily
returns of each stock equal to zero. I measure this using the past 12
months of daily returns for each firm.
B/M CRSP and
Compustat
This is the ratio of the book value to the market capitalization of the
firm.
BIDASK CRSP This is the average daily bid-ask spread over the past 12 months.
IHOLDING Thomson
Reuters
The fraction of a stock’s outstanding shares held by institutional in-
vestors. I obtain the stock’s institutional holdings by aggregating the
positions of its institutional investors. If the Thomson Reuters database
does not have data on a particular stock, I set the stock’s institutional
holdings to zero.
ILLIQ CRSP This is the annual average of the daily ratio of absolute stock return to
daily dollar trading volume, following Amihud (2002).
IVOL CRSP Volatility of residuals obtained from running the four-factor model of
Carhart (1997) on daily returns for the most recent month.
LEVERAGE CRSP and
Compustat
This is the sum of total debt from current liabilities plus total long-term
debt, all divided by total assets.
ME CRSP Price times shares outstanding.
PRICE CRSP Monthly closing price.
RET[-1,0] CRSP Buy-and-hold return over the previous month.
RET[-12,-2] CRSP The prior years monthly compounded buy-and-hold return skipping the
last month.
RHOLDING Brokerage Percentage of total shares outstanding owned by individuals in the bro-
kerage sample.
SHORTRATIO Compustat Average ratio of short interest to shares outstanding over the past 12
months.
TURNOVER CRSP Total trading volume over the last month divided by shares outstanding.
VOLATILITY CRSP Volatility of daily returns for the most recent month.
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Table 3.A: (Continued)
Variable Name Source Description
Panel C: Variables Used in the Individual Holdings Regressions
Age (Years) Brokerage The portfolio holder’s age.








This is the proportion of residents in the portfolio holder’s county with





This is the ratio of the number of households in the lowest annual income
group (less than $10,000) to those in the highest annual income group














This is the natural log of the portfolio holder’s home county population.
ln(Portolio Size) Brokerage This is the natural log of the size of the portfolio.
Local Weight Brokerage Portfolio weight allocated to stocks located in the portfolio holder’s home
state.
Male Dummy Brokerage This is equal to 1 if the portfolio holder is a male.
Married Dummy Brokerage This is equal to 1 if the portfolio holder is married.
Minority 1990
Census






Monthly compounded portfolio returns over the past 12 months.
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Table 3.A: (Continued)
Variable Name Source Description





Variance of the portfolio estimated using the past 12 months of returns.
Portfolio α Brokerage
and CRSP
This is the intercept of the regression of monthly portfolio returns for
Carharts (1997) four factors estimated using the past 12 months of data.
Rural 1990
Census
This is the proportion of the population that lives in rural areas in the
portfolio holder’s county.
Tenant Dummy Brokerage This is equal to 1 if the portfolio holder lives in a rental property.
WESKEW Brokerage Average monthly weight allocated to stocks with ESKEW values above
the cross-sectional median over the past 12 months.
WJACKPOT Brokerage Average monthly weight allocated to stocks with JACKPOT values
above the cross-sectional median over the past 12 months.
WLIDX Brokerage Average monthly weight allocated to stocks with LIDX values above the
cross-sectional median over the past 12 months.
WMAXRET Brokerage Average monthly weight allocated to stocks with MAXRET values above
the cross-sectional median over the past 12 months.
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Chapter 4
Do Geography and Industry
Predict Mispricing?
4.1 Introduction
Firms with similar attributes can attract common investor clienteles and expe-
rience common variations in discount rates. Parsons et al. (2017), for example, argue
that firm scrutiny by common investors or analysts is in fact crucial for the incorpora-
tion of all information into prices, and focus on industry and geography as two key firm
attributes to show that a lack of scrutiny by the same group of investors can lead to a
delayed reaction to peer information. However, commonality in investor clienteles can
also cause prices to reflect their biases and behaviors (Kumar et al., 2013). This can
result in firms with a specific common set of investors becoming mispriced. Industry
and geography are particularly interesting firm attributes for which to investigate this
effect because they have been widely shown to attract common market participants (e.g.,
Coval and Moskowitz, 1999; Kacperczyk et al., 2005).
In this study, I explore whether a firm’s industry and geography contain infor-
mation about its susceptibility to mispricing. In this context, mispricing is defined as
the predictability of a firm’s returns with respect to market anomalies. Market anoma-
lies are cross-sectional patterns in stock returns that are not explained by asset pricing
models. In many cases, such patterns take the form of certain stock characteristics that
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predict future stock returns in the cross section without capturing an apparent source of
systematic risk. Several studies suggest that anomalies at least partly reflect mispricing;
for example, Nagel (2005) and Stambaugh et al. (2015) demonstrate that anomalies are
considerably more pronounced among stocks facing significant arbitrage risks and costs.
Furthermore, overpricing is more prevalent than underpricing in market anomalies be-
cause many investors are reluctant or unable to short-sell in order to adjust overpricing
(Hirshleifer et al., 2011; Stambaugh et al., 2012; Avramov et al., 2013).
If there is a clientele effect that leads to mispricing in specific regions or industries,
this should be persistent, and therefore, groups of firms that experience relatively higher
levels of mispricing are likely to continue to be mispriced in the future. An empirical
explanation of this phenomenon entails dividing the whole cross section of stock returns
into smaller geographic and industrial cross sections and investigating the performance
of anomalies within each one. My expectation is that I will be able to predict how well
anomalies perform in the future for each stock based on their past performance within
that stock’s geographical region or industry.
I follow Stambaugh et al. (2015) and measure the common mispricing-related
component of anomalies, taking the average of each stock’s decile ranks with respect
to 11 anomaly variables. I consider the following anomalies: accruals (Sloan, 1996),
asset growth (Cooper et al., 2008), composite equity issues (Daniel and Titman, 2006),
distress (Campbell et al., 2008), gross profitability (Novy-Marx, 2013), investment-to-
assets (Titman et al., 2004), momentum (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993), net operating
assets (Hirshleifer et al., 2004), net stock issues (Ritter, 1991; Loughran and Ritter,
1995), O-score (Ohlson, 1980), and return on assets (Fama and French, 2006). This
approach essentially diversifies any anomaly-specific effect and offers an ex-ante measure
of mispricing for each stock (see Stambaugh et al., 2015; Stambaugh and Yuan, 2016).
The main hypothesis of this paper explores whether geographic and industrial
mispricing exists. In particular, I examine whether the mispricing levels of a firm’s
geographic or industrial peers can predict its mispricing in the future. This follows my
argument above that firms in the same region or industry are affected by the behaviors
of their common investors, meaning that these firms are exposed to the same forces that
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can generate common mispricing.
I test my hypothesis in two ways and find strong support for it in all cases.
First, I construct hedge portfolios (going long stocks in the highest quintile short those
in the lowest quintile) based on my anomaly-based mispricing variable. I find that
hedge abnormal returns are 0.346% higher for stocks headquartered in those states that
had the highest abnormal returns over the previous year. The corresponding figure
for stocks belonging to industries with the highest past abnormal returns is 0.348%.
Second, I look at the return predictability at the firm level by only considering each
firm’s peers in my calculations of geographic or industrial mispricing. An increase of 1
standard deviation in the state-level mispricing of peer firms measured over the previous
12 months increases the return predictability of the firm by 0.045% on a monthly basis,
while the corresponding figure for industry-level mispricing is 0.062%. Both results are
highly statistically significant.
Both industrial and geographic mispricing variables remain economically and
statistically significant in a setting where they are considered at the same time; in other
words, they are complementing effects, in that neither captures the other. I also show
that these results are robust to a series of basic tests, including an examination of
subsamples and the use of alternative data filters. In addition, I control for a wide range
of proxies for limits to arbitrage, and conclude that my measures of geographic and
industrial mispricing are not only capturing illiquidity or trading costs. Nevertheless,
one could still cast doubt on the results by arguing that any other arbitrary way of
grouping stocks would lead to the same findings. To address this, I run a simulation
exercise in which I randomly assign firms to other states and industries and estimate
results accordingly. In so doing, I show that I find outcomes with magnitudes larger
than or equal to mine in less than 1% of simulated cases.
In the second part of the paper, I explore the potential drivers of geographic or
industrial mispricing. I begin by considering the role played by analysts. Specifically,
I build on Engelberg et al. (2017) and argue that analyst forecast errors can poten-
tially generate biased expectations, leading to mispricing. Therefore, firms in the most
mispriced industries or regions may be those that are valued incorrectly by analysts.
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However, analysts are more likely to be clustered by industry than geography (Parsons
et al., 2017); therefore, I expect to observe a stronger role for analysts in generating
industrial than geographic mispricing. My results indicate that industry-level mispric-
ing is only significant for the subset of stocks with high analyst forecast errors in the
most recent period. Although a similar result is observed for state-level mispricing, it is
significantly weaker.
In addition, I investigate the role of local sentiment and risk aversion as a second
potential driver of geographic mispricing. Following Korniotis and Kumar (2013b) and
Kumar et al. (2013), I argue that local investor demand shocks can affect the prices of
local stocks. Baker et al. (2012) shows that market anomalies perform better in countries
with higher levels of sentiment. Original to the literature, I conjecture that heterogeneous
investor sentiment levels across US states leads to different levels of mispricing for stocks
in different regions. To measure local sentiment, I replicate the sentiment measure of
Baker et al. (2012) across US states and, as a proxy for local risk aversion, I use the
state macroeconomic index of Korniotis and Kumar (2013b). My results indicate that
state-level mispricing is driven by those states experiencing economic expansion, or those
with higher levels of investor sentiment.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to investigate differences in
the return predictability of market anomalies across different regions and industries. My
study relates to two main strands of finance literature. First, I contribute to the litera-
ture on market anomalies (e.g., Nagel (2005); Stambaugh et al. (2012, 2015); Avramov
et al. (2013); Hanson and Sunderam (2014); Chordia et al. (2014); McLean and Pontiff
(2016); Chordia et al. (2017)) by showing that anomalies perform differently for firms in
different states and industries; thus, refining anomaly strategies by geography or indus-
try can improve their performance. Second, this study contributes to the literature by
highlighting the importance of geography and industry in asset pricing (e.g., Moskowitz
and Grinblatt (1999); Hou and Robinson (2006); Kumar et al. (2013); Korniotis and
Kumar (2013b); Parsons et al. (2017)). I add to this vein of literature by showing that
geography and industry not only affect discount rates, but also have the potential to
generate return predictability.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 briefly reviews
the literature and develops the hypothesis; Section 4.3 summarizes the data and the
main variables; Section 4.4 presents the main empirical results; Section 4.5 includes a
series of robustness checks; and Section 4.6 concludes this paper.
4.2 Background and Hypotheses
I begin this section by summarizing the literature on the role of geography and industry in
asset pricing. I then develop my main testable hypothesis to explore whether geography
and industry can predict mispricing.
4.2.1 Related Literature
A large body of literature documents how firms’ geographical locations can affect their
stock returns. Pirinsky and Wang (2006) show that the stock returns of firms head-
quartered in the same geographical area comove with each other, and further argue that
this comovement is not related to economic fundamentals, but is rather linked to the
trading patterns of local investors. Bernile et al. (2017) extend these findings, and show
that firms headquartered in different but economically connected states also experience
excess stock comovement. Various papers attribute this excess comovement to local bias,
which induces local investors to take larger positions in local stocks. For example, Bernile
et al. (2015) suggest that institutional investors overweigh firms whose 10-K frequently
mentions the investors’ state. On the other hand, Kumar et al. (2013) show that retail
trades cause comovement in local stocks, whereas institutional trades actually mitigate
the issue.1
Local bias leads to the incorporation of the behaviors and preferences of local
investors into the prices of local stocks. Becker et al. (2011) provide evidence indicating
that firms located in regions with higher fractions of seniors experience stronger demand
for dividends, leading to larger stock price falls on ex-dividend days. Hong et al. (2008)
and Korniotis and Kumar (2013b) highlight that local risk tolerance affects the returns
of local stocks. Specifically, Korniotis and Kumar (2013b) argue that U.S. state-level
1Other studies that document the localization of investors’ trading activity include Coval and
Moskowitz (1999, 2001), Loughran and Schultz (2004, 2005), and Shive (2012).
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heterogeneity in economic conditions leads to variations in investor risk tolerance across
states, and that this heterogeneous risk tolerance results in variations in the cross section
of stock returns. Moreover, although Korniotis and Kumar (2013b) attribute some
mispricing to geographical differences in stock returns, other studies provide risk-based
explanations. For example, Garcia and Norli (2012) and Tuzel and Zhang (2017) show
that there are various geographical sources of systematic risk that can lead firms in
specific regions to experience higher expected returns.
There have been similar findings relating to the effect of firms’ industries on
stock returns. Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) find a lead-lag relationship between the
returns of a stock and those of its industrial peers, while Parsons et al. (2017) argue
that this relationship arises because the stock price movements of industry peers contain
information about a firm’s future earnings. However, since analysts are often clustered by
industry, they are likely to communicate industry-related information and thus eliminate
industry momentum. Parsons et al. (2017) provide evidence for this argument by showing
that industry momentum is concentrated in small stocks with lower analyst following.
Industry is also shown to affect returns due to long-term shifts in consumption
patterns. DellaVigna and Pollet (2007) document that demographic changes bring about
forecastable changes in profits in various industries, and that this information is not in-
corporated into stock returns. Hou and Robinson (2006) prove that more concentrated
industries generate lower returns because they have lower levels of risk in terms of inno-
vation and technological progress. Moreover, institutional investors are aware of these
predictable patterns in industries’ stock returns. For example, Kacperczyk et al. (2005)
find that mutual fund managers deviate from well-diversified portfolios and concentrate
their investments in specific industries; their choice of industry is often related to their
informational advantage because those with more concentrated positions demonstrate
better performance.
The literature clearly shows a strong link between geography and industry, and
expected returns. However, a missing piece of the puzzle concerns the question of whether
a firm’s geography and industry affect its levels of mispricing. Market anomalies are often
used to characterize mispricing because there is indirect evidence that anomalies appear,
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at least partly, due to some form of market friction. Nagel (2005) and Stambaugh et al.
(2015), among others, find that anomalies are stronger among stocks with a higher arbi-
trage risk; in fact, increases in arbitrage activity can mitigate anomaly-strategy returns
(e.g., Hanson and Sunderam, 2014; Chordia et al., 2014; McLean and Pontiff, 2016). In
addition, the profitability of anomaly strategies is mostly generated by overpriced stocks
(e.g., Hirshleifer et al., 2011; Stambaugh et al., 2012; Avramov et al., 2013). Miller
(1977) argues that this is because short-selling impediments make it harder to adjust
overpricing than underpricing. Stambaugh et al. (2012, 2014) build on these findings,
indicating both that there is a common mispricing component across anomalies and that
this component is strongly related to investor sentiment. In the next subsection, I form
my main testable hypothesis based on the literature reviewed above.
4.2.2 Main Testable Hypothesis
In this paper, I examine whether the geography or industry of a firm can predict its
predisposition to mispricing; in other words, I look at whether firms in geographic regions
or industries with higher levels of cross-sectional mispricing will be more mispriced in
the future. Following the literature reviewed in the previous subsection, we can expect
a strong clientele effect for firms in certain regions and industries; in other words, firms
are likely to share common investors with their geographic or industrial peers.
According to Parsons et al. (2017), scrutiny by a common set of investors or ana-
lysts affects how information is incorporated into prices. I argue that mistakes or biases
among these common market participants can generate mispricing in the stocks of firms
in specific regions or industries. This being so, I expect to observe that this mispricing
– measured by market anomalies – is predictable by looking at a firm’s geographic or
industrial levels of mispricing. This leads to my primary hypothesis:
H1: Firms in regions or industries experiencing higher levels of cross-sectional
mispricing are more likely to be mispriced in future periods, compared to their
peers in less mispriced regions or industries.
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4.3 Data
My sample includes all common (share code 10 or 11) NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ
stocks with available data in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) monthly
stock return files in the period from July 1963 to December 2017. I exclude all firms
with negative book equity, those belonging to the financial sector (6000 ≤ SIC ≤ 6999),
and those with a share price below $1.2 In the case of missing returns, I use delisting
returns.
The anomaly variables use accounting data from Compustat Fundamentals An-
nual and Quarterly files. For analyst earnings forecasts and coverage measures, I use
the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (IBES) database. The Baker and Wurgler
(2006) US-wide sentiment data are taken from Professor Jeffery Wurgler’s website.3 I
construct a state-wide sentiment series following the methodology of Baker et al. (2012)
and, in doing so, collect the IPO offer date, offer price, and zip code data from Thom-
son Reuters Securities Data Corporation (SDC). All other attributes, including the IPO
closing price for the first day, stock turnover, and stock returns, are drawn from CRSP
daily and monthly files. Lastly, I collect short-interest data from Compustat and quar-
terly data on institutional stock holdings from Thomson Reuters. Table 4.A.1 presents
the definitions and sources of all variables.
Firms in this paper are classified geographically by the states in which their
headquarters are located; this state-level classification method is chosen to maintain
consistency with previous studies, e.g. Parsons et al. (2017) and Korniotis and Kumar
(2013b). Firm headquarters state data are obtained from the Compustat Fundamentals
Annual database. Although Compustat only reports current firm headquarters loca-
tion, according to Parsons et al. (2017), this measurement error has a limited effect. I
also assign firms to the Fama-French 48 industry classifications using their SIC codes.
This number of industry classifications is chosen to ensure that there are similar num-
bers of industry and state groups, which facilitates direct comparison between the two
categories.
2I consider other share price cutoffs in the robustness tests, and thereby show that my results do not




In this section, I briefly introduce my firm-, state-, and industry-level mispricing vari-
ables. Further details regarding the construction of the variables are presented in Table
4.A.1. To construct the main measure of mispricing for each firm, i.e. MIS, I combine in-
formation from the 11 prominent anomaly strategies analyzed in Stambaugh et al. (2012,
2014, 2015). These anomalies consist of accruals (Sloan, 1996), asset growth (Cooper
et al., 2008), composite equity issues (Daniel and Titman, 2006), distress (Campbell
et al., 2008), gross profitability (Novy-Marx, 2013), investment-to-assets (Titman et al.,
2004), momentum (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993), net operating assets (Hirshleifer et al.,
2004), net stock issues (Ritter, 1991; Loughran and Ritter, 1995), O-score (Ohlson, 1980),
and return on assets (Fama and French, 2006). Specifically, I compute the common mis-
pricing component across all the anomalies following Stambaugh et al. (2015). MIS is
constructed by taking the average of each stock’s decile ranks with respect to the 11
anomaly variables. Decile ranks are defined at the end of every month, with the first
and 10th deciles consisting of stocks that each anomaly strategy predicts are going to
underperform and outperform the most in the following month, respectively. Anomalies
may not be wholly related to mispricing; therefore MIS is a less noisy measure of mis-
pricing than considering across all the anomalies separately. This is because, by taking
the average of the anomaly decile ranks, we diversify any anomaly-specific effect, and
are thus left with a mispricing component that is common across all the strategies (see
Stambaugh et al., 2015; Stambaugh and Yuan, 2016).
State- and industry-level mispricing variables essentially capture the performance
of the firm-level mispricing variable, MIS, in predicting returns within each state or in-
dustry group. A larger state or industry mispricing measure indicates greater return
predictability, and ultimately higher anomaly profits for stocks in that group. To con-
struct these measures, I estimate the following Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression for
each state or industry group g:
Ri,τ = β0g + β1gMISi,τ−1 +
N∑
n=1
βn+1gControlni,τ−1 + i,τ (4.1)
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where, Ri,τ is the monthly return for firm i in month τ , MISi,τ−1 is the monthly firm
mispricing measure for firm i in month τ−1, and Controlni,τ−1 is a monthly firm control
variable. The estimated β1g coefficient is the measure of state or industry mispricing
for each stock in the state or industry group g. In order to look for the out-of-sample
performance of the mispricing measures, I estimate the state and industry mispricing
measures at the end of each month t by running the model in Equation 4.1, using the
past T months of data ending in month t−1. I call the resulting state (geographic) mis-
pricing variable GM[t-T,t-1] and the industry mispricing variable IM[t-T,t-1]. Moreover,
since each stock is itself included in the estimations for that stock’s state and industry
mispricing variables, the estimates may capture the stock’s past performance, rather
than the state or industry effects. To address this, I construct two alternative measures
that exclude each stock itself, and use the rest of the sample to estimate the state or
industry mispricing measures for that stock. I call these alternative state and industry
mispricing measures GMX[t-T,t-1] and IMX[t-T,t-1], respectively.
4.3.2 Descriptive Statistics: What Are the Characteristics of Mis-
priced States or Industries?
Table 4.1 presents the characteristics of firms in each state and industry group averaged
over the whole sample period. I follow Korniotis and Kumar (2013b) and Parsons et al.
(2017) and require each group to have at least 5 nonmissing observations for at least
1 month. Since some groups do not meet this criteria due to missing MIS values, I
exclude them from the sample altogether. I also exclude month groups with less than
5 nonmissing observations; however, I compute the average number of observations, i.e.
N, in Table 4.1 before excluding these firm months.
States and industries in Table 4.1 are sorted by their group mispricing measures,
i.e. GM and IM, estimated using the whole sample. That is, I run the regression in
Equation 4.1 using all firm-months for each state and industry group. Higher GM and
IM suggest more mispricing on average. I also report MIS α for each state or industry.
This is computed as the intercept of the four factor model of Carhart (1997) for the
time-series of monthly hedge (long minus short) MIS portfolio returns. Monthly hedge
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MIS portfolio returns for each state or industry group are defined as the monthly average
returns of stocks in that group with MIS values above the cross-sectional median at the
beginning of each month, minus the average returns of those with MIS values below the
cross-sectional median. The median MIS is based on the whole cross section and not
each individual state or industry.
There are no visible trends in firm characteristics as one moves from the least
mispriced states or industries to the most mispriced ones. As shown in Panel A of Table
4.1, the least mispriced states are Kentucky, New Mexico, and Montana. In these states,
GM is negative, meaning that MIS predicts lower average future returns in contrast to
what the anomalies suggest. By contrast, South Dakota, Tennessee, and the District
of Columbia are the most mispriced regions. The average number of observations (N ),
firm size (ME ), share price (PRICE ), and the other characteristics of the most and least
mispriced states are not substantially different.
The results presented in Panel B of Table 4.1 are very similar to those in Panel
A; that is, the most and the least mispriced groups do not have visibly different firm
characteristics. The figures fluctuate noticeably from one industry to another, but do not
follow a specific trend. The least mispriced industries are Coal, Shipping Containers, and
Tobacco Products, while the most mispriced ones are Recreation, Candy and Soda, and
Other (uncategorized firms). Overall, average firm characteristics indicate that there is
no fundamental difference between firms in various states or industries that can explain
the heterogeneity in mispricing.
4.4 Empirical Results
In this section, I present the main empirical findings of this paper. I begin by testing
whether mispricing is persistent and predictable across different geographic and indus-
trial groups (H1 ). I then examine whether analyst errors, along with local sentiment and
risk aversion induced by changes in local macroeconomic conditions can help to explain
the geographic and industrial heterogeneity in mispricing.
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4.4.1 Geographic and Industrial Mispricing
4.4.1.1 Is Mispricing Persistent in States or Industries?
I test my primary hypothesis (H1 ) by analyzing whether mispriced states or industries
continue to be mispriced in future periods; in other words, I investigate whether one
can predict future stock mispricing levels by taking mispricing of the stock’s industrial
or geographic peers into account. Given the persistence of state-level and industry-level
mispricing, one should be able to predict the performance of anomaly strategies based
on MIS for firms in each state or industry using their past performance within that state
or industry. In order to test this prediction, I double-sort stocks based on their current
MIS and past MIS performance in the state or industry to which they belong.
My double sorting procedure entails four steps. First, I construct hedge MIS
portfolios for firms in each state and industry. Hedge MIS portfolio returns for each
state or industry group are defined as the average returns of stocks in that group that
have MIS values above the cross-sectional median, minus the average returns of those
with MIS values below the cross-sectional median. I use the median MIS based on the
whole cross section, rather than on each individual state or industry, in order to ensure
the portfolios will be comparable across states and industries. Second, for each month
t, I regress the time-series of hedge MIS portfolio returns for each state or industry
from months t − T to t − 1 on the four factors of Carhart (1997). The intercept (α)
of the regression is my measure of past mispricing in each state or industry. Third,
I independently sort stocks each month into 5 portfolios based on their MIS and 5
portfolios based on their past state or industry MIS α. I then compute the average
returns of the 25 intersecting portfolios for the following month and regress the time
series of returns on the four factors of Carhart (1997). The regression intercepts are the
abnormal return estimates for the 25 portfolios.
The doubles sorting results are reported in Table 4.2. Panels A and B present the
results for state-level and industry-level mispricing portfolios, respectively. The past MIS
α estimates in these panels use the observations from the previous 12 months (T = 12).
The results in Panel A indicate that hedge MIS abnormal returns are 0.346% higher
for stocks headquartered in states that had the highest hedge MIS abnormal returns
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over the previous year compared to those in states with the lowest hedge MIS abnormal
returns. Similarly, in Panel B, stocks belonging to industries with the highest past hedge
MIS abnormal returns generate MIS strategy abnormal returns that are 0.348% larger
compared to those of industries with the lowest past hedge MIS abnormal returns.4
In Panels C and D of Table 4.2, I consider alternative past MIS α estimates
based on longer time windows, namely over the past 24 (T = 24) and past 60 (T = 60)
months. Interestingly, there are no differences in MIS abnormal returns for firms in
state or industry groups with the highest and the lowest past two-year or five-year hedge
MIS abnormal returns. This indicates that state-level or industry-level mispricing fades
away after a year. Korniotis and Kumar (2013b) report similar findings regarding the
dissipation of state-level mispricing after 12 months.
Overall, the double sorting results provide corroborating evidence for my primary
hypothesis (H1 ); that is, stocks belonging to the most mispriced states or industries, as
captured by the MIS strategy, continue to be more mispriced in the cross section. In
the next subsection, I further elaborate on this result by conducting my tests at the firm
level rather than using portfolios.
4.4.1.2 Firm-Level Return Predictability
In the previous subsection, I test my primary hypothesis (H1 ) using a double sorting
approach and find evidence in line with my predictions. However, double sorting has
two major shortcomings stemming from its portfolio-based approach. First, past and
future state-level and industry-level portfolios could contain the same set of stocks. This
means that the persistence in state-level and industry-level mispricing could be due to
the persistence in mispricing levels of each individual firm, rather than the common
mispricing level in firms’ states or industries. Second, double sorting does not allow firm
characteristics to be controlled for, or for state and industry effects to be compared.
I address the challenges above by complementing my tests with a firm-level re-
gression approach. If there is any persistence in mispricing within states or industries, I
expect to observe that the combined mispricing measure (MIS ) is a stronger predictor
4Considering that the double sorting approach does not control for time and state / industry fixed
effects, I also test the persistence in hedge portfolio returns using panel regressions with fixed effects and
find similar returns. These results are presented in Appendix Table 4.A.2.
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of future returns in states or industries that experienced higher return predictability in
the past. I test this conjecture by adding past geographic and industrial peer mispricing
measures, i.e. GMX[t-T,t-1] and IMX[t-T,t-1], and their interactions with (MIS ) to the
Fama-MacBeth regression in Equation 4.1. The coefficients of interest are those on the
interaction terms. I estimate GMX[t-T,t-1] and IMX[t-T,t-1] using various time periods
(T ): namely, 1, 3, 6, 12, 24, and 60 months.
Panels A and B of Table 4.3 present estimation results for states and industries,
respectively. As presented in the first columns of both tables, 1 standard deviation
increase in MIS before controlling for past state or industry mispricing is associated
with 0.446% (t-statistic of 11) higher future monthly returns. After adding GMX[t-T,t-
1] or IMX[t-T,t-1] and the interaction terms, the MIS coefficients remain almost the
same in all specifications in both panels.
In Panel A, the MIS × GMX[t-T,t-1] interaction coefficients start from 0.024%
(t-statistic of 1.81) for the estimation window of 1 month (T=1), peak at 0.045% (t-
statistic of 3.2) for the estimation period of 12 months (T=12), and become weaker and
insignificant for longer estimation periods. The result based on the 12-month estima-
tion window is both statistically and economically significant. A 1-standard-deviation
increase in the state mispricing measured over the past 12 months increases the return
predictability of MIS by 0.045%, which amounts to around 10% of the coefficient of
MIS. This result is also statistically significant, as the t-statistic of 3.2 is larger than the
target threshold figure of 3 suggested by Harvey et al. (2016).5
The results based on industry groups presented in Panel B are slightly different to
those in Panel A. First, in all the 6 specifications, the MIS × IMX[t-T,t-1] coefficients are
statistically significant at the 5% level. Second, the estimation window of 1 month (T=1)
generates the largest interaction coefficient of 0.07% (t-statistic of 4.19). After this point,
the interaction coefficients become smaller and less significant as the estimation window
expands. These results are also economically significant; taking the 12-month estimation
specification (T=12) again, for example, a 1-standard-deviation increase in the industry-
level mispricing measured over the past 12 months increases the return predictability of
5Harvey et al. (2016) argue that because of potential data-mining issues, a t-statistic of 3 is a more
appropriate significance cutoff for Fama-MacBeth regressions than the usual cutoff of 2.
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MIS by 0.062% (t-statistic of 3.76).
It is interesting to observe that both GMX[t-T,t-1] and IMX[t-T,t-1] have neg-
ative coefficients in all specifications. This indicates that a stock is more likely to be
overpriced in states or industries in which returns are more predictable. A plausible
explanation for this observation could be that, if overpricing is the prevalent form of
mispricing, then firms in more mispriced states or industries are more likely to be over-
priced than underpriced. I investigate this further in subsection 4.4.2.
In Panel C of Table 4.3, I repeat the tests in Panels A and B, but with alter-
native state- and industry-level mispricing measures, i.e. GM[t-T,t-1] and IM[t-T,t-1],
respectively. The only difference is that GM[t-T,t-1] and IM[t-T,t-1] do not exclude
the firm for which mispricing is measured from the estimates of past state or industry
mispricing; that is, I include all firms in a state or industry when estimating the model
in Equation 4.1. Results based on these alternative measures are slightly stronger and
more robust than those in Panels A and B. For example, the MIS × GM[t-T,t-1] co-
efficient for the 12-month estimation period (T=12) increases to 0.052% (t-statistic of
3.47) from 0.045% in Panel A. Similarly, the MIS × IM[t-T,t-1] coefficient for the same
specification is 0.076% (t-statistic of 4.1), which is larger than the 0.07% interaction
coefficient in Panel B.
Overall, the results in Table 4.3 again support my primary hypothesis (H1 ). The
combined anomaly variable (MIS ) generates larger future returns in states and industries
in which there is a history of return predictability. In other words, the mispricing levels
of a firm’s geographic and industrial peers can predict its likelihood of being mispriced
in the future.
4.4.1.3 State-Level vs. Industry-Level Mispricing
In the previous subsections, I established that the level of mispricing in a firm’s state or
industry offers relevant information about its general susceptibility to mispricing. Nev-
ertheless, one might ask how the effects of state and industry mispricing compare to each
other. One possible concern is that there may be a considerable overlap between states
and industries, so that state- and industry-level mispricing may be highly correlated.
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In order to address these issues, I include both the industry- and state-level interaction
terms in the regression model. In so doing, I am essentially examining the effect of one
variable while controlling for the other.
Results presented in Panel A of Table 4.4 indicate that both the MIS × GMX[t-
T,t-1] and MIS × IMX[t-T,t-1] interaction coefficients remain almost the same as before
when they are added in one regression. For example, the coefficients for the estimation
period of 12 months (T=12) are 0.04% (t-statistic of 2.96) and 0.061% (t-statistic of
3.65) for MIS × GMX[t-T,t-1] and MIS × IMX[t-T,t-1], respectively. The correspond-
ing figures in Panels A and B of Table 4.3, where the interaction terms are estimated
in separate regressions, are 0.045% (t-statistic of 3.2) and 0.062% (t-statistic of 3.76),
respectively. The results of the other specifications and those based on GM[t-T,t-1] and
IM[t-T,t-1] in Panel B of Table 4.4 are also very close to the original estimates in Table
4.3.
These findings indicate that state- and industry-level mispricing variables do not
explain each other: both interaction terms remain robust after controlling for the other.
In other words, past state and industry mispricing can predict future mispricing levels
of a stock independent of each other. This is in line with our predictions regarding the
two group effects having different causes.
4.4.2 The Role of Analysts
In this subsection, I examine the role of analyst earnings forecasts in generating state-
and industry-level mispricing. Following Parsons et al. (2017), analysts are clustered by
industry, and are therefore crucial in helping industry-related information be incorpo-
rated into prices. If analysts make errors, however, it is likely that firms within the same
industry will not be properly distinguished and priced. I expect to observe that firms
experiencing greater levels of analyst earnings forecast errors are more likely to be af-
fected by industrial mispricing. Moreover, since analysts are not clustered by geography
(Parsons et al., 2017), I do not expect to find a similar effect for geographic mispricing.
Nevertheless, analysts errors can affect mispricing in general (Engelberg et al., 2017);
therefore, even geographic mispricing should be stronger for stocks with greater analyst
116
forecast errors. However, this result is likely to be weaker compared to that for industrial
mispricing.
I begin by looking at the analyst-related characteristics of quintile portfolios
based on state- and industry-level mispricing variables. As in the previous sections, I
take GMX[t-12,t-1] and IMX[t-12,t-1] as my main variable specifications. Quintiles are
formed by sorting stocks based on each of these variables separately into 5 groups. I
then look at the average characteristics of each portfolio measured at the end of the
previous month. These characteristics include absolute earnings forecast error (AFE ),
signed forecast error (FE ), forecast dispersion (DISPERSION ), and no analyst coverage
indicator (NOCOVERAGE ). The construction details of all variables are explained in
Table 4.A.1.
Panels A and B of Table 4.5 present the average characteristics for the GMX[t-
12,t-1] and IMX[t-12,t-1] quintiles, respectively. The figures indicate that both AFE
and FE increase with state- and industry-level mispricing. However, the differences
between the AFE and FE figures of IMX[t-12,t-1] quintiles 1 and 5 are much larger
than those for GMX[t-12,t-1]. For instance, the 5 - 1 average AFE figure for IMX[t-
12,t-1] is 0.099 (t-statistic of 4.46), whereas the comparable figure for GMX[t-12,t-1] is
0.052 (t-statistic of 4.61). In addition, the difference between the average FE of GMX[t-
12,t-1] for quintiles 1 and 5 is not statistically significant. This indicates that firms in
the most mispriced industries have significantly higher earnings forecast errors, and that
their forecasts tend to be over-optimistic rather than over-pessimistic. Firms in the most
mispriced states, on the other hand, face moderately higher analyst forecast errors, but
their forecasts are not necessarily over-optimistic.
Firms in higher IMX[t-12,t-1] quintiles also have higher levels of dispersion in
earnings forecasts (DISPERSION ), with the difference between the first and fifth quin-
tiles being highly statistically significant. Although a similar pattern exists for GMX[t-
12,t-1] quintiles, the difference between the values of the extreme quintiles is only statis-
tically significant at the 5% level. Lastly, the highest GMX[t-12,t-1] and IMX[t-12,t-1]
quintiles have a larger proportion of stocks with no analyst coverage. Overall, the results
indicate that the most mispriced states and industries include firms with more noisy, bi-
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ased, and dispersed earnings forecasts, and that this is more the case for mispriced
industries than mispriced states.
After establishing that there is a relationship between analyst forecast errors and
state- and industry-level mispricing, I divide my sample into two parts based on AFE
and estimate the regressions in Panels A and B of Table 4.3 for each subsample. I use the
AFE cross-sectional median as the break point for the two subsamples. My expectation
is that firms facing higher analyst forecast errors have higher degrees of state- and
industry-level mispricing. This effect should be particularly strong for industry-level
mispricing.
The results in Panels A and B of Table 4.6 indicate that the MIS × GMX[t-
12,t-1] and MIS × IMX[t-12,t-1] interaction coefficients are only statistically significant
for the subsample of high AFE stocks. However, the differences between the interaction
coefficients of the high and the low AFE subsamples are only just statistically significant
for MIS × IMX[t-12,t-1] in Panel B. The difference in figures are 0.055% (t-statistic of
1.26) and 0.098% (t-statistic of 1.96) for MIS × GMX[t-12,t-1] and MIS × IMX[t-12,t-
1], respectively. These results are in line with my earlier prediction that industry-level
mispricing is particularly driven by stocks that are subject to analyst forecast errors.
Moreover, although a similar result is observed for state-level mispricing, it is significantly
less robust, which is also in line with my earlier prediction.
4.4.3 Sentiment and Local Risk Aversion
In this subsection, I consider heterogeneous state-wide sentiment and risk aversion as
another possible explanation for state-wide mispricing. I build on Korniotis and Kumar
(2013b) and Kumar et al. (2013) to argue that shocks to local investor demand can affect
the prices of local stocks. Baker et al. (2012) examine this idea across different coun-
tries and finds a link between measures of local sentiment and local return predictability
or mispricing. I also expect to find that geographic mispricing is more pronounced in
regions facing greater levels of investor sentiment or lower risk aversion. Before testing
this prediction, however, I examine the effect of national sentiment in generating mis-
pricing. To do this, I use the sentiment proxy of Baker and Wurgler (2006), and assess
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whether changes in national sentiment affect state- and industry-wide mispricing. From
Stambaugh et al. (2015), we already know that sentiment affects firm-level mispricing;
however, it is not immediately clear whether geographic and industrial mispricing are
also affected by national sentiment.
In a similar fashion to the methodology of Subsection 4.4.3, I divide my sample
into two parts, based on the time-series median of national sentiment (NSENT ) measure
of Baker and Wurgler (2006). I then estimate the regressions in Panels A and B of Table
4.3 for each subsample. Just as before, my emphasis is on the MIS × GMX[t-12,t-1]
and MIS × IMX[t-12,t-1] interaction coefficients. The results presented in Panels A
and B of Table 4.7 indicate that the two interaction coefficients are only statistically
significant at the 1% level in periods of high NSENT, while the magnitudes of the
interaction coefficients in high NSENT periods are twice those in low NSENT periods.
Nevertheless, the differences in the interaction coefficients of the two subsamples are not
statistically significant, even at the 5% level. This indicates that one cannot reliably
conclude that national sentiment affects state- or industry-level mispricing.
After gaining some insight into the role of national sentiment, I focus on local,
i.e. state-wide, variations in sentiment. I use two main proxies for local sentiment. First,
I follow the country-wide sentiment methodology of Baker et al. (2012) and construct a
sentiment index for each state (SSENT ). This is computed by taking the first principal
component of volatility premium, number of IPOs, average first-day returns of IPOs, and
turnover for each state. Second, I use the state macroeconomic activity index (SEA)
of Korniotis and Kumar (2013b). This is defined as taking the standardized values
of state income growth and housing collateral, subtracting the standardized value of
relative unemployment, and dividing by 3. Korniotis and Kumar (2013b) show that
this measure captures the dynamics in local investors’ risk aversion, and can predict
mispricing in local stocks. Table 4.A.1 provides further details about the construction
of these variables.
I also examine the effect of SEA and SSENT on state-level mispricing by dividing
the sample into two subsamples, using the cross-sectional median of each variable as the
breaking point. I then estimate the MIS × GMX[t-12,t-1] interaction coefficient, as I
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did for Tables 4.6 and 4.7. Results are presented in Table 4.8. Panels A and B show
that the interaction coefficients are only statistically significant in subsamples of high
SEA or SSENT. Differences in the interaction coefficients of the two subsamples are also
statistically significant at the 5% level. Periods of high SEA and high SSENT generate
0.075% (t-statistic of 1.94) and 0.050% (t-statistic of 2.09) higher MIS × GMX[t-12,t-1]
interaction coefficients, respectively. In summary, these results support my prediction
and suggest that state-level mispricing can be driven by states experiencing economic
expansion or higher levels of investor sentiment.
4.5 Robustness Checks
4.5.1 Basic Robustness Checks and Controlling for Limits to Arbitrage
This subsection examines the robustness of my main results, as presented in Table 4.3,
using several additional tests. Results from these robustness tests are summarized in
Table 4.9. I only focus on the coefficients in Panel A of Table 4.3, and the specifications
based on the estimation period of 12 months (T=12); that is, I use GMX[t-12,t-1] and
IMX[t-12,t-1] as the main state- and industry-level mispricing variables. I choose 12
months as the estimation period here because it provides the most collectively robust
specification for the state- and industry-level mispricing variables. In the interests of
brevity, I only report the estimates for the interaction terms, i.e. MIS × GMX[t-12,t-1]
and MIS × IMX[t-12,t-1], which are my main variables of interest.
The results in Panel A of Table 4.9 indicate that the interaction coefficient es-
timates are robust for the sample, excluding stocks cheaper than $5, the largest and
smallest quantiles of stocks, and the expansion and recession subsamples, defined using
the NBER Recession Indicator.6 Although excluding stocks cheaper than $5 slightly re-
duces the magnitude of the argued estimates, their statistical and economic significance
remain. In addition, the interaction coefficients tend to be larger and more significant
for the quintile consisting of the smallest stocks based on market capitalization, com-
pared to the quintile of large stocks. This is in line with Parsons et al. (2017), who
6The data are taken from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis website
(https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/USREC).
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argues that the smallest stocks are more likely to be affected by geographic or industrial
mispricing effects because they are scrutinized by the market to a lesser degree. Lastly,
the interaction coefficient estimates are larger but less significant for recession periods.
While this is an interesting observation, it would be beyond the scope of this study to
justify.
When using the midpoint, i.e. year 1990, to break the sample into two parts,
the MIS × IMX[t-12,t-1] loses its statistical significance in the subsample 1963-1990.
However, MIS × GMX[t-12,t-1] remains statistically significant in both subsamples,
albeit smaller in magnitude during the period 1963-1990. The weaker results for the first
27 years could be due to the lower number of observations in each group, which leads
to lower statistical power in all tests. Nevertheless, this is an interesting observation
because it indicates that the main findings of the paper may actually be stronger in
recent years, despite the increase in arbitrage activity.
Another concern regarding the results in Table 4.3 is that the state- and industry-
level mispricing variables may simply act as a proxy for liquidity or arbitrage costs. It is
well documented that market anomalies, and mispricing in general, are more prevalent
among stocks that are harder to arbitrage (see, e.g., Nagel, 2005; Hirshleifer et al., 2011;
Stambaugh et al., 2012; Avramov et al., 2013; Stambaugh et al., 2015). This being so,
most mispriced states or industries could continue to be mispriced because they happen
to include stocks that face significant limits to arbitrage, rather than necessarily being
exposed to forces related to their geographic or industrial identity.
Accordingly, I control for the effects of limits to arbitrage by adding five commonly
used proxies and their interactions with MIS to the regression in Table 4.3. The five
measures include the illiquidity measure of Amihud (2002), short interest ratio (following
Hanson and Sunderam (2014)), idiosyncratic volatility (motivated by Stambaugh et al.
(2015)), institutional holdings (following Nagel (2005)), and market capitalization. The
results in Panel B of Table 4.9 indicate that none of these proxies, nor their interactions
with MIS, absorb the coefficients of MIS × GMX[t-12,t-1] and MIS × IMX[t-12,t-1].
These two main interaction coefficients remain statistically and economically significant
in all cases, which means that the ability of state or industry affiliations to predict future
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mispricing is not due to the concentration of illiquid stocks in specific groups.
4.5.2 Robustness Simulations
In the previous subsection, I showed that the main results in Table 4.3 are robust to a
range of simple robustness tests and controls for limits to arbitrage. However, this does
not fully address all identification concerns regarding the state- and the industry-level
mispricing variables. One could argue that these two variables predict future mispricing
simply for spurious reasons; after all, some firms tend to be more mispriced than others,
and will continue to be that way, while specific state or industry groups could be more
mispriced simply because they randomly include the most mispriced firms, regardless
of the characteristics of the state or industry. In other words, it might be possible to
observe the same pattern in my data after repeating the exercise for any other method
of grouping firms that is not necessarily linked to firms’ geography or industry.
I address the challenge outlined above by randomizing the state and industry
allocations of all firms in the sample. To do so, I randomly allocate firms in the sample
to other state and industry groups, then re-run my tests. I require all my pseudo-state
and -industry groups to include the same number of firms as the original groups in order
to ensure that the sample groups are as statistically comparable as possible. Specifically,
I simulate 10,000 iterations based on these pseudo-state and -industry allocations for the
12-month specifications (T=12) in Panel C of Table 4.3. I focus on the GM and IM
variables because they are better predictors of future mispricing, and are more likely to
lead to spurious findings. If I find that the MIS × GM[t-12,t-1] and MIS × IM[t-12,t-1]
coefficients are not statistically and economically meaningful in a significant proportion
of the simulated estimates, I can safely argue in favor of the existence of state and
industry effects.
Table 4.10 summarizes my simulation results. The 99th percentiles (P99 ) of the
distributions of simulated MIS × GM[t-12,t-1] and MIS × IM[t-12,t-1] coefficients are
0.040% (t-statistic of 2.92) and 0.041% (t-statistic of 2.88), respectively. In comparison,
the baseline estimates from Panel C of Table 4.3 are 0.045% (t-statistic of 3.20) and
0.062% (t-statistic of 3.76), respectively. This means that less than 1% of simulation
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runs lead to estimates that are as statistically and economically significant as the baseline
result. The MIS × IM[t-12,t-1] coefficient tends to be slightly more robust than that
of MIS × GM[t-12,t-1] because it has a larger gap with the 99th percentile threshold.
I also plot the histogram of simulations in Figure 4.1. Again, it is visually evident that
the actual coefficients (subfigures (a) and (c)) and t-statistics (subfigures (b) and (d))
are far to the right of the 1% threshold.
In summary, my simulation results indicate that the probability of any random
groups of stocks yielding the same results as those presented in Table 4.3 is less than
1%. The GM[t-12,t-1] and IM[t-12,t-1] for which the simulations are performed generate
the strongest collective results for both state- and industry-level mispricing. They also
include each firm itself in the past state and industry mispricing estimates, and are thus
more prone to autocorrelation or spuriosity compared to GMX[t-12,t-1] and IMX[t-12,t-
1]. Despite this, however, the fact that results based on even these variables specifically
are highly unlikely to be achieved with random groups supports my main contention
regarding the role of geographic and industrial forces in mispricing.
4.6 Conclusion
This study investigates whether the geographic or industry characteristics of a firm can
affect its mispricing, as captured by market anomalies. Using a composite mispricing
measure based on 11 anomaly strategies, I show that states or industries experiencing
higher levels of cross-sectional mispricing are more likely to have mispriced firms in
future periods.
These findings are robust to several different specifications, treatments, and con-
trols, and have potentially important practical implications. For example, my results
indicate that anomaly strategies could be refined by considering the performance of the
firm’s regional or geographic peers, while geographic and industrial mispricing are in-
dependent of each other, and provide complementary information about a firm’s future
mispricing. This being so, both should be taken into account at the same time in order
to fully exploit the observed phenomenon.
In summary, I argue that geography and industry predict mispricing consistent
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with common behaviors or biases of clienteles of investors or analysts who concentrate
on firms in a certain region or industry. However, I provide evidence that the mechanism
through which these clienteles generate mispricing differs geographically and by industry.
For industries, analysts tend to play a significant role because they are clustered by
industry, and are thus crucial in distinguishing between industrial peers (Parsons et al.,
2017); consequently, their lack of ability to value stocks within an industry can lead
to mispricing for all stocks in the group. On the other hand, for geographical regions,
the common investor clientele is likely to be local investors who possess a local bias.
Therefore any shift in local sentiment or risk aversion can affect the prices of local stocks
and lead to mispricing, as documented by previous papers (e.g., Stambaugh et al., 2012;
Baker et al., 2012)
The main objective of this study is to highlight the role of geography and industry
in stock mispricing. This study represents an initial attempt in the literature to provide
an explanation for this phenomenon. Investigating other channels that could potentially
explain the results obtained in this study would be a fruitful avenue of future research.
Further work should also explore the profitability of trading strategies based on firm
geography and industry.
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Figure 4.1: Histograms of Simulated Coefficients
The subfigures below present the histograms of simulated coefficients and their t-statistics as summarized
in Table 4.5. Subfigure (a) presents the histogram of simulated MIS×GM[t-12,t-1] coefficients. Subfigure
(b) presents the histogram of simulated MIS × GM[t-12,t-1] t-statistics. Subfigure (c) presents the
histogram of simulated MIS × IM[t-12,t-1] coefficients. Subfigure (d) presents the histogram of simulated
MIS × IM[t-12,t-1] t-statistics. All subfigures include the normal and the kernel distribution curves
together with lines marking the 99th percentiles of simulations and the actual estimates.
(a) MIS × GM[t-12,t-1] Coefficients (b) MIS × GM[t-12,t-1] t-statistics
(c) MIS × IM[t-12,t-1] Coefficients (d) MIS × IM[t-12,t-1] t-statistics
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics
This table reports the average characteristics of firms in each state and industry. The states in Panel A
and industries in Panel B are sorted from the least to the most mispriced, based on their GM and IM
values, estimated using the whole sample. MIS α is the abnormal return (intercept of the four factor
model of Carhart (1997)) of the hedge (long minus short) MIS portfolio of firms in each state or industry.
Hedge MIS returns for each state or industry group are defined as the average returns of stocks in that
group that have MIS values above the cross-sectional median minus the average returns of those with
MIS values below the cross-sectional median. The median MIS is based on the whole cross section and
not each individual state or industry. The definition of state and industry for each firm are the same
as those used in GM and IM variables defined in Table 4.A.1. N is the average number of firms in each
group, before excluding the firm-groups with lower than 5 observations. GM, IM, and all other variables
are defined in Table 4.A.1. The sample excludes penny stocks and covers the period from July 1963 to
December 2017, except for the IHOLD variable, which starts in January 1980.
Panel A: States
# State GM MIS α N PRICE ME B/M VOL IVOL TURN ILLIQ IHOLD
1 Kentucky -3.861 0.848 17 24.520 1,046 0.861 2.458 2.282 0.087 2.633 44.183
2 New Mexico -3.541 0.152 5 15.510 630 0.938 2.951 2.764 0.104 4.322 41.190
3 Montana -2.365 0.245 2 17.999 340 0.604 2.853 2.624 0.072 1.057 25.575
4 Delaware -1.515 0.159 12 24.946 3,248 0.932 2.619 2.436 0.065 2.564 35.501
5 West Virginia -1.367 0.662 3 10.131 143 1.177 3.218 3.085 0.068 10.246 31.380
6 North Dakota 0.000 -0.690 2 24.280 854 0.907 2.082 1.898 0.106 2.915 35.459
7 Indiana 0.100 0.440 38 26.535 1,553 0.950 2.643 2.445 0.083 3.725 43.234
8 South Carolina 0.186 0.549 16 21.743 659 0.935 2.688 2.466 0.076 3.588 42.203
9 Missouri 0.197 0.392 54 26.777 1,801 0.873 2.430 2.219 0.092 1.845 42.847
10 Winsconsin 0.225 0.237 50 24.632 944 0.824 2.390 2.189 0.071 2.722 44.188
11 Alabama 0.260 0.536 16 21.922 690 0.843 2.654 2.470 0.095 5.300 40.875
12 Arkansas 0.271 0.239 13 21.967 6,931 0.948 2.643 2.440 0.085 4.253 40.750
13 Mississippi 0.289 0.886 5 16.671 304 0.884 2.996 2.811 0.132 9.083 41.765
14 Washington 0.294 0.422 45 22.573 3,953 0.763 2.920 2.703 0.110 2.393 37.695
15 Oklahoma 0.311 0.685 25 19.876 1,357 0.813 3.221 2.977 0.098 6.079 37.044
16 Texas 0.359 0.550 288 21.767 1,645 0.828 3.028 2.782 0.103 3.912 41.951
17 Nevada 0.360 0.268 24 20.733 1,008 0.728 3.148 2.935 0.105 4.224 29.689
18 Arizona 0.374 0.751 42 19.832 997 0.777 3.084 2.854 0.120 4.157 43.239
19 Pennsylvania 0.375 0.469 138 23.029 1,186 0.846 2.757 2.540 0.091 4.348 43.448
20 Connecticut 0.394 0.617 81 26.637 1,630 0.797 2.800 2.575 0.087 3.789 44.753
21 Illinois 0.415 0.475 156 25.971 2,520 0.860 2.572 2.355 0.086 2.769 46.338
22 New York 0.417 0.634 277 20.878 2,640 0.894 3.097 2.906 0.092 6.595 35.835
23 Minnesota 0.418 0.506 90 22.835 1,325 0.724 2.876 2.699 0.088 4.273 37.380
24 Colorado 0.425 1.026 70 16.695 769 0.782 3.344 3.130 0.107 6.424 35.930
25 North Carolina 0.430 0.548 64 22.366 1,403 0.932 2.686 2.489 0.092 3.316 42.243
26 Ohio 0.439 0.645 126 24.705 1,848 0.924 2.544 2.339 0.084 2.852 44.297
27 Iowa 0.444 0.700 17 21.696 675 0.892 2.491 2.301 0.071 2.731 37.654
28 Massachusetts 0.445 0.555 157 19.732 1,608 0.780 3.259 3.024 0.107 4.265 40.125
29 Virginia 0.450 0.716 79 31.942 1,955 0.810 2.756 2.544 0.095 2.599 41.743
30 Georgia 0.458 0.720 81 21.597 2,376 0.840 2.873 2.666 0.086 4.272 47.348
31 New Jersey 0.472 0.696 154 19.708 2,551 0.805 3.164 2.985 0.095 6.181 35.872
32 Oregon 0.484 0.539 28 20.227 1,006 0.813 2.945 2.722 0.093 6.409 42.984
33 Michingan 0.488 0.691 82 22.193 2,058 0.922 2.646 2.427 0.084 3.469 41.953
34 California 0.508 0.763 432 19.033 1,800 0.714 3.386 3.135 0.129 3.859 39.398
35 Maryland 0.513 0.346 46 20.342 973 0.83 3.179 2.979 0.112 4.281 36.762
36 Florida 0.567 0.874 123 17.822 671 0.845 3.277 3.086 0.094 5.180 34.718
37 Idaho 0.623 0.252 9 22.417 1,496 0.662 2.859 2.623 0.122 0.804 42.113
38 Utah 0.684 1.212 24 17.676 392 0.764 3.208 3.034 0.093 3.577 34.022
39 Rhode Island 0.808 0.787 11 22.801 2,864 0.858 2.704 2.522 0.075 2.471 42.605
40 Hawaii 2.506 0.810 6 18.728 423 0.819 2.403 2.275 0.051 2.374 23.527
41 New Hampshire 2.645 -0.029 15 19.802 316 0.752 2.881 2.644 0.081 2.819 38.477
42 Kansas 2.945 0.175 18 62.339 1,054 0.911 2.857 2.694 0.097 4.462 34.534
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics (Continued)
Panel A: States (Continued)
# State GM MIS α N PRICE ME B/M VOL IVOL TURN ILLIQ IHOLD
43 Nebraska 3.019 1.098 9 25.826 2,078 0.711 2.665 2.489 0.081 2.147 35.539
44 Louisiana 3.554 0.839 17 21.940 1,381 1.005 2.775 2.533 0.107 3.659 43.684
45 Vermont 3.976 1.620 5 18.213 822 0.793 3.133 2.936 0.099 4.548 30.755
46 Maine 5.091 0.917 5 23.363 718 0.931 2.381 2.290 0.050 7.905 30.215
47 District of Columbia 9.152 0.239 7 24.183 2,333 0.902 2.562 2.379 0.105 2.330 48.584
48 Tennessee 10.821 0.324 42 24.357 1,314 0.830 2.519 2.325 0.086 2.019 46.485
49 South Dakota 70.306 1.223 5 21.323 407 0.712 2.270 2.077 0.080 0.836 40.752
Panel B: Industries
# Industry IM MIS α N PRICE ME B/M VOL IVOL TURN ILLIQ IHOLD
1 Coal -0.997 -1.715 6 26.100 944 1.119 2.901 2.552 0.187 0.870 44.387
2 Shipping Containers -0.251 0.703 22 27.168 1,527 0.817 2.489 2.291 0.072 3.310 47.688
3 Tobacco Products -0.189 2.741 7 38.291 15,490 0.658 1.974 1.809 0.067 1.291 43.064
4
Non-Metallic and
0.073 2.392 17 21.373 1,327 0.839 3.148 2.885 0.111 1.869 32.363
Industrial Metal Mining
5 Agriculture 0.108 3.019 11 20.256 360 0.874 2.801 2.650 0.066 3.548 34.503
6 Defense 0.187 1.302 7 28.230 2,510 0.719 2.659 2.461 0.134 2.695 45.356
7 Precious Metals 0.209 1.133 10 16.495 2,129 0.522 3.613 3.413 0.151 2.137 31.921
8 Textiles 0.253 1.620 34 17.821 355 1.374 2.874 2.707 0.058 6.648 39.271
9 Food Products 0.254 1.453 65 38.428 2,018 0.853 2.411 2.279 0.070 3.179 34.643
10 Utilities 0.260 1.840 142 28.589 2,499 0.973 1.465 1.325 0.057 0.437 33.980
11
Rubber and Plastic




0.300 1.652 71 21.473 1,453 0.801 2.937 2.743 0.098 5.030 41.045
Motels
13 Business Supplies 0.302 2.232 39 26.170 1,463 0.887 2.301 2.078 0.063 3.381 47.509
14 Printing and Publishing 0.306 1.295 39 33.595 1,279 0.777 2.401 2.206 0.068 2.160 46.119
15
Pharmaceutical
0.306 1.043 127 24.877 2,931 0.410 3.295 3.066 0.115 1.972 35.810
Products
16 Aircraft 0.306 1.088 22 29.977 3,986 0.799 2.738 2.500 0.075 4.364 45.182
17
Measuring and Control
0.310 0.593 72 20.420 952 0.686 3.248 3.021 0.087 6.345 37.651
Equipment
18 Retail 0.327 1.206 192 21.747 2,234 0.980 2.822 2.629 0.110 3.938 44.587
19 Construction 0.332 1.886 41 24.199 590 1.049 3.151 2.891 0.119 5.969 42.468
20 Petroleum and Natural 0.335 1.007 129 26.081 2,503 0.786 3.104 2.802 0.114 4.509 40.250
21
Gas Construction
0.353 1.992 105 23.010 860 0.955 2.600 2.394 0.072 4.507 40.728
Materials
22 Beer & Liquor 0.371 2.547 13 28.793 1,767 1.052 2.473 2.334 0.068 2.867 35.929
23 Electronic Equipment 0.382 1.642 177 17.128 1,526 0.709 3.518 3.227 0.134 5.875 39.575
24 Steel Works Etc 0.386 1.135 61 22.858 1,211 1.144 2.686 2.401 0.113 2.534 48.140
25 Personal Services 0.387 0.774 37 16.420 471 0.889 3.042 2.867 0.088 6.721 44.851
26 Communication 0.394 0.810 74 27.017 4,110 0.775 2.804 2.564 0.100 2.156 41.210
27 Electrical Equipment 0.401 1.344 79 17.985 1,205 0.734 3.313 3.096 0.099 5.506 35.838
28 Machinery 0.410 1.635 128 23.352 1,650 0.835 2.793 2.548 0.085 4.106 44.150
29 Computers 0.413 1.961 104 27.063 3,364 0.655 3.454 3.168 0.132 3.798 39.560
30 Wholesale 0.432 1.304 138 18.371 797 0.945 3.113 2.929 0.087 7.444 43.619
31 Apparel 0.494 2.198 53 20.192 1,086 1.008 2.861 2.683 0.096 6.175 42.421
32 Entertainment 0.496 2.743 42 17.578 1,483 0.839 3.276 3.086 0.102 8.028 33.788
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics (Continued)
Panel B: Industries (Continued)
# Industry IM MIS α N PRICE ME B/M VOL IVOL TURN ILLIQ IHOLD
33 Consumer Goods 0.513 2.170 81 25.827 3,383 0.816 2.679 2.491 0.078 4.484 40.672
34 Chemicals 0.517 1.848 70 29.270 2,220 0.732 2.585 2.348 0.082 2.518 48.300
35 Transportation 0.534 1.870 81 24.828 1,634 1.176 2.805 2.560 0.109 2.809 44.823
36 Business Services 0.547 2.013 321 18.770 1,381 0.668 3.373 3.150 0.108 4.862 39.008
37 Medical Equipment 0.569 1.844 88 23.561 1,070 0.482 3.261 3.072 0.101 2.624 35.691
38
Automobiles and




0.592 0.490 7 29.430 1,455 1.025 2.612 2.364 0.090 1.514 48.843
Equipment
40 Healthcare 0.609 1.657 64 15.653 845 0.713 3.509 3.314 0.112 4.584 39.691
41 Fabricated Products 0.611 0.513 14 17.986 315 0.988 2.792 2.582 0.064 3.821 36.877
42 Candy & Soda 0.728 0.801 11 31.888 12,425 0.606 2.050 1.885 0.055 2.074 37.102
43 Other 0.743 1.552 15 17.271 1,691 0.773 3.220 3.031 0.079 1.959 38.649
44 Recreation 0.878 2.842 33 16.184 516 0.966 3.289 3.105 0.081 5.892 33.044
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Table 4.2: Persistence of Abnormal Returns by Geography and Industry
This table presents benchmark adjusted returns for double-sorted portfolios based on MIS (defined in
Table 4.A.1) and past MIS abnormal returns (α) within each firm’s state or industry. The portfolios
are formed by sorting stocks independently into five portfolios at the end of every month with respect
to each variable. I then compute the average returns of the 25 intersecting portfolios for the following
month and regress the time series of returns on the four factors of Carhart (1997). The regression
intercept is the abnormal return estimate reported in the table below. Past MIS abnormal returns (α)
are computed by regressing past hedge MIS returns of firms headquartered in each state or industry on
the time series of returns on the four factors of Carhart (1997). Hedge MIS returns for each state or
industry group are defined as the average returns of stocks in that group that have MIS values above
the cross-sectional median minus the average returns of those with MIS values below the cross-sectional
median. The median MIS is based on the whole cross section and not each individual state or industry.
The definitions of state and industry are the same as those used in GM and IM variables defined in
Table 4.A.1. In Panel A, past MIS α for month t is computed using observations from months t− 12 to
t− 1; in Panel B, we use observations from months t− 24 to t− 1 or months t− 60 to t− 1. The sample
excludes penny stocks and covers the period from July 1963 to December 2017. *, **, and *** denote
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Persistence of Geographic Mispricing Measured Over the Past-Year
Low Past MIS α 2 3 4 High Past MIS α High - Low
Low MIS
-0.587*** -0.743*** -0.656*** -0.489*** -0.793*** -0.206*
(-5.26) (-6.01) (-5.36) (-3.59) (-6.26) (-1.89)
2
-0.006 0.024 0.090 0.055 0.102 0.107
(-0.07) (0.26) (0.93) (0.56) (1.19) (1.18)
3
0.204*** 0.243*** 0.245*** 0.275*** 0.260*** 0.055
(2.82) (3.06) (2.95) (3.38) (3.27) (0.67)
4
0.438*** 0.367*** 0.420*** 0.411*** 0.341*** -0.096
(6.86) (5.21) (5.95) (5.88) (5.03) (-1.28)
High MIS
0.497*** 0.510*** 0.549*** 0.514*** 0.637*** 0.140*
(8.02) (7.32) (8.56) (8.01) (10.28) (1.95)
High - Low
1.084*** 1.253*** 1.205*** 1.003*** 1.429*** 0.346***
(8.74) (9.14) (9.36) (7.00) (10.78) (2.79)
Panel B: Persistence of Industrial Mispricing Measured Over the Past-Year
Low Past MIS α 2 3 4 High Past MIS α High - Low
Low MIS
-0.507*** -0.682*** -0.857*** -0.518*** -0.767*** -0.260*
(-3.85) (-4.74) (-6.15) (-3.78) (-5.92) (-1.71)
2
0.129 0.043 0.006 0.305*** -0.155 -0.284**
(1.22) (0.43) (0.05) (2.71) (-1.58) (-2.36)
3
0.264*** 0.165* 0.316*** 0.422*** 0.171** -0.093
(2.98) (1.71) (3.46) (4.37) (2.11) (-0.83)
4
0.320*** 0.324*** 0.289*** 0.527*** 0.370*** 0.050
(4.04) (3.88) (3.83) (6.34) (4.91) (0.50)
High MIS
0.399*** 0.566*** 0.530*** 0.687*** 0.487*** 0.088
(5.50) (6.68) (7.38) (9.19) (7.09) (1.00)
High - Low
0.906*** 1.248*** 1.387*** 1.206*** 1.253*** 0.348**
(8.51) (8.67) (9.85) (8.68) (10.44) (3.18)
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Table 4.2: Persistence of Abnormal Returns by Geography and Industry (Continued)
Panel C: Persistence of Geographic Mispricing Measured Over the Past Two and Five Years
T=24 T=60
1 5 5 - 1 1 5 5 - 1
Low MIS
-0.495*** -0.625*** -0.130 -0.573*** -0.699*** -0.126
(-3.63) (-4.79) (-0.83) (-4.60) (-5.77) (-1.21)
High MIS
0.382*** 0.509*** 0.127 0.555*** 0.541*** -0.015
(5.26) (6.92) (1.36) (9.53) (8.86) (-0.22)
High - Low
0.877*** 1.134*** 0.256 1.128*** 1.239*** 0.111
(5.87) (8.07) (1.51) (8.33) (9.54) (0.98)
Panel D: Persistence of Industrial Mispricing Measured Over the Past Two and Five Years
T=24 T=60
1 5 5 - 1 1 5 5 - 1
Low MIS
-0.544*** -0.687*** -0.143 -0.605*** -0.698*** -0.093
(-4.70) (-5.68) (-1.43) (-4.52) (-5.19) (-0.54)
High MIS
0.506*** 0.590*** 0.084 0.454*** 0.547*** 0.093
(8.32) (9.11) (1.18) (6.60) (7.07) (0.99)
High - Low
1.050*** 1.277*** 0.227* 1.059*** 1.245*** 0.186
(8.20) (10.15) (1.92) (7.53) (9.13) (1.13)
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Table 4.3: Firm-Level Return Predictability Based on Geography and Industry
This table presents estimates from the monthly Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions. At the end
of each month t, I use a set of independent variables including stock characteristics and my mispricing
measures to predict the stock returns for month t+1. My primary independent variable is the interaction
between the combined anomaly variable, MIS, and GMX[t-T,t-1] or IMX[t-T,t-1]. For each stock,
GMX[t-T,t-1] and IMX[t-T,t-1] measure the past return predictability of MIS from month t − T to
t− 1 within that stock’s state and industry peers, respectively. Table 4.A.1 defines all the variables. All
independent variables in my regressions are standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation
of 1, and are winsorized at the 0.5 and 99.5 percentiles. Standard errors are adjusted using the Newey
and West (1987) approach. Panels A and B report the baseline regression results based on GMX[t-T,t-1]
and IMX[t-T,t-1], respectively. Panel C presents the results based on alternative measures of past state
and industry mispricing, i.e. GM[t-T,t-1] and IM[t-T,t-1], which include the dependent-variable firm
itself to estimate the past return predictability of each state and industry. For brevity, I exclude the
intercept and the control variable estimates in Panel C. The sample excludes penny stocks and covers
the period from July 1963 to December 2017. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Firm-Level Return Predictability Based on Past Geographic Mispricing
Only MIS T=1 T=3 T=6 T=12 T=24 T=60
Intercept 0.998*** 1.002*** 0.999*** 0.996*** 0.995*** 0.990*** 0.987***
(4.33) (4.36) (4.34) (4.32) (4.32) (4.30) (4.30)
GMX[t-T,t-1] -0.049*** -0.029* -0.035** -0.033** -0.03* -0.035**
(-3.38) (-1.85) (-2.34) (-2.18) (-1.96) (-2.15)
MIS 0.446*** 0.443*** 0.438*** 0.443*** 0.442*** 0.447*** 0.439***
(11.00) (11.03) (10.59) (10.65) (10.84) (10.85) (10.78)
MIS × GMX[t-T,t-1] 0.024* 0.014 0.042*** 0.045*** 0.027* 0.014
(1.81) (0.96) (3.06) (3.20) (1.94) (1.00)
log(ME) -0.199** -0.194** -0.195** -0.195** -0.195** -0.194** -0.195**
(-2.43) (-2.39) (-2.39) (-2.39) (-2.39) (-2.39) (-2.40)
log(B/M) 0.321*** 0.318*** 0.319*** 0.318*** 0.318*** 0.319*** 0.319***
(5.27) (5.22) (5.24) (5.22) (5.22) (5.24) (5.25)
RET[-12,-2] 0.361*** 0.356*** 0.355*** 0.354*** 0.353*** 0.355*** 0.356***
(4.50) (4.46) (4.45) (4.43) (4.42) (4.45) (4.46)
RET[-1,0] -0.633*** -0.638*** -0.639*** -0.639*** -0.639*** -0.638*** -0.638***
(-10.97) (-11.10) (-11.09) (-11.10) (-11.10) (-11.06) (-11.06)
Average Adjusted R2 4.23% 4.27% 4.28% 4.28% 4.29% 4.29% 4.28%
Average Observations 2,852 2,812 2,813 2,814 2,815 2,816 2,819
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Table 4.3: Firm-Level Return Predictability Based on Geography and Industry (Con-
tinued)
Panel B: Firm-Level Return Predictability Based on Past Industrial Mispricing
Only MIS T=1 T=3 T=6 T=12 T=24 T=60
Intercept 0.998*** 0.992*** 0.989*** 1.004*** 1.001*** 0.998*** 0.996***
(4.33) (4.35) (4.35) (4.41) (4.39) (4.37) (4.36)
IMX[t-T,t-1] -0.126*** -0.107*** -0.110*** -0.094*** -0.071*** -0.071***
(-4.93) (-3.99) (-4.10) (-3.41) (-2.62) (-2.92)
MIS 0.446*** 0.427*** 0.428*** 0.427*** 0.427*** 0.429*** 0.425***
(11.00) (11.20) (11.09) (11.10) (11.22) (11.19) (11.08)
MIS × IMX[t-T,t-1] 0.07*** 0.067*** 0.06*** 0.062*** 0.044*** 0.038**
(4.19) (3.85) (3.65) (3.76) (2.74) (2.51)
log(ME) -0.199** -0.182** -0.180** -0.184** -0.185** -0.187** -0.186**
(-2.43) (-2.25) (-2.22) (-2.27) (-2.27) (-2.30) (-2.29)
log(B/M) 0.321*** 0.321*** 0.320*** 0.321*** 0.322*** 0.322*** 0.317***
(5.27) (5.33) (5.33) (5.31) (5.31) (5.31) (5.21)
RET[-12,-2] 0.361*** 0.344*** 0.339*** 0.338*** 0.337*** 0.341*** 0.343***
(4.50) (4.23) (4.19) (4.20) (4.20) (4.24) (4.24)
RET[-1,0] -0.633*** -0.647*** -0.646*** -0.646*** -0.645*** -0.643*** -0.641***
(-10.97) (-11.11) (-11.13) (-11.13) (-11.09) (-11.06) (-11.03)
Average Adjusted R2 4.23% 4.45% 4.45% 4.45% 4.44% 4.44% 4.41%
Average Observations 2,852 2,731 2,731 2,732 2,732 2,733 2,734
Panel C: Alternative Past Mispricing Measure (Including the Dependent Variable Firm)
Only MIS T=1 T=3 T=6 T=12 T=24 T=60
GM[t-T,t-1] -0.054*** -0.027* -0.035** -0.042*** -0.029* -0.034**
(-3.58) (-1.72) (-2.26) (-2.62) (-1.80) (-1.99)
MIS 0.446*** 0.442*** 0.442*** 0.445*** 0.456*** 0.456*** 0.449***
(11.00) (11.07) (10.91) (10.87) (11.28) (11.12) (10.94)
MIS × GM[t-T,t-1] 0.029** 0.015 0.047*** 0.052*** 0.026* 0.018
(2.08) (1.03) (3.24) (3.47) (1.93) (1.30)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Average Adjusted R2 4.23% 4.26% 4.27% 4.26% 4.27% 4.26% 4.26%
Average Observations 2,852 2,840 2,840 2,841 2,841 2,842 2,843
IM[t-T,t-1] -0.133*** -0.118*** -0.121*** -0.102*** -0.079*** -0.052
(-5.08) (-4.21) (-4.32) (-3.47) (-2.59) (-1.63)
MIS 0.446*** 0.426*** 0.426*** 0.433*** 0.44*** 0.434*** 0.421***
(11.00) (11.07) (11.03) (11.32) (11.61) (10.98) (10.59)
MIS × IM[t-T,t-1] 0.064*** 0.066*** 0.059*** 0.076*** 0.044** 0.017
(3.60) (3.50) (3.29) (4.10) (2.55) (1.00)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Average Adjusted R2 4.23% 4.44% 4.46% 4.46% 4.45% 4.45% 4.42%
Average Observations 2,852 2,759 2,759 2,759 2,760 2,760 2,760
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Table 4.4: Firm-Level Return Predictability Based on Both Geography and Industry
This table presents the Fama-MacBeth regression results based on a model that includes both MIS ×
GMX[t-T,t-1] and MIS × IMX[t-T,t-1] interactions at the same time. The regression methodology is the
same as that described in Table 4.2. Table 4.A.1 defines all the variables. The sample period covers July
1963 to December 2017. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Past Mispricing Excluding the Dependent Variable Firm
T=1 T=3 T=6 T=12 T=24 T=60
MIS 0.427*** 0.422*** 0.426*** 0.427*** 0.434*** 0.423***
(11.29) (10.50) (10.70) (10.99) (10.94) (10.76)
GMX[t-T,t-1] -0.045*** -0.030* -0.032** -0.027* -0.027* -0.031*
(-3.17) (-1.95) (-2.20) (-1.84) (-1.81) (-1.94)
IMX[t-T,t-1] -0.124*** -0.107*** -0.109*** -0.092*** -0.070*** -0.070***
(-4.86) (-4.02) (-4.13) (-3.38) (-2.60) (-2.88)
MIS × GMX[t-T,t-1] 0.024* 0.014 0.043*** 0.040*** 0.023* 0.011
(1.76) (1.05) (3.20) (2.96) (1.69) (0.71)
MIS × IMX[t-T,t-1] 0.071*** 0.070*** 0.060*** 0.061*** 0.041** 0.035**
(4.27) (4.02) (3.67) (3.65) (2.51) (2.30)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Average Adjusted R2 4.47% 4.48% 4.47% 4.48% 4.47% 4.44%
Average Observations 2,080 2,710 2,711 2,713 2,715 2,718
Panel B: Past Mispricing Including the Dependent Variable Firm
T=1 T=3 T=6 T=12 T=24 T=60
MIS 0.425*** 0.426*** 0.433*** 0.449*** 0.443*** 0.422***
(11.12) (10.87) (11.07) (11.7) (10.93) (10.39)
GM[t-T,t-1] -0.048*** -0.028* -0.030* -0.037** -0.024 -0.031*
(-3.21) (-1.80) (-1.95) (-2.38) (-1.56) (-1.88)
IM[t-T,t-1] -0.131*** -0.118*** -0.122*** -0.101*** -0.077** -0.051
(-5.02) (-4.24) (-4.36) (-3.48) (-2.55) (-1.58)
MIS × GM[t-T,t-1] 0.027* 0.016 0.042*** 0.044*** 0.020 0.015
(1.89) (1.07) (2.93) (3.00) (1.45) (1.10)
MIS × IM[t-T,t-1] 0.065*** 0.068*** 0.058*** 0.075*** 0.044** 0.017
(3.65) (3.62) (3.25) (4.06) (2.52) (0.99)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Average Adjusted R2 4.46% 4.5% 4.48% 4.48% 4.47% 4.44%
Average Observations 2,744 2,744 2,745 2,746 2,747 2,748
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Table 4.5: Analyst Characteristics of GMX[t-12,t-1] and IMX[t-12,t-1] Quintiles
This table reports the average analyst characteristics of quintile portfolios, sorted based on the past
geographic (GMX[t-12,t-1]) and industrial (IMX[t-12,t-1]) mispricing variables. The quintiles are formed
by sorting all stocks at the end of each month, based on their most recent GMX[t-12,t-1] and IMX[t-
12,t-1] values. The characteristics are also reported for the same month, at the end of which the quintiles
are formed. AFE is the average absolute analyst forecast error for the most recent quarter scaled by the
stock price, FE is the forecast error for the most recent quarter scaled by the stock price, DISPERSION
is the average analyst forecast dispersion for the most recent quarter, and NOCOVERAGE is equal to 1
if a stock did not have any analyst coverage over the past 3 months, and 0 otherwise. The construction
details of all variables are explained in Table 4.A.1. All variables are winsorized at their 0.1 and 99.9
percentile levels. The t-statistics for the difference between the values of quintiles 1 and 5 (5 - 1) are
based on Newey-West heteroscedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors using a lag of
12 months. The sample excludes penny stocks and covers January 1990 to December 2017.
Panel A: Quintiles Based on GMX[t-12,t-1]
1 2 3 4 5 5 - 1 (t)
AFE 0.596 0.621 0.631 0.64 0.648 0.052 (4.61)
FE 0.070 0.071 0.065 0.069 0.082 0.012 (1.51)
DISPERSION 0.221 0.228 0.228 0.236 0.233 0.012 (1.99)
NOCOVERAGE 36.391 36.326 36.826 37.35 38.144 1.754 (2.52)
Panel B: Quintiles Based on IMX[t-12,t-1]
1 2 3 4 5 5 - 1 (t)
AFE 0.589 0.596 0.598 0.616 0.688 0.099 (4.46)
FE 0.066 0.064 0.057 0.056 0.104 0.038 (3.00)
DISPERSION 0.217 0.227 0.229 0.229 0.240 0.024 (2.78)
NOCOVERAGE 36.346 36.819 36.704 36.713 38.177 1.831 (2.93)
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Table 4.6: Firm-Level Return Predictability Within Subsamples of Absolute Analyst
Forecast Error
This table presents Fama-MacBeth regression estimates for two subsamples of stocks formed based on
their absolute forecast errors (AFE). The subsamples are formed by sorting stocks every month, based on
their most recent AFE values, into two groups. I then take the regression specifications in Table 4.3 and
estimate them for each of the two subsamples. The construction details of all variables are explained
in Table 4.A.1. For brevity, I exclude the intercept and control variable estimates. All independent
variables in the regressions are standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1, and
are winsorized at their 0.5 and 99.5 percentile levels. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity
and autocorrelation using the Newey and West (1987) approach. The sample excludes penny stocks and
covers January 1990 to December 2017.
Panel A: Firm-Level Return Predictability Based on Past Geographic Mispricing
Low AFE High AFE High - Low
MIS 0.231*** 0.612*** 0.381***
(3.37) (8.05) (3.70)
GMX[t-12,t-1] -0.011 0.001 0.012
(-0.40) (0.04) (0.32)
MIS × GMX[t-12,t-1] 0.015 0.070** 0.055
(0.57) (2.02) (1.26)
Controls Yes Yes
Average Adjusted R2 5.44% 4.05%
Average Observations 1014 983
Panel B: Firm-Level Return Predictability Based on Past Industrial Mispricing
Low AFE High AFE High - Low
MIS 0.191*** 0.564*** 0.373***
(2.99) (7.64) (3.82)
IMX[t-12,t-1] -0.018 -0.100 -0.082
(-0.42) (-1.61) (-1.09)
MIS × IMX[t-12,t-1] 0.032 0.13*** 0.098**
(1.03) (3.33) (1.96)
Controls Yes Yes
Average Adjusted R2 5.65% 4.35%
Average Observations 996 958
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Table 4.7: Firm-Level Return Predictability for Periods of High and Low National Sen-
timent
This table report Fama-MacBeth regression estimates for two subsamples of stocks formed based on the
previous month’s sentiment score. The subsamples are formed by dividing the sample into months of
high and low sentiment, using the Baker and Wurgler (2006) sentiment score for the previous month. I
then take the regression specifications in Table 4.3 and estimate them for each of the two subsamples.
The construction details of all variables are explained in Table 4.A.1. For brevity, I exclude the intercept
and control variable estimates. All independent variables in the regressions are standardized to have a
mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1, and are winsorized at their 0.5 and 99.5 percentile levels.
Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation using the Newey and West (1987)
approach. The sample excludes penny stocks and covers January 1970 to December 2015.
Panel A: Firm-Level Return Predictability Based on Past Geographic Mispricing
Low NSENT High NSENT High - Low
MIS 0.358*** 0.652*** 0.294***
(7.35) (8.45) (3.20)
GMX[t-12,t-1] -0.020 -0.059** -0.039
(-0.93) (-2.21) (-1.14)
MIS × GMX[t-12,t-1] 0.030 0.079*** 0.049
(1.60) (3.39) (1.64)
Controls Yes Yes
Average Adjusted R2 3.7% 4.47%
Average Observations 2818 3422
Panel B: Firm-Level Return Predictability Based on Past Industrial Mispricing
Low NSENT High NSENT High - Low
MIS 0.346*** 0.634*** 0.288***
(7.15) (9.14) (3.41)
IMX[t-12,t-1] -0.078** -0.153*** -0.075
(-2.07) (-3.01) (-1.19)
MIS × IMX[t-12,t-1] 0.048** 0.113*** 0.065*
(2.05) (4.00) (1.77)
Controls Yes Yes
Average Adjusted R2 3.85% 4.61%
Average Observations 2707 3369
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Table 4.8: Firm-Level Return Predictability for Periods of High and Low State Sentiment
and Economic Activity
This table reports the Fama-MacBeth regression estimates for the subsamples of stocks formed based
on the previous month’s state sentiment or state macroeconomic activity variables. In Panel A, the
subsamples are formed by dividing the sample into two parts, based the state sentiment score for each
stock available at the end of the previous month. The subsamples in Panel B are constructed using the
most recent quarterly state macroeconomic activity index of Korniotis and Kumar (2013b) available from
the previous month. I then take the regression specifications in Table 4.3, and estimate them for each of
the two subsamples. The construction details of all variables are explained in Table 4.A.1. For brevity,
I exclude the intercept and the control variable estimates. All independent variables in the regressions
are standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1, and are winsorized at their 0.5
and 99.5 percentile levels. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation using
the Newey and West (1987) approach. The sample excludes penny stocks and covers January 1970 to
December 2017 for Panel B. Due to data constraints, for Panel A, the sample covers only 1980 to 2008.
Panel A: Dividing the Sample by State Economic Activity Index (SEA)
Low SEA High SEA High - Low
MIS 0.530*** 0.551*** 0.021
(9.49) (9.48) (0.30)
GMX[t-12,t-1] -0.027 -0.146*** -0.119**
(-1.14) (-2.67) (-2.00)
MIS × GMX[t-12,t-1] 0.030 0.105*** 0.075**
(1.69) (3.06) (1.94)
Controls Yes Yes
Average Adjusted R2 3.59% 3.63%
Average Observations 1699 1709
Panel B: Dividing the Sample by State Sentiment (SSENT)
Low SSENT High SSENT High - Low
MIS 0.471*** 0.486*** 0.015
(10.17) (9.96) (0.20)
GMX[t-12,t-1] -0.035 0 0.035
(-1.48) (0.01) (1.48)
MIS × GMX[t-12,t-1] 0.005 0.055** 0.050**
(1.00) (2.35) (2.09)
Controls Yes Yes
Average Adjusted R2 3.99% 4.17%
Average Observations 1530 1525
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Table 4.9: Robustness and Control for Limits to Arbitrage
Panel A presents the estimates of MIS×GMX[t-12,t-1] and MIS× IMX[t-12,t-1] interactions from Panels
A and B of Table 4.2, based on alternative samples or data filters. Panel B reports the estimates of the
interaction terms in Panel A after controlling for limits to arbitrage. I take the regression specifications in
Table 4.2 and add five proxies for limits to arbitrage and their interactions with MIS to each specification,
separately. ILLIQ is the illiquidity measure of Amihud (2002); SIR is the short interest ratio following
Hanson and Sunderam (2014); IVOL is the idiosyncratic volatility; log(ME) is the natural logarithm of
market capitalization; and IHOLD is the percentage of institutional holdings. Table 4.A.1 explains the
construction details for all variables. For brevity, I only report the interaction coefficients in both panels.
All variables are defined in Table 4.A.1. The sample period covers July 1963 to December 2017. *, **,
and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Basic Robustness
MIS × GMX[t-12,t-1] MIS × IMX[t-12,t-1]
Test Estimate (t) N Estimate (t) N
Baseline 0.045*** (3.20) 2,815 0.062*** (3.76) 2,732
Exclude price < $5 0.035*** (2.69) 2,223 0.054*** (3.39) 2,163
1963-1990 0.039** (1.99) 2,396 0.025 (1.10) 2,296
1991-2017 0.051** (2.54) 3,240 0.100*** (4.22) 3,175
Exclude highest size quintile 0.054*** (3.27) 2,221 0.073*** (4.02) 2,145
Exclude lowest size quintile 0.048*** (3.56) 2,283 0.064*** (3.83) 2,220
Expansion periods 0.053*** (3.17) 2,560 0.061*** (3.21) 2,488
Recession periods 0.076** (2.24) 1,671 0.089** (1.99) 1,565
Panel B: Controlling for Limits to Arbitrage Variables
Control for liquidity (ILLIQ) 0.047*** (3.04) 3,127 0.065*** (3.44) 3,043
Control for short interest (SIR) 0.054*** (3.42) 3,191 0.078*** (4.07) 3,101
Control for idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) 0.034** (2.46) 2,815 0.054*** (3.44) 2,732
Control for size (log(ME)) 0.042*** (2.97) 2,815 0.050*** (3.06) 2,732
Control for institutional holdings (IHOLD) 0.052*** (2.93) 3,263 0.091*** (4.39) 3,199
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Table 4.10: Robustness Simulations
This table presents the Fama-MacBeth regression results for MIS × GM[t-12,t-1] and MIS × IM[t-12,t-1]
interaction coefficients, based on 10,000 simulated samples of artificial state and industry allocations.
The model specification is the same as that in Panel B of Table 4.2. For each simulation, state and
industry allocations are shuﬄed among firms so that each firm has a state and industry that is different
from its original ones. Randomization is performed in a way that ensures there are the same number
of stocks in each state and industry group as there were originally in that group. The regressions are
then estimated based on artificial state and industry allocations to get the estimated coefficients. The
results include the original estimates, together with the summary statistics of the coefficients and the
t-statistics, based on simulations. Table 4.A.1 defines all the variables. The sample period covers July
1963 to December 2017.
MIS × GM[t-12,t-1] MIS × IM[t-12,t-1]
Coefficient t Coefficient t
Estimates Based on Sample Data:
Baseline 0.045 3.20 0.062 3.76
Simulations:
Mean 0.008 0.58 0.008 0.59
Standard Deviation 0.014 1.00 0.014 0.98
P1 -0.025 -1.72 -0.024 -1.67
P25 -0.001 -0.10 -0.001 -0.07
P50 0.008 0.59 0.008 0.59
P75 0.017 1.26 0.018 1.25
P99 0.040 2.92 0.041 2.88
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Table 4.A.1: Variable Descriptions
This table defines the main variables used in the empirical analysis.
Panel A: Mispricing Variables
Variable Name Source Description
GM[t-T,t-1] CRSP and
Compustat
This is defined in the same way as GMX[t-T,t-1], except stock s is
included in the Fama-MacBeth estimation sample.
GMX[t-T,t-1] CRSP and
Compustat
For each stock s and month t, this is defined as the estimated β1g co-
efficient from running the following Fama-MacBeth regression: Ri,τ =
β0g + β1gMISi,τ−1 +
∑N
n=1 βn+1gControlni,τ−1 + i,τ . The model is esti-
mated using monthly data from month t−T to month t−1. The sample
includes all stocks in stock s’s state, except stock s itself. States are de-
fined based on the firm headquarters location, available on Compustat.
IM[t-T,t-1] CRSP and
Compustat
This is defined the same as IMX[t-T,t-1] except that stock s is included
in the Fama-MacBeth estimation sample.
IMX[t-T,t-1] CRSP and
Compustat
For each stock s and month t, this is defined as the estimated β1g co-
efficient from running the following Fama-MacBeth regression: Ri,τ =
β0g + β1gMISi,τ−1 +
∑N
n=1 βn+1gControlni,τ−1 + i,τ . The model is esti-
mated using monthly data from month t−T to month t−1. The sample
includes all stocks in stock s’s industry, except stock s itself. Industries
are defined based on the FamaFrench 48 industry definitions.
LONG CRSP and
Compustat
Defined as a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a stock is in MIS
quintile 5, and 0 otherwise. MIS quintiles are defined by sorting all
stocks in the cross section at the beginning of every month, based on
the most recent MIS values available at the end of the previous month.
MIS CRSP and
Compustat
Following Stambaugh et al. (2015), MIS is the average of the decile
ranks of a stock, with respect to 11 prominent anomalies. Sorting for
each anomaly is performed at the end of every month. Deciles 1 and
10 include stocks that each anomaly strategy predicts will underperform
and outperform the most in the following month, respectively. Unlike
Stambaugh et al. (2015), I determine the decile cutoffs using my whole
sample, not just NYSE stocks. I require at least 5 non-missing anomaly
decile ranks to compute the MIS for a stock. The 11 anomaly strategies
considered are accruals (Sloan, 1996), asset growth (Cooper et al., 2008),
composite equity issues (Daniel and Titman, 2006), distress (Campbell
et al., 2008), gross profitability (Novy-Marx, 2013), investment-to-assets
(Titman et al., 2004), momentum (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993), net
operating assets (Hirshleifer et al., 2004), net stock issues (Ritter, 1991;
Loughran and Ritter, 1995), O-score (Ohlson, 1980), and return on as-
sets (Fama and French, 2006). I follow the detailed description of Stam-
baugh et al. (2012, 2015), together with the corresponding anomaly
literature, to replicate each strategy.
SHORT CRSP and
Compustat
Defined as a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a stock is in MIS
quintile 1, and 0 otherwise. MIS quintiles are defined by sorting all
stocks in the cross section at the beginning of each month, based on the
most recent MIS values available at the end of the previous month.
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Table 4.A.1: (Continued)
Panel B: Analyst Forecast, Sentiment and Economic Activity Variables
Variable Name Source Description
AFE IBES and
CRSP
Computed as the average of |(analystearningsforecast −
actualearnings)|/price, where price is the stock price at the be-
ginning of the forecast period. The average is computed using all
earnings forecasts for the most recent quarter announced over the past
3 months.
NOCOVERAGE IBES Equal to 1 if a stock did not have any analyst forecasts during the past
3 months and 0 otherwise.
DISPERSION IBES Standard deviation of analyst earnings forecasts for the most recent
quarter annouced over the past 3 months.
FE IBES Computed as the average of (analystearningsforecast −
actualearnings)/price, where price is the stock price at the be-
ginning of the forecast period. The average is computed using all











Index of macroeconomic activity calculated for each state quarter by
adding the standardized values of state income growth and housing col-
lateral, subtracting the standardized value of relative unemployment,







This is the investor sentiment index for each state, computed by taking
the first principal component of four time-series proxies for sentiment,
following Baker et al. (2012). The four sentiment proxies are as follows:
1-Volatility premium, defined as the ratio of the value-weighted average
market-to-book ratio of stocks in the top 3 state volatility deciles to
that of the stocks in the bottom 3 state volatility deciles. Volatility is
defined as the standard deviation of CAPM residuals estimated using
the past 12 months of returns. 2-The number of IPOs in that state
during the previous 12 months. 3-Average first-day returns of IPOs
during the past 12 months. 4-State turnover computed as the log of
total turnover (total dollar volume of all stocks headquartered in the
state over the year, divided by total capitalization at the end of the
prior year), detrended with the five-year moving average.
141
Table 4.A.1: (Continued)
Panel C: Firm Characteristics and Control Variables
Variable Name Source Description
B/M CRSP and
Compustat




The fraction of a stock’s outstanding shares held by institutional in-
vestors. I obtain the stock’s institutional holdings by aggregating the
positions of its institutional investors. If the Thomson Reuters database
does not have data on a particular stock, I set its institutional holdings
to zero.
ILLIQ CRSP This is the annual average of the daily ratio of absolute stock return to
daily dollar trading volume, following Amihud (2002).
IVOL CRSP Volatility of residuals obtained from running the four-factor model of
Carhart (1997) on daily returns for the most recent month.
ME CRSP Price times shares outstanding.
PRICE CRSP Monthly closing price.
RET[-1,0] CRSP Buy-and-hold return over the previous month.
RET[-12,-2] CRSP The prior year’s monthly compounded buy-and-hold return, skipping
the last month.
SHORTRATIO Compustat Average ratio of short interest to shares outstanding over the past 12
months.
TURN CRSP Total trading volume over the last month, divided by shares outstanding.
VOL CRSP Volatility of daily returns for the most recent month.
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Table 4.A.2: Mispricing Persistence Regressions
This table presents coefficient estimates from panel regressions of monthly hedge MIS portfolio returns
for each state and industry on average hedge MIS portfolio returns for that state and industry over the
previous 12 months. Hedge MIS returns for each state or industry group are defined as the average
returns of stocks in that group that have MIS values above the cross-sectional median minus the average
returns of those with MIS values below the cross-sectional median. The median MIS is based on the
whole cross section and not each individual state or industry. The definitions of state and industry
are the same as those used in GM and IM variables defined in Table 4.A.1. The regressions include
fixed effects for time and state or industry. t-statistics are based on standard errors double-clustered by
time and state or industry. The sample excludes penny stocks and covers the period from July 1963 to
December 2017. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable
State MIS Returns Industry MIS Returns
Past State MIS Returns 0.445**
(2.01)
Past Industry MIS Returns 0.587**
(2.08)
R2 10.62% 12.71%
Time Fixed Effects YES YES




My thesis explores various channels rooted in investor behavior that can explain puzzling
aspects of market mispricing. The foundation of my work is built upon the literature
showing market anomalies exhibit commonalities (e.g., Stambaugh et al., 2012, 2015;
Jacobs, 2016). In most cases, such commonalities reflect stock mispricing as they are
driven mostly by stocks facing barriers to arbitrage. My contribution is to highlight two
previously undocumented factors that can shed light on the dynamics of the common
mispricing-related component across market anomalies. These are investor preference
for skewness and firm geographic and industrial attributes.
In Chapter 2, I show that investor preference for skewness is a more consequential
phenomenon in asset pricing than has been reported. Stocks that are predicted to
underperform in anomalies are often those with the highest level of positive skewness in
the cross section. This feature attracts investors that are willing to pay a premium to hold
positively-skewed stocks and leads to underpricing. I apply this idea to the profitability
anomaly and observe that less profitable firms are in fact more positively skewed than
their more profitable peers. Also, in line with my conjecture, the premium associated
with profitability is considerably stronger among more positively-skewed stocks; however,
investor preference for skewness cannot fully explain the profitability premium. This is
because profitability is unlikely to be priced solely due to market mispricing (Ball et al.,
2015). Moreover, the premium associated with it is partly captured by systematic risk
factors (Novy-Marx, 2013).
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Next, in Chapter 3, in order to focus more on the mispricing-related part of
anomalies, I follow Stambaugh et al. (2015) and combine a range of prominent anomalies
to capture the common component reflecting mispricing. I find that skewness-loving in-
vestors overweight stocks that this measure indicates will underperform. Also, positively-
skewed stocks are the predominant set whose returns are predictable using the combined
anomaly measure. Therefore, I suggest that investor preference for skewness can, in fact,
explain a large part of the mispricing-related aspect of market anomalies.
Finally, in Chapter 4, I explore the implications of a firm’s geographic and in-
dustrial characteristics. These attributes are likely to attract common investor clienteles
and affect a firm’s susceptibility to mispricing, as captured by market anomalies. I show
that the mispricing levels of a firm’s geographic or industrial peers can predict how mis-
priced the firm will be in the future. This effect is relatively stronger for geography than
for industry, however, the two attributes tend to have complementary predictive power.
Geographic persistence in mispricing is concentrated in regions experiencing high
levels of investor sentiment. I argue that firms in specific regions are more prone to
market anomalies as their investor clienteles are relatively more over-optimistic and,
as a result, invest in overpriced stocks. On the other hand, industrial persistence in
mispricing is driven by stocks experiencing higher levels of analyst forecast errors. This
is in line with the argument that firms in certain industries are more prone to mispricing
as analysts covering that industry do a poorer job of distinguishing overpriced and
underpriced firms.
My studies contribute to the asset pricing literature on market anomalies. This
is primarily by highlighting that exploring investor behavior is crucial for understanding
anomalous patterns in stock returns. My research can be further developed in two main
ways. First, it would be interesting to explore how relatively sophisticated investors
such as short sellers or active funds react to eliminate market anomalies. In particular,
it is not clear whether overpriced stocks – which are the primary drivers of mispricing
– are impossible to arbitrage or institutions are unable or unwilling to invest in them
for other reasons. One could even discover that more sophisticated investors are a
part of the problem due to the same behavioral arguments. Second, my findings have
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a range of trading implications which might potentially yield profits after transaction
costs. Specifically, I speculate that investors trading on anomalies can improve their
performance by refining their strategies to take into account skewness, geography, and
industry. It would be fruitful to investigate empirically whether such strategies are
profitable and, if so, to what extent.
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